The many futures of Pakistan

PAKISTAN: UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF STATE AND SOCIETY - EDITED BY SYED FAROOQ HASNAT AND AHMAD FARUQUI

2008-05-22T22:31:00.000-07:00

Democracy Rules! Pakistan Blocks/Bans YouTube

2008-02-22T13:50:00.001-08:00

There's an old (from our youth :p) Bollywood song that goes "Main ro'oon ya hansoon; karoon mai kyaa karoon?!" or "Should I cry or laugh; To do, what do I do?"

Users subscribing to the Internet though the PTCL (Pakistan Telecom Corporation Limited, the semi- or formerly-government-owned corporation), in particular, have been getting the following message today if they tried to access YouTube:

-------------- Dear Internet Users Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (www.pta.gov.pk)has directed all ISPs of the country to block access to www.youtube.com web site for containing blasphemous web content/movies. The site would remain blocked till further orders from PTA. Meanwhile, Internet users can write to youtube.com to remove the objectionable web content/movies because this removal would enable the authorities to order un-blocking of this web site. Best Regards Manager Technical Assistance Center Micronet Broadband Pvt. Ltd. Islamabad -------------

For background, see:
http://www.teeth.com.pk/blog/2008/02/22/youtube-blocked-in-pakistan/
http://www.teeth.com.pk/blog/2008/02/22/vote-rigging-videos-in-karachi-could-this-be-why-youtube-is-blocked/
http://www.kidvai.com/windmills/2008/02/last-laugh.html

RIGGING OF ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN -PART 2

2007-12-23T18:08:00.000-08:00

VOA RADIO
DECEMBER 03, 2007

DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

RIGGING OF ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN -PART 1

2007-12-23T17:37:00.000-08:00

VOA RADIO
DECEMBER 03, 2007

DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

Into the marketplace with bejewelled limbs we go...

2007-11-08T02:43:00.000-08:00

... so said Faiz Ahmed Faiz, probably the most popular poet of revolution in the latter half of the 20th century in South Asia; Pakistan, India, and particularly on the Left.

South Asia has a very rich tradition of poetry, one which draws on both the spiritual tradition that gave the world Rumi and Khayyam, and the revolutionary spirit of the last century or two. And because of the Sufi tradition it is steeped in, allegory, depth of meaning, and multi-faceted verbiage is the norm, rather than the exception. The words "Aaj bazaar main pa-bajaolaan chalo..." are probably some of the most recognized word. The "jewels" being described are, for the uninitiated, the ball and chain of oppression. Here's the poet himself reciting the poem, with English sub-titles, followed by one of the best renditions of the poem with music, in this case with an overlay of dramatic video:

[You can read the piece by Dr. Adil Najam, where I first found this video, here.]

But wait, the Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists has sent out a poster that puts these words above a poster that just needs to be seen to be believed. You couldn't, as we say, make this stuff up:

Please check in regularly at WikiPakistan's Emergency 2007 pages:

http://pakistan.wikia.com/wiki/Emergency_2007

for updates. And contribute what input you can, participate in whichever way you can.

[My previous post on the issue, introducing the Emergency 2007 wiki pages, by the way, is here.]

Technorati tags applicable to this post: Pakistan - Emergency - Crisis PK

AMERICA BULLIES IRAN THROUGH SANCTIONS - OCT 26, 2007

2007-10-27T21:04:00.000-07:00

POSTED BY: DR FAROOQ HASNAT
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MOST BRUTAL PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN PAKISTAN’S HISTORY

2007-09-30T18:24:00.000-07:00

POSTED BY:

DR. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT
MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CHIEF JUSTICE CONQUERS CENTRAL AND SOUTH PUNJAB -FAROOQ HASNAT

2007-06-26T18:39:00.000-07:00

Living up to his tradition the Chief Justice of Pakistan received mammoth receptions when he visited the Central/South cities of the Punjab. His message for the supremacy of Law and the Constitution was widely applauded by huge masses that had gathered throughout his route of travel.

Are we not in a middle of a “revolution” of a unique magnitude?

Musharraf – It’s Time To Quit!

2007-05-30T15:24:00.001-07:00

Syed Farooq Hasnat
Adjunct Scholar
Middle East Institute
Washington, D.C.

- May 24th, 2007

- Even the most well-versed pundits of Pakistani politics did not expect the turmoil currently plaguing the country.

General Pervez Musharraf, who has ruled Pakistan for nearly eight years without much resistance, has suddenly found himself in the middle of a crisis. The government mishandled an otherwise routine judicial matter right from the start. First, the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was suspended. Next, the order was hurriedly withdrawn since it contradicted the spirit of Pakistan’s constitution. Then, the chief justice and his family were virtually put under house arrest, which provoked sharp condemnations from across the country.

Chaudhry has become a symbol of resistance against Musharraf’s dictatorial rule. A mass movement supporting Justice Chaudhry is spearheaded by lawyers and supported by opposition political parties and civil rights groups.

When the army staged a coup in October 1999, the major political parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had lost public support because of rampant corruption and misrule during their administrations. General Musharraf took advantage of public apathy and exiled both leaders - although for different reasons.

In recent months the high court under Chief Justice Chaudhry showed its strength when it dealt with habeas corpus issues and other matters that linked the government to corruption. In the past, the military governments easily intimidated Pakistan’s high courts. Notable among the court decisions that went against the regime was the issue of missing persons. At the time, it was feared that many Pakistani citizens were being handed over to the US intelligence agencies without providing valid evidence that they were involved in any unlawful acts. The second matter, which irked the military government, was the court’s nullification of the sale of the Pakistan Steel Mill, which was to be sold to a private party known to the Prime Minister, at a much cheaper price than its market value.

The Supreme Court’s new attitude is putting Musharraf on edge ahead of the 2007 elections, which are important for his survival as Pakistan’s leader. The court still has a number of contentious issues to decide that also make the military leadership nervous: Can the president be elected twice by the same assembly? Could the president remain in military uniform and still be president? Should the two exiled leaders Bhutto and Sharif be allowed to take part in the elections? There are also questions about the transparency of the elections and the dual nationality of the prime minister.

With the threat of an independent judiciary, Musharraf removed the chief justice, but he miscalculated the resilience of the judge who refused to resign. Musharraf also miscalculated the level of widespread public support for the opponent of his military rule. Street protests also exposed the vulnerability of his ruling Q League (the Pakistan Muslim League).

This is the first time in Pakistan’s 60-year history that a mass movement has been launched without the leadership of political parties. Now it’s the politicians who are following the dictates of the public mood and the legal community. This is also the first time that the army as an institution has been the target of public resentment. Previously, it was individual military personalities who were singled out for criticism.

Pakistan is not, however, politically “fragmented” along the lines of moderates and fundamentalists, as Musharraf has claimed. Recent events illustrate that the real contention is between those pushing for democratic reforms and those who support continued military rule.

Initially, the Musharraf regime thought public resentment would fizzle, mainly because of the summer heat and the political apathy that has prevailed for the last eight years. Instead, with every passing day the situation has worsened for Musharraf. Unprecedented public support for the judge and opposition to the government was apparent on May 5 when Justice Chaudhry was showered with rose petals by supporters as he journeyed from Islamabad to Lahore. The trip, which usually takes about five hours, took more than 26 hours as he greeted supporters along the way. Many had waited overnight to greet their new “symbol of resistance.”

On May 12, when the Chief Justice visited Karachi at the invitation of Sindh High Court Bar Association, an ethnic group, MQM — a staunch supporter of General Musharraf — blocked the judge from addressing the lawyers gathered there. Karachi erupted. After three days of riots, 42 people had died and more than 150 were injured. On May 16, General Musharraf gave his full backing to the MQM and showed no sympathy for the killings. The Karachi carnage has further weakened his military rule.

The general is left with few options for survival. He and his ministers have hinted at imposing a state of emergency or even Martial Law. He specifically stated that he is ready for extra constitutional measures to enhance his stay in power. But the mood of the people shows that such tactics will face widespread and stiff public resistance.

The only option left for General Musharraf is to form a neutral interim government and to hold free and open parliamentary elections. It’s time for him to quit - the army and the presidency.

WAR CLOUDS OVER IRAN

2007-04-16T10:07:00.000-07:00

February 17, 2007

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT
Adjunct Scholar
Middle East Institute
Washington, D.C.

Ever since the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran, the Bush administration hyped up its aggressive rhetoric towards that country, thus adding tensions to the already volatile region.

According to prudent opinions, including the US Congress, it is desired that the Bush administration and its European allies should engage Iran in a meaningful diplomacy, so that a mutually agreeable understanding can be reached. On the contrary, for last few months the Bush administration has exerted tremendous pressure on Iran - militarily, financially and politically.

In his January 29 interview on NPR (National Public Radio), Bush said that, “If Iran escalates its military action in Iraq to the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi people, we will respond firmly.” Immediately after this tough talk, a case was made by the military officials in Iraq that Iran provides deadly explosives to the “insurgents”, who are responsible for the killing of the American troops.

However, the Bush administration’s charge was met with scepticism by the media and the Congress. Amanda Johnson responded in the New York Times by saying: “What we should be shocked by is the Bush administration’s attempts to create yet another pretext for an unnecessary war, this time possibly with Iran”. On the other hand, Iran dismissed the accusations saying that the United States has already “decided on a policy and is trying to fabricate evidence if it cannot find one.”

The belligerent attitude of President Bush goes against the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, commissioned by the US Congress. The Group asked for a dialogue with Iran to further settle such hotspots of the Middle East, like Iraq, Lebanon and above all the Palestinian issue. The administration’s aggressive posture is also against the wishes of the public opinion, which is against any further surge of hostilities in the region.

Highly sceptical of the intensions of President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, the newly elected Democratic Congress decided to exert their part of the authority in the decision making process. In numerous Congressional Committee hearings, the members repeatedly issued caution to the Bush administration to refrain from hostilities against Iran. It has become quite obvious that on Iran the country has conflicting views.

There is a strong suspicion that if not stopped by the Congress, under one pretext or the other, the Bush administration is geared to go beyond just imposing UNSC sanctions against Iran. President’s long record of hostile attitude towards Iran goes back to his State of the Union speech of January 2002. In that address he had called Iran as a part of the “axis of evil” and condemned those “axis” countries for the alleged support for international terrorism and their “despotic” governments. The term by itself is a misnomer as no joint planning or coordination exists between the four mentioned countries – Iran, Iraq, Syria and North Korea, in their policies to support international terrorism. Nor was any evidence provided by President Bush to prove his allegation. Nevertheless, the rhetoric never ceased.
Hardly, a year before these serious charges Iran had held fair and free presidential elections, in which Mohammad Khatami, a moderate was re-elected as the President by a wide margin. To reduce the tensions, in 2003 the Iranian President proposed a comprehensive talks with the Bush administration on all issues of content. As according to the recent Washington Post report of February 14, this message was ignored and an opportunity was missed for the normalisation of relations between the two countries. The neocons in the Bush administration were too obsessed with Iran to pick up a conflict.

In recent months Iran had to face two pressures from the United States. First on their nuclear programme and when things got bad in Iraq, various allegations of interference were leveled against Iran. Many in the US argue that Bush administration does not have any concrete evidence of Iran’s interference in the Iraq conflict. The Iranian officials point out to the fact that their interference in Iraq will have negative repercussions on their country and therefore would not like to see Iraq being destabilised. Secondly, the Iraqi government has fairly good relations with the Iranians and it would be illogical to undermine such a regime in Iraq.

The remaining two years of the Bush administration will be testing for the American people as well as for the world community. Although the Democrat Congress will exercise its function of checks and balances but the President has the ability to create crises by improvising various methods or by creating conditions, in which the Congress has no option but to go along with the chief executive. Analogy can also be drawn with the failing of the US policy in Vietnam in the late 1960s, when President Nixon attacked Cambodia, without the knowledge of the Congress. Sensing the danger, the Washington Post in its editorial of February 13 opined that “before things get any more out of hand, President Bush needs to make his intentions toward Iran clear. And Congress needs to make it clear that this time it will be neither tricked nor bullied into supporting another disastrous war”.

Experience in Iraq and even Afghanistan demonstrates that superpower has its limitations and that the resistance can be much more stiff and lethal than anticipated. Iran is a large country with over 60 million population and is also more united and motivated than its two neighbours. Furthermore, any misadventure against Iran can prompt that country to destabilise the already precarious Iraq and Afghanistan. Secondly, Iran has a sufficient leverage in Lebanon and other parts of the Middle East and can create serious and long lasting problems for the United States.

In the interest of world peace and for America’s own sake, the US Congress and the people are likely to restrain the Bush administration and its neocon allies. The people of the United States stand for a dialogue, as the Baker-Hamilton Report recommends. It is the best way to resolve the issues and conflicts in the Middle East region.

Echoes of Iraq Study Group Report

2007-01-23T09:54:00.000-08:00

THE NATION
January 09, 2007

DR SYED FAROOQ HASNAT

Ever since James Baker and Lee Hamilton presented their bipartisan report to President Bush, the ongoing debate about Iraq increased manifold. The Iraq Study Group Report encouraged even those, who were hesitant to take definite stance on the Iraq war and to articulate their views in public. Prominent amongst them being, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. In an interview with CBS (Face the Nation), Powell opposed Bush administration’s expected plans to increase US troops in Iraq and said that the US government should instead talk directly with Iran and Syria, to stabilise the Middle Eastern region. He was joined by the incoming Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, who expressed similar views. The senator went on to say that he would oppose President Bush’s plan to accelerate the war in Iraq and would obstruct any effort to increase the already 140,000 troops present in Iraq. No matter how belligerent the Bush administration would like to be in Iraq, it will face a stiff resistance from the Democratic dominated 110 Congress, which is being convened on January 4, 2007.

The American people gave their decision against the continuation of war in Iraq, by defeating the Republican Party in the midterm congressional elections. This change led to a number of questions and options regarding the worsening situation in Iraq. However, the details and the kind of course, which the administration could adopt will be debated in the coming weeks and months. President Bush reacted to the report with caution but indicated that he regarded the findings of the report worth examining. However, his later meetings with the State Department and Pentagon officials indicate that his future course of action would not conform to the recommendations of this report. Although the report was commissioned by the US Congress, but it has no binding on the administration to implement, and it only has an advisory capacity. The strength of the report comes from the fact that all its ten members are persons of high caliber and above all it is bipartisan - half of the 10 members from each side of the political spectrum. The committee was chaired by James Baker, a former Secretary of State under President George H W Bush and Lee Hamilton was the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House International Relations Committee from early 1970s to 1993. Its members include Supreme Court retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor; William J Perry, a former Secretary of Defence in the 1990s and now Professor at Stanford University and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Secretary of State under President George H W Bush.

Different points of view are examined in this report; therefore it is considered by the American public as a consensus, representing all shades of opinion. Part of the report recognises this fact and says that the “US foreign policy is doomed to failure – as is any course of action in Iraq – if it is not supported by a broad, sustained consensus. The aim of our report is to move our country toward such a consensus.” This report in summary recommends that the American troops must come back in the first quarter of 2008. Although, no exact timetable is provided but many see it a kind of a time line which the US government should adopt. President Bush, on the other hand insist that there should be no time table and that the troops should only come back from Iraq, “after the job is done”. The administration can choose to ignore the advised crises management methods, but the report will certainly impact a new kind of pressure on the decision makers. After the recommendations of the report were announced, 70 per cent of the American people favoured military disengagement in Iraq. According to the NBC and Wall Street Journal survey, “seven in 10 say they want the new Congress to pressure the White House to begin bringing troops home within six months.”

In recent weeks, President Bush has been more forthcoming, in putting forward his plan, to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 30,000 to 40,000, for the purpose of taking control of the deteriorating situation. This is not what the report suggests. A veteran of Vietnam War, Congressman John Murtha asks the question that since the “United States has already lost the Iraq war”, therefore “what’s the point in sending another 40,000 troops?” Secondly, Bush administration’s belligerent posture towards Iran in recent Security Council sanctions indicate that his administration is not interested in incorporating regional powers like Iran and Syria, in any peace plan for the region. This attitude is contrary to the recommendations of the report which pleads with the administration to involve these two countries for any meaningful peace in Iraq and even to solve the Palestinian and Lebanese issues.

There is a widespread conviction amongst the Americans that the US forces are not going to achieve victory in Iraq and that the course must be changed, the troops brought back home and that the Bush administration should refrain from any such invasions, in the future. These are supplemented by a feeling that the war in Iraq was mishandled and mismanaged. Right actions were not taken at a right time and that the involvement in Iraq has reduced the American capacity to use its influence, elsewhere. The report in fact reflects the general view of the American public.
President Bush has lowered his criteria of victory and now he speaks about the bringing back of the troops, after “they finish their job” in Iraq. Too many observe this position of President Bush remains open-ended and conveys different meanings to different people. But at the same time he remains adamant that desired results will be achieved and to quote his favourite phrase, “the job will be done.” It is speculated that in the next few weeks he will announce his “new course” for Iraq.

Even if the recommendations of the Iraq Report are accepted, the exit of the American forces can not be sudden – it will be in stages, making certain that there is a façade of peace at least in the city of Baghdad. There will also be a desperate effort to train the Iraqi army and police, at an acceptable level. The Iraq Report also desires that the Iraqi people should be prepared to take over the responsibilities of their country.

There is at least one point of agreement between the report and the Bush administration. Both desire that Iraqi security forces and the political institutions are developed on the premises that they can be on their own, without any external help.

The opponents of the presence of the American troops in Iraq are of the view that it will be possible only, if a time table is forced upon the Iraqi government. They believe that if a time frame is not provided then the Iraqis will continue to rely more and more on the Americans, which in turn would obstruct their genuine efforts, to strength their institutions.

Since there is an indication that the American forces are expected to leave Iraq in 2008, therefore the Iraqis will have to expedite a governing system for their country. Iraq has been battered and destabilised by the shabby invasion and it will take plenty of effort and leadership to mend the damaged society.

A New Meaning of Conflicts: Some Lessons for Pakistan

2006-12-20T11:36:00.000-08:00

Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat
Scholar
Middle East Institute

Increasingly, the perceptions and rules governing post Second World War conflicts, border wars and even total wars have changed. In various situations the era of standing armies and the might of armament have become less relevant. The theorists and futurists of conflict can no longer rely on a raw data of the armed forces as well the destructive capacity of an armament. There are many more factors that must be scrutinized before we can come to an objective prediction. The tactics have changed and so has the focus of a war theater. Urban guerilla combat, hit and run, suicide bombing and more so the battles being fought in front of cameras, with night vision technology are the hard realities that is and will be considered in the future. Furthermore, it has been observed that low intensity conflicts take a heavy toll on the developed economies. Apart from the tactics, the ideological nature of global conflicts, particularly in the Middle East has received a new meaning. The Muslims see the support for westernization of their societies as a reminder of the European colonial onslaught through their “civilizing mission”. They perceive the agenda of “Enlightened Moderation” nothing but a foreign instrument of dominance, especially when the political institutions are made exception to this rule. The West, in turn sees the Muslim agitation as a threat to their “civilization” and “way of living”, as repeatedly presented by the Western politicians and media. In short, the rules of the game have changed.

The United States in Vietnam and again in Iraq, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and Israel in Lebanon wrestled against much smaller and weak opponents but were unable to pacify their adversaries. This was in spite of the fact that there was no match between the belligerents, in terms of military equipment and usage of defence technology. In such endeavors these otherwise powerful nations also loose their credibility of being invincible. Who could image that Israel would be subdued, when in the past they were able to rout the combined armies of the Arab countries, in just six days. Surely, these setbacks have reduced the capacity of global and regional powers to take or influence any similar endeavors, in the future. The United Sates found itself completely incapacitated in the Lebanon crises and the lingering Palestinian issue, mainly because of its being bogged down in Iraq. In all these situations it is the stronger power that suffered ultimate defeat in a sense that it failed to achieve its goals for which aggression was launched. On the other hand, though weak entities suffered tremendous human loss and misery, but it is the ultimate that counts.

In three out of the four mentioned conflicts the tactics of widespread suicide bombing was and is being used only in Iraq. There is some exception in another war theater in Afghanistan where the conflict still goes on and therefore a final assessment has still to come. The suicide tactics, though deplorable is erroneously being seen by the West as a part of a Muslim ideology and religion. The reality is that basically suicide bombings are a European invention by an anarchist, Joseph Conrad, who introduced it in his novel “Secret Agent” (1907). The concept was used as a battle tactic, by Japanese Kamikaze, during the Second World War and there were some instances from the Germans, as well. Later on, the Tamil Tigers used this method against the government of Sri Lanka. As we understand today, it is primarily a tool of stateless groups, who are otherwise out numbered and outgunned by their adversaries.

The United States under President Bush sees global conflicts in a changed perspective. Well know Bush doctrine points out towards a notion of a “preemptive strike”, meaning that a country can be attacked and even destroyed, if there is a suspicion that in the future it can pose a threat to the American interests. Using the pretext of Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction Iraq was attacked in March-April, 2003. Even when it came to be known that there were no weapons of such kind, nor Saddam had any links with al-Qaeda, the justification to continue the conflict got another names like “regime change” and “establishing a democratic system”. The conventional wisdom as established by the U.N. charter is that a country cannot resort to war unless attacked, in actual terms and its national sovereignty threatened.

In another war theater, the Israelis knew no limits when under the pretext of freeing two of its solders devastated Lebanon and killed more than 500 children and an equal number of innocent women. Both these conflicts took a heavy toll on human lives, as thousands were displaced and their homes destroyed. It is estimated that in Iraq more than half a million Iraqi civilians have lost their lives with many more injured, while in Lebanon more than 1000 died in just 30 days of relentless aerial bombing. In spite of all the killings and destruction, both the United States and Israel remained far from victory. The stubbornness and reliance of the small groups send a message that future conflicts and wars will be of different nature – where huge armies, armament and advanced military technology will take a back seat.

MIT professor Noam Chomsky and co-author Professor Gilbert Achcar points towards the new implications of inter-state conflicts in their recent book, “Perilous Power:” The authors observe that first; religion is being used in the recent conflicts, as a vehicle for political and economic interests. Secondly, fundamentalism is not confined to the Muslim combatant groups, alone. It is also very much “a powerful Christian strain as it exists in the US that has enormous influence over right wing Republican-led governments.” The authors acknowledge that fundamentalism has become a global affair, spread over nearly all societies around the globe – a phenomenon that came into focus just over the last two decades. This view is supplemented by Reza Aslan in his book “There is no god but God”. He cites one of many examples where the global conflicts are seen by the fundamentalists, in the West, as between good and evil. He writes, “When the Republican senator from Oklahoma, James Inhofe, stands before the U.S. Congress and insists that the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are not political or territorial battles but ‘a contest over whether or not the word of God is true,’ he speaks, knowingly or not, the language of the Crusades.”

The changed perspective of conflicts requires that nations like Pakistan with huge defence budget and top-heavy army should reconsider their security options. As the examples of Iraq and Lebanon shows the new wars can be fought successfully, without the shining insignias of the elite class. Genuine requisites to protect a nation include the strength of people through their well build civil institutions as well as the requirement of the involvement by the people in the decision making process.

The mystery of Pak-Iran ties

2006-12-04T13:39:00.000-08:00

THE NATION
December 03, 2006

By Dr Syed Farooq Hasnat

While talking to the Iranian media delegation, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said on November 6, that his country supports Iran to acquire nuclear technology and that Pakistan desires to develop its relations with Iran, still further. The Prime Minister elaborated that Pakistan was serious in the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project as it would strengthen trade between the two countries. Repeating the rhetoric in the same tone Foreign Minister Kasuri assured the Iranian delegation that Pakistan opposes the American use of force against the Iranian nuclear sites. On another occasion Mr Aziz said, “we think Iran should not proliferate. We’re against production of any nuclear weapons in the region. We think Iran does have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under IAEA safeguards and guidelines.”

It goes without saying that neither the PM nor his Foreign Minister design Pakistan’s domestic or foreign policy. The fixation of the establishment with a single power has paralysed the policy makers to consider the future developments that would emerge after the international war against terrorism concludes or subsides. There is no blueprint for days when Pakistan will struggle for partners and reliance, as prevalent high dependency policy, projected and perused zealously, would whither away, as it would not find any partners.

When it comes to Pakistan-Iran relations there is much more than what actually is being said by the establishment or its proxies. It is this aspect which worries a common Pakistani who would like to see Pakistan as a sovereign and viable state, free to choose its friends and allies in a long term perspective. It is being felt that a traditional high priority that every government attached to its relations with Iran is no more there. The closeness of the two countries is reflected well by President Ayub Khan, who said while addressing the Iranian Senate in 1959 that, “Our two nations are no strangers to each other, our friendship is nothing new… Your classics are our classics. Your heroes are our heroes. It is not only through a common culture and religious heritage that our nations are linked together—historically we have been one nation in the past, geographically we have a common border and ethnologically we are of the same stock.”

The point of departure from what was said in the late 1950s comes when the present establishment does not posses enough sensitivity and sophistication to understand the realities of closeness between the two countries. The lowest ebb of relations between the two countries came when in mid-1990s the Pakistani establishment developed close ties with the Taliban and openly supported them in their battles against the Iran backed Northern Alliance. The darkest moment came when nine Iranian diplomats were killed by the Taliban in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998. Iranians accused Pakistan of not doing enough to stop the murder of their diplomats, although assurances ware given by the Pakistani government for the safety of the diplomats. A crises situation arose in the region when 200,000 Iranian troops massed on the Afghan border supported by amour, helicopters and other war related logistics were put in place. Although an armed clash was avoided, it left yet another blotch on the weakling Pakistan-Iran relations.

Before the Taliban became Pakistan’s obsession and consequentially an icon of the flawed policy, Pakistan maintained more than cordial relations with Iran. As mentioned above, Iran was regarded as closest to Pakistan’s history, culture, language, and heritage and security interests, along with Turkey. People of Pakistan still recall the 14 September 1965 visit of the Iranian Prime Minister to Rawalpindi, along with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He carried a message of support from the Iranian government, for Pakistan’s conflict with India.
Iran co-ordinated its policies with Pakistan, opposing the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a visible tilt towards Iran in its war against Iraq. Both the countries are partners in an economic regional organisation, Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO), a forerunner of Regional Co-operation for Development (RCD), which was established in 1964 along with Turkey. Within the regional organisational framework both countries vow to continue to co-operate with each other on various matters of mutual interest, but there is hardly a substantial dividend on the ground. Both the countries have signed scores of MoUs and agreements but very little have come out in a concrete manner. Even the well-projected and well-advertised gas pipeline is under jeopardy. The trade volume between the two neighbouring countries remains disappointingly low and no serious parameters are set to correct this deficiency.

Despite of difference of policies between Pakistan and Iran on the Taliban issue, after 2002 both the countries struggled to maintain good workable relations. There are stronger extractions that do not allow these countries to harmonise with each other. There is hardly a high level contact between the two countries or a strong desire to improvise methods for closer ties. General Musharraf has not visited Iran since 1999 and so has any Iranian high official after President Mohammad Khatami’s visit in December 2002. There seems to be a detracting pull that is tearing both the countries apart from each other. A number of analysts are of the view that there is a powerful lobby in Islamabad which has succeeded in keeping Pakistan away from Iran and they believe that it is the same lobby which is creating hindrances in the gas pipeline and other co-operative measures between the two neighbours.
It is a wrong assumption to believe that Iran’s closer ties with India is a factor in distancing of relations between Iran and Pakistan. First, Pakistan itself for obvious reasons is going out of its way to normalise relations with India, even making adjustments in its principled position. Secondly, Indian stance in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) against Iran’s nuclear programme has further proved that this premise is not correct. There are other reasons that become a hindrance between the two countries to normalise their relations.

The confined people of Pakistan are mere spectators in this big puzzle. The clueless masses just ponder that who allowed these precious links to wither away and what kind of self-interests are responsible for inflicting this damage to the Pakistani vital objectives and above all who has taken away all the warmth for the Iranian people.

email: hasnatf1@yahoo.com

AMAZON BOOK REVIEW - "IN THE LINE OF FIRE"

2006-11-09T12:23:00.000-08:00

FROM THE BARREL OF THE GUN

November 6, 2006

Reviewer: Syed Farooq Hasnat

In his bibliography General Pervez Musharraf has presented himself as a staunch ally of the United Sates, in the war against terror and even beyond. His perception and conviction is that not only he is invincible but also irreplaceable, as long as he gets the blessings of the Bush administration. His intentions are clear and vocal. He shows no interest nor relates to the sentiments of his countrymen and does not look for a popular support from the domestic scene. His authority comes from the barrel of the gun and that suffice him.

In his book Musharraf stands out as a person who lacks discipline and sensibility. He proudly tells us, in a most sadistic manner, at least two instances while he was growing up. One is in which he and his friends bullied an elderly bald person and second his blasting an explosive at the house of aging and weak warden. He shows no regrets for these rather inhuman acts. The reader is also astonished to learn the lack of discipline the writer admits while he was in the army - one being a clear case of cheating and another was walking away from a highly tense situation at the borders in 1965. One wonders that how such a person achieved the distinction of being the commander in chief of the armed forces. It is no wonder that when the elected Prime Minister fired him, he refused to be removed and staged a military coup, instead.

In his bibliography General Musharraf informs the reader about the misadventure of Kargil and stresses that he informed the then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif about his plans to take possession of the Indian held territory in Kashmir. Nawaz Sharif on his part refutes Musharraf's side of the story by saying that he was never informed of the plans about Kargil. A close analysis of the events show that it was General Musharraf's idea to move ahead and he did so without adequate planning or assessing the fallout of the military action. It remains doubtful if he ever thought fit to inform the Prime Minister because in his judgment, as we gather from other sources, the Army was beyond the civilian control and that he was not answerable to the people's representatives.

General Musharraf in his bibliography highlights the nuclear proliferation by a Pakistani scientist but does not come up with any defense against the accusations that some greedy Army generals were involved in these unlawful acts. Although he admits that the centrifuges were carried on C-130, an aircraft which is under Army's control.

"In the line of fire" informs the reader about million of dollars that were received by the Pakistani government from the Bush administration, for handing over terrorist suspects. In his CNN appearance General Musharraf said that it is not the government but some people who received that money - contradicting his own writings. He remains defenseless in this matter as he has been accused of turning Pakistan into a client State. These and other facts have been removed from the Urdu version of the bibliography.

The reader is horrified to know that while staging a coup, his loyal soldiers came very near to kill the newly appointed Commander-in-Chief and other generals, who were promoted at that time. The happenings as described by General Musharraf are frightening as for the first time the people of Pakistan become aware that the coup had serious risks and potential of a widespread bloodshed.

General Musharraf accuses Islamic fundamentalists for a number of assassination attempts against him. The details that he gives of the Air Force and Army personals' involvement lead the reader to believe that there is more to that. It seems that apart from the Islamic fundamentalists there were also nationalists who might have conspired against him.

The main weakness of the book remains when the author does not tell his readers about the general Pakistani impression that the Army generals have become highly corrupt and non-professional. Nor does he explain the military reasons for the humiliating defeat of the Army in 1971 East Pakistan war.

SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, Ph.D.
Columbia, Maryland

THE KILLINGS IN PAKISTAN

2006-11-02T15:35:00.000-08:00

By

Dr. Syed Farooq Hasnat

On October 3oth, the Pakistan army, as according to its own admission, wittingly killed scores of Pakistanis in the Khar village, located in Bajaur Agency, near the Afghan border. The army spokesman Major General Shaukat Sultan, gloating over the “success” claimed that in this operation gunship helicopters and precision weapons were used. Some eyewitnesses claimed that it was the American Predator Drone that fired missiles at the site, while the Pakistani official said that the Americans only provided intelligence. The Bajaur political officials barred local and representatives of foreign news agencies from entering the vicinity where this massacre took place. A noted newspaper editorial remarked that “the decision to ban journalists’ entry into the Bajaur agency is not prudent. It suggests that the government may have much to hide.”

In the first week of October, Foreign Minister Kasuri was reported to have said that Pakistan has made clear (to the U.S.) that it would not kill its own people in the tribal areas. He said that “use of military force is not the solution of problems and political matters are resolved through talks.” A CNN interview quoted his saying that “…there’s a time when not just brawn but brains are also needed,” Foreign Minister told CNN’s Late Edition. “Sometimes what happens is that when you have acts of violence you end up alienating the local population.”

The attack at Khar came as a surprise and as a tragic incident, for the people of Pakistan. The residents of Bajaur were shocked as they were gearing up for a North Waziristan type peace agreement. The signing ceremony was to take place after few hours.

It should be pointed out that the American officials have been critical of the previous peace deal between the government of Pakistan and the residents of the tribal areas, in North Waziristan. Apparently, the Bush administration demands the Pakistan government to use high handed methods against its own people. No matter, why and how it happened, there is no excuse for killing more than 80 Pakistanis. The manner in which this attack was conducted and the approach through which the government spokesmen justified it, raises lots of questions and doubts. A renowned Human Rights Organisation Amnesty International issued a statement saying that “if these killings were deliberate and took place without first attempting to arrest suspected offenders, without warning, without the suspects offering armed resistance, and in circumstances in which suspects posed no immediate risk to security forces, the killings are considered extrajudicial executions in violation of international human rights law.”

There is enough evidence by the foreign and Pakistani journalists that there were children at the premises and that the air attack was more than from the Pakistani air force. As mentioned earlier just after few hours a peace treaty was going to be signed with the tribal elders, on the same pattern as that of Waziristan. Part of the North Waziristan deal read, “There will be no target killing and no parallel administration in the agency. The writ of the state will prevail in the area”. Those who carried out December 30 Bajaur killings did so to sabotage peace in the tribal areas and as a consequence the unity of Pakistan is undermined and Army’s image is further tarnished.

Some analysts like Hassan Abbas argue that a high percentage of Pashtoon representation in the Army led to the Waziristan agreement. While others agree that in reality the Army suffered a “defeat” at the battle ground. According to government’s own admission more than 700 of its men lost their lives. The Army just fled as they have done before, in East Pakistan and Kargil. This was in spite of the fact that more than 80,000 Pakistani military troops are deployed along the tribal areas of the Afghan border. It was believed at that time that the best option for the establishment was to talk to the tribesmen through their representatives.

Another category of arguments goes that it was a pro Taliban faction with which the government entered into an agreement in Waziristan. The Taliban of the 1990s were prompted and encouraged by the Army and the tribes were made to believe that by supporting the Taliban they were helping the Pakistan Army, if not Pakistan, itself. Then, came that famous somersault in 2001. Any expert on human psychology would agree that it’s not an easy matter for the groups with conviction (instilled or otherwise) to turnaround and change their opinion, overnight. The change in attitudes comes through dialogue and persuasion. The use of force in such circumstances is counter productive and harmful for the unity and strength of the country.

There have been so many blames as well as blunders assigned to the Pakistan Army that it has become indefensible even for a relentless ally of the establishment to validate their performance. It is unfortunate that a national institution has lost its professionalism to a great extent. The obvious reason being the heavy involvement of the generals in politicking and their greed for wealth and other undue privileges (See the findings of Hamood ur Rehman Commission Report).They have too many stakes to guard – strict adherence to professionalism becomes the last option.

The crux of the matter is that one person is playing havoc with the civil, military and social institutions of Pakistan. His most serious crime in the eyes of many Pakistanis is that apart from tearing down the national institutions he is also deforming the language, culture, heritage and above all the sovereignty of Pakistan

jawaid

2006-08-14T02:18:00.000-07:00

jawaid: "would "

Dhaikhaingay; Lazim Hai kay Hum Bhee Dhaikhaingay

2006-05-17T11:32:00.000-07:00

Adil Najam's Pakistan- Based on Faiz Ahmed Faiz's "Hum Daiykain Gay".
6 minutes and 35 seconds
April 24th, 2006

Here's a personal testament from one Pakistani about his country. It's also a very interesting piece of electronic art incorporating one of the most popular pieces of Urdu poetry written in the 20th Century:

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-6291983484610119600&q=pakistan

Technorati tags applicable to this post: Urdu - Faiz - Pakistan

PhotoBlogging Cartoon Protests in Karachi

2006-02-15T20:14:00.000-08:00

As the protests against "Those Cartoons"j move ("spread" doesn't seem appropriate) into Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, Cemendtaur is covering them on the Karachi Photo Blog. He's posting reports from the day on the Photo Blog. You can start at:

http://karachiphotoblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/cancel-your-trip-danish-cartoonists.html

and following on from there:

http://karachiphotoblog.blogspot.com/

Pakistani "Reaction" to "Those Cartoons"

2006-02-15T13:41:00.000-08:00

I am trying to follow up with real journalists on the ground in the region on this. Can any readers help? I am also posting this on my personal blog:

http://ifaqeer.blogspot.com/2006/02/pakistani-reaction-to-those-cartoons.html

Would appreciate some help.

My point is this:

Daal main kuch kaala hai. How do we go from this:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4688624.stm

to this:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4715084.stm

in a few days? And the recent reaction has been mainly in Islamabad and Peshawar; places that are the least dense population centers but have different political context than our larger population centers in Lahore and Karachi. (Yes, I know Lahore has had riots. But how long after the issue hit the international front pages?) Is it this:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4716762.stm

Window into Pakistan; The Karachi Photo Blog

2006-02-14T02:45:00.000-08:00

Friend and fellow writer/blogger Cemendtaur is in Pakistan for a while and has a photoblog providing a rather nuts and bolts stream from The Land of the Pure:

http://karachiphotoblog.blogspot.com/

My favorite post is the very first one; scroll all the way down to the bottom of:

http://karachiphotoblog.blogspot.com/2006_01_01_karachiphotoblog_archive.html

PS, February 15th, 2006: As a postscript to that review, almost as if on cue in the last couple of days, there've been some reports of a McDonald's being torched in Pakistan. The only thing I can say for now is that the latter report seems to be from Islamabad, while the picture above is of the Mickey D's in Karachi.

IRC Briefing on Earthquake relief--live updates

2006-02-02T19:20:00.000-08:00

I am at the IRC briefing and will be posting updates on my blog--and will try to do as much as I can real-time:

http://iFaqeer.blogspot.com

Kashmir Banay Ga...

2006-01-26T02:01:00.000-08:00

As I have always said, in any situation where a duopoly (or any other small, finite, number of players) rules the roost, the thing that most scares the folks that own the "market" is the possibility that someone might wise up to the idea that they can operate outside of their control. Whether it is the US two party system; or our college days in Pakistan when the ethnic militants and the Islamist militants ruled our campus at the point of a gun, anything that showed any promise was often greeted with a very loud "Listen; you just can't survive as an independent."

And as my brother's favourite political quotation goes "Don't believe anything until it has been officialy denied." Here's the official denial that Kashmir can go it alone:

http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?content_id=86616

Don't get me wrong; I am very patriotic Pakistani and avidly for peace between the two wonderful countries I and my wife belong to. But anyone or anything that reminds me of those Kalashnikov-toting Jamat-e-Islami activists or equally earnest representatives of my own ethnic organization that tried to shut down our efforts to organize concerts and the like at NED University in Karachi just rubs me the wrong way. There's gotta be a better way of convincing the Kashmiris you love them and will do best by them.

Though you do have to give Gen. Saab credit for being honest about why and independent Kashmir is not a possibility.

[A version of this has also been published on my personal blog.]

Outsourcing Plastic Surgery...to Pakistan

2006-01-24T16:18:00.000-08:00

This came in on one of the mailing lists I am on. Interesting form of offshoring/outsourcing, no? Comments? I guess the US-based--and particularly in Silicon Valley--is not mature enough to get to where they are doing things like this...

LONDON, Jan. 23 (UPI) -- The number of Pakistani women returning to their home country from England for discount plastic surgery with no waiting is on the rise.
Dr. Abdul Hameed, the president of the Pakistani Association of Plastic Surgeons, told The Independent the trend began four years ago when doctors noticed "waves of British clients" coming during the summer and winter holiday seasons. About 400 women were visiting the country to visit families and include some cosmetic surgery every year.
"The women know that the waiting lists for good cosmetic surgery in London are maybe three months long," he said. "In Pakistan, there is no waiting list. We do them whenever we get them."
Nose jobs, tummy tucks, liposuction and breast enlargements are the favored treatments for many, Hameed said.
Pakistan has about 70 plastic surgeons, mostly in Islamabad, Lahore or Karachi.

http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060123-011334-4586r

Though another story about a non-IT spin on Offshoring/Outsourcing also came in yesterday, oddly enough, on the same list and, come to think of it, it is a list for people in Pakistan. I guess for them there's life besides IT. Which is reassuring, actually:

LAHORE, January 22 (Online): The Tools, Dies and Moulds Center in Karachi will be equipped with 100 seats of UGS' NX Software for Computer-Aided-Design (CAD) and Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM) Systems for teaching, training and developing human resources for the rapidly growing engineering industry in Pakistan.

http://paktribune.com/news/index.php?id=131878

Of Balochistan, Civil Wars, and Accountable Governments

2006-01-04T03:09:00.000-08:00

There's a article on the Internet by an academic at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign, titled "Should Pakistan Be Broken Up?" and dated January 1, 2002. You can read it directly (google it if the link here doesn't work) or go to www.saveindus.org and follow the link from there.

Every once in a while, or should I say at least once in the life cycle of each mailing list related to Pakistan, this piece comes up and is discussed. This happened recently on a list I am on. Of course, the discussion of that list took an arc that is now often very familiar: some took the position that it was anti-Pakistan; others discussed the greviances of various groups that were mentioned in the article--or not; inevitably the Civil War came up. And then one person chimed in with the "why are we discussing this; why don't we discuss real issues?" I think the words "negative attitude" came up, too."

Here's part of what I quoted in reply.

"Closing one's eyes to unpleasant truths OR lies that are circulating out there is not good for anybody--whether you want to defend your country or whether you want to fight injustices that you think are being or have been done.

I just pray that more of us would try to understand what grievances some of our fellow countryfolk have, so we can discuss them, address them, and either dispel them as not necessary or remedy them, if they are based on real situations. Outsiders being able to divide a nation, a group, or a community only works when they can use/exploit people within who have grievances that are not being addressed. That's how Bangladesh was born. That's why we had another civil war we seldom talk about in the 70s in Balochistan. And, if I may say so, that's how Pakistan itself was born: because--justifiably or not--the community felt they would not be able get a fair shake in a united South Asian state after the British left.

I consider myself a very patriotic Pakistani and a believing Muslim, but as far as I am concerned, the interests or continued existence of a given country/nation-state/geo-political entity is not more important than the basic rights and well-being of individual humans and communities of citizens. If a citizen or a community feels that a government or state has become oppressive, people have not just a right, but a responsibility to try to correct that: working within the system where at all possible, but not ruling out more extreme measures. That's the understanding of the ideal of Pakistan I was brought up with (see the Objectives Resolution or any number of documents); that's the understanding of Islam I was brought up with (see Hazrat Abu Bakar's "Acceptance Speech" as Caliph, for example; and Bibi Ayesha, for example, did not sit quietly when she thought the government was not doing the right thing ;and then we have the example of the Hasnain...); and that's the understanding of good governance and democracy I was brought up with (see the American Declaration of Independence, the preamble to any of the constitutions Pakistan has had...)."

[NB: I have posted a version of this entry on my personal blog.

A South Asian Union

2006-01-01T14:06:00.000-08:00

During the year 2006, I hope the leaders of all South Asian nations will begin to think seriously about creating a South Asian Union akin to the European Union, where the national boundaries have almost become meaningless.

We have thousands of years of common history between the peoples who now reside in the nation states of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

Admittedly, some of it is violent history but a lot more of it is not. There have been long spells of peaceful co-existence in the past. If theEuropeans, with their intense history of hatred and violence, can "turn their swords into ploughshares," why can't we.

Having learnt from the excesses of the distant and not too distantpast, we should move toward a vision of shared humanism. We should foster an inclusive vision that allows for diversity of ideologies and lifestyle, not an exclusive vision that dictates what everyone will do in their personal and public lives. In other words, we should use the energy released by the start of a new year to transcend this drift toward authoritarianism, nationalism and militarism that is rife in South Asia and most certainly in our beloved Pakistan.

With best wishes to everyone for the New Year!

More Re: Dr. Amartya Sen

2006-01-01T04:04:00.000-08:00

A while back on this blog, I had mentioned a post on my own blog which mentioned Dr. Amartya Sen's description of Pakistan's Civil Society. There were a couple of other things in that interview of his that I have been wanting to draw attention to and have now placed a short post on my personal blog doing exactly that. Please take a look.

Role of the Military in Disasters...and that of the World Bank

2005-10-31T03:10:00.000-08:00

I have posted a couple of new entries on my blog, and a new PodCast on Azad Karachi Radio:

Azad Karachi Radio Program 002 now available

2005-10-20T05:04:00.000-07:00

The second program of a new project I am working with Cemendtaur on has just been uploaded. Please take a look and tell us what you think:

Azad Karachi Radio is an Urdu language audio program available on the web. Published under the Azad South Asia banner, this program covers, politics, poetry, and life. The first two programs are now available at:

http://AzadKarachiRadio.blogspot.com

You can subscribe using podcasting software using the address:

http://feeds.feedburner.com/AzadKarachiRadio

Azad Karachi Radio is also available for online listening via Yahoo!s new (Beta) Podcasting service at:

http://podcasts.yahoo.com/series?s=3d848ad579b260b163d17218e7fcbad5

Please send comments to me at iFaqeer@gmail.com

Pakistan's Civil Society Shines

2005-10-19T03:23:00.000-07:00

Just posted something on my personal blog that folks might want to read:

http://ifaqeer.blogspot.com/2005/10/pakistans-civil-society-shines.html

Earthquake victims angry at gov't reassurances

2005-10-13T21:10:00.000-07:00

Daily Times - Site Edition
Friday, October 14, 2005
Victims still cut off, dismiss aid promise
* Soldiers scour mountains for quake victims * UN official calls situation desperate * Aid arrived too late, say Balakot survivorsGHARIDUPATTA: In parts of Pakistan still cut off five days after Saturday’s earthquake, people angrily dismiss government reassurances that help is on the way as the army struggles to clear landslides blocking roads.The confirmed death toll from Saturday’s quake was 25,000 on Thursday, but some local officials and politicians say it could exceed 40,000.Muzaffarabad was devastated and outlying areas suffered huge damage and numerous casualties, but most parts have yet to be reached as landslides triggered by the quake have blocked or swept away roads.A Reuters news team on Thursday trekked up Jhelum Valley, crossing six big landslides and passing numerous rock falls on a 10-kilometre stretch of road to reach the small market town of Gharidupatta, 25 km east of Muzaffarabad.While army helicopters have evacuated most of the injured, residents say they have received no aid.Pakistani troops raced on Thursday to reach remote parts of earthquake-hit Azad Jammu and Kashmir where no relief workers had set foot and thousands are feared dead.Soldiers in their hundreds lined up at a field in the city for their turn to board a helicopter bound for isolated villages in the Neelam Valley.About 30 kilometres northwest of Muzaffarabad in Balakot, which was also totally destroyed by the quake, villagers were walking in with their wounded from the surrounding mountains.“No search team came to our village. Most people have fled and there are only the injured left. Nothing came by helicopter either,” said Zaman, 28, who said he came from “the other side of the mountain” in the village of Bahngia.In the remote town of Bagh, the centre of a district with some 390,000 people in Azad Kashmir, Maj Khalid Hussain said he could not count the dead.“We have suffered massive loss, but we cannot give you an exact figure. Presently the biggest task of the army is to restore road links to the hundreds of villages which are cut off,” he said.The people of Hajira and adjacent areas have appealed to the Pakistani and Azad Kashmir governments as well as donor agencies to help earthquake victims in the area.UN disaster coordination chief Jan Egeland, who visited Muzaffarabad, which was near the epicentre of the quake in Azad Kashmir, said relief workers were facing unparalleled difficulties in the Himalayan region.South Asia’s earthquake was more devastating than last year’s Indian Ocean tsunami in terms of the number of homeless and destruction to infrastructure, a WHO official said on Thursday.The Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) on Thursday confirmed that the death toll from Saturday’s earthquake had risen to 25,188 dead and 53,001 injured.The NWFP Crisis Management Centre said on Thursday that the death toll in the NWFP had reached 11,531, Daily Times correspondent reported.Two additional US military CH-53 helicopters arrived on Thursday while an eight-member Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) arrived in Islamabad on Wednesday, a Daily Times correspondent reported.The Water and Power Ministry was told on Thursday that 30 percent of the transmission lines of the Balakot and Battal grid stations had been erected and electricity restored.The World Food Programme said on Thursday that it would divert 65 trucks from its operation in Afghanistan to Pakistan’s quake-hit areas, sending them across the border with tonnes of food and other aid.Two transport aircraft left Japan for Pakistan on Thursday as part of an emergency assistance team of 120 troops and three helicopters to distribute supplies to earthquake victims, officials said.Two freight trains carrying relief goods for earthquake victims will be arriving in Rawalpindi today (Friday).The bodies of a PIA captain and his wife and an unidentified foreigner were evacuated from the rubble of Margalla Towers on Thursday. The death toll in the towers’ collapse has risen to 42.The number of health workers helping quake victims need to be doubled or even tripled in some locations to help the estimated 50,000 injured people there, WHO said on Wednesday.About 8,000 schools were damaged or totally destroyed by Saturday’s quake, the NWFP education minister said on Thursday.Meanwhile, rescue teams were packing their bags in Muzaffarabad late on Thursday, as attention is turned to bringing relief to desperate survivors. agencies
Home Main

Information Site on Earthquake

2005-10-08T03:13:00.000-07:00

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with WikiPakistan. (See here and here.)

I have set up a page on WikiPakistan, which can be used to gather information, provide links, etc.:

http://pakistan.wikicities.com/wiki/Earthquake_10-05

Suggestions/Requests for information:

* Specific information about towns, cities, etc. and how much they have been affected.
* Database of missing people and informatioin about people found.
* First hand accounts of events, photographs (phone camera pix welcome)
* Relief efforts, fundraising events planned, etc.

Please add the information yourself, if you can. Otherwise, e-mail it to iFaqeer@gmail.com.

Since this tragedy spans several countries, please feel free to add quake-related information, from India and Afghanistan (and beyond? China?).

A Turkish Odyssey

2005-10-07T10:42:00.000-07:00

Dear Friends,

While I am still working on an article about our 11 days in Turkey, here are six photo albums for your enjoyment.

http://community.webshots.com/user/afaruqui

You will find them listed at the very top of this home page. We toured Istanbul (both ancient and modern), Cappadocia (central Turkey), Pamukkale (southwestern Turkey) and Ephesus (western Turkey). If you are really pressed for time, check out the one called "The best of Turkey."

For the shutter bugs, I used a Pentax digital SLR with two different lenses (a wide angle zoom lens and a telephoto zoom lens) to take the shots. All together, I took 700+ pictures. The six albums contain about 30 percent of the exposures.

The place is incredibly photo genic, as you will see. The Turks are very friendly with the cutest round-faced children I have ever seen. We found great weather where ever we went. The language posed a challenge because the otherwise English-looking alphabets are often pronounced differently (thank Ataturk for that). I have had an easier time in Saudi Arabia with Arabic than I did in Turkey with Turkish. We could understand about 5 to 10 percent of the words, since they have found their way into Urdu (which of course is a Turkish word; there is also a town by that name on the Black Sea, spelled Ordu).

And, as for the food, it was not so great, at least for our Pakistani palate. Even the sea food was a bit of disappointment, since the fish would appear with their heads, tails and bones all intact on the plate. There was an extra charge for getting rid of all that baggage.

Just about all of us had (minor) tummy upsets throughout the trip and that made me wonder about the integrity of their food supply system. After all, it is a relatively poor country by European standards.

The country is neither Middle Eastern nor European but a unique hybrid. The mosques in Istanbul issue the call for prayer (azan) five times a day but are mostly empty, frequented more by tourists than worshippers. The sole exception was the Mosque of Fatih (Mehmed II, the Conqueror of Constantinople, 1453). That whole area around Fatih struck me as being quite religous and a shop keeper near the Hagia Sophia confirmed that.

The place is expensive, even according to American standards. We found a few good deals on trinkets (and they have loads of things to sell) but not much else. Touring in Turkey is an expensive (but very rewarding) proposition. You literally feel like you walking on land where history was made. If you listen carefully, you can hear the footsteps of the Hittites, Romans, Greeks, early Christians, Byzantines, early Arabs and the Seljuks. If you don't listen carefully, you can still see their monuments.

I can't wait to go back there to see the places we missed, such as Konya and Troy and Bodrum and Van (near the Iranian border) and Mount Ararat and Numrood and the House of Virgin Mary (near Ephesus). You can only do so much in one trip.

Ahmad

"Installing Urdu" on Windows XP

2005-09-21T03:13:00.000-07:00

I have made a lot of noise along the way about blogging in Urdu and I promised instructions on how to install Urdu as a language that your Windows XP machine can handle. Here are the instructions, from the website of the Center for Research in Urdu Language Processing in Pakistan:

http://www.crulp.org/Downloads/read_me_xp.txt

Once you have followed those instructions, you can use Urdu not just for blogging, but for pretty much anything you now use English and the English script for on your computer. And as I have said before, no, it is not the same as using InPage or some other editor to write Urdu, but using Urdu all the time. With the InPage solution (which is wonderful for "kitaabath" and page layout), what you have to do is convert your text in to a graphic and put it on your website or page, etc. But with this procedure, you can actually write directly in your HTML file, or Word document--or even while chatting with people over Yahoo! Messenger, MSN Messenger or other IM client!

First published on Urdu ke Naam

Report from Turkey

2005-09-21T01:25:00.000-07:00

During my travels through Turkey (thus far I have spent four and a half days in Istanbul while on a ten day family vacation) I have found not one but two Turkeys. One is very much Muslim and Asian in character and the other is very much non-Muslim and European in character. The non-Muslim trend pre-dates Ataturk by at least a century and was very evident when I visited the Dolmabache Palace, which was used during the last 100 years of the Ottoman Empire. Ataturk was simply the continuation of this trend.

It was very evident in the furnishings of the Palace. The crystal, chandeliars and paintings were either French, British or Russian or Czeck. Only the marble in one bathroom was Eyptian Alabaster. Of course, all the rugs were Turkish but then they were made to be stepped upon. Two Russian bears made for equally impressive floor mats.

The figure of Ataturk is everywhere. My daughters did not even know his name before coming to this country. One of them thought it was the name of a bridge that we crossed across the Golden Horn while coming to our hotel in the New City (it overlooks the Dolmabache Palace and has sweeping views of the Bosphorous and the skyline of the Old city).

Of course, the skyline in Istanbul is almost completely "Muslim" in its architecture. I have not seen so many big mosques and minarest anywhere else (they curiously all look alike). We have been touring them to our heart's content.

Greece is viewed neither as an enemy or a friend. Russia is very much in evidence around here, most visibly through all the Russian ships that travel through the Bosphorous onto the Black Sea.

One of the best sellers is a book called Metal Storm, which describes a hypothetical invasion of Turkey by the US. The book is only available in Turkish so it remains beyond my reach. However, attesting to the popularity of its theme, a sequel called Metal Storm II has been issued.

Bush is very unpopular here. One person called him a zero, another a fascist, and so on. The people I talked to were very upset about the war in Iraq. This seemed to cut across Muslim/non-Muslim lines.

The price of gasoline is about $8.50 a gallon and people were saying, how come it is only $3 a gallon in the US.

The Turks are watching the election in Germany with much interest, because of what it means for Turkey's entry into the EU. They want Schroeder to continue as Chancellor as much as they did not want Bush to be re-elected. One person said that he had lost faith in the American people because they re-elected Bush. Another said that Bush was out to pick a fight with everyone who disagreed with him. Yet another predicted that America will split into four or five countries in the next half century (and cited the example of how the Ottoman empire broke up eventually when it over-stretched itself).

Ahmad

Urdu Technical Blog

2005-09-19T12:20:00.000-07:00

At this point there are now more than one blog from Pakistan on technical issues. And at least a few devoted to Urdu on the Internet. (See this previous post, and this one.) I have been invited to join a new blog in Urdu about technical topics. It's at:

http://urdutechnews.blogspot.com/

Please check in once in a while to see what's happening.

Katrina and the Pakistani Community

2005-09-13T05:00:00.000-07:00

There's a growing page that provides Katrina-related information that has a strong component of involvement by Pakistanis, Pakistani-Americans, and other parts of the diaspora, or are focused on Pakistani-Americans affected by the hurricane at:

http://pakistan.wikicities.com/wiki/Katrina

Please point people who are involved on any side of the issue (giving, offering, needing, wondering how to help) to that page. Folks that have information that might be useful for others, please edit the page directly (just hit the "Edit" link at the top of the page and edit the page as you please), or send the information to iFaqeer@gmail.com . Don't worry about layout and suchlike, I or another volunteer can clean it up later.

WikiPakistan is a relatively new Information Database about Pakistan, Pakistanis and the diaspora. The site is at http://pakistan.wikicities.com/ and background information can be seen at http://pakistan.wikicities.com/wiki/Pakistan:About . It is an open database that anyone can edit and is developed under a Free Document License. Contributors are encouraged to click on the "Create an account or log in" link in the top righthand corner of every page and created an account. You do not need to provide any personal information.

Conversation about the Pakistani economy

2005-09-09T04:48:00.000-07:00

This conversatoin was triggered by a news item about a forthcoming report from the Asian Development Bank, which predicted that Pakistan's economic growth for the coming year would be around 6.5%, down two percentage points from the past year.

Saquib,

This is not true, and I say that as an economist. All the Asian tigers have had growth rates upwards of 8% back to back for many years, with China being in front of that pack. Even India is now entering that space.

Pakistan needs such 8% growth rates to make a dent in its poverty levels. For how long is more than a third of the population going to get by on an income of less than a dollar a day?

Inflationary pressures arise when economy-wide demand exceeds economy-wide supply. If they make the right kind of investments, supply will grow and the risk of inflation will be managed. China invests something like 35% of its GDP on developing new capacity. In Pakistan, all they are doing with the "new money" is driving up real estate prices. Investment rates are under 20% of GDP and domestic savings rates are even lower. Pakistan, strangely enough for a poor country, is a high consumption society like the US!!!

"That bat say rahna hay
Siraf aaj kaa soochna hay
Kul key kis ko fikar?"

I agree with your observation about the need to raise income tax revenues. Long over due. Less than 1% of the population pays income tax. How long can that continue?

But they also need to rein in unproductive government spending. I am sure everyone has their favorites but defense spending is the least productive form of spending, especially when most of the equipment you buy is imported at very high prices and burdensome interest rates that mortgage the country's future for years to come.

Anyway, that is my take on things.SAQUIB1@aol.com wrote:

*The growth rate of 8.4% whilst spectacular is clearly unsustainable for any country and would lead to eventual overheating of the economy.

*The 6.5% growth rate predicted for 2006 is still very healthy and should be easier to manage and sustain.

*The key is to keep a grip on inflation, imports and to ensure the infrastructure is developed to keep pace with the growth.

*They also need to tackle the issue of raising income tax receipts urgently. It is a disgrace and a matter of great shame that Pakistan remains a tax-free haven for so many middle and upper class 'citizens' whilst the poor mostly go without life's basic necessities.

Of course, I am no economist and this is just a personal view.

Kind regards,

SAQUIB

The Youth of Pakistan

2005-09-01T02:40:00.000-07:00

Someone on a mailing list I am on announced an organization for Pakistani Youth. I meant to congratulate and encourage them, but the following spilled out from my keyboard. It comes from the dark side of the old psyche, but bears repeating, I guess:

It is commendable for Youth to help themselves by creating institutions what will help them learn, grow, and engage with society and the wider world. I currently make my living as a technical writer based in Silicon Valley, but I started my career as editor of The Teenager, Pakistan, in 1987, during General Ziaul Haq's time. This was just about the time the last working dance floor in Karachi shut down; it was before satellite, and MTV and even the modern rock of Vital Signs and the neo-Sufi rock of Junoon; before MBA's and BBA's broke the back of the "Engineer-Doctor" career obsession in society; before offshoring and outsourcing brought jobs that paid decent salaries to young folk. The word that one most often heard in relation to the Youth of Pakistan, was "Frustration". Even now, some days I am reminded of the French philosopher that said "Energy restricted is energy perverted" and feel it is not an exaggeration to say that we Pakistanis, and the rest of the world with us, are reaping the whirlwind we sowed by putting the energy and life of a generation of young people in a vise; leaving them without any positive, constructive outlets for their youthful energy.

So bless you for starting an organization for the Youth of Pakistan.

[First published on my individual blog at: http://ifaqeer.blogspot.com/2005/08/on-local-elections-in-pakistan.html.]

On Local Elections in Pakistan, Musharraf, and Other Modern Dictators

2005-08-29T23:25:00.000-07:00

Okay, this might be simplistic, but someone on a list I am on asked what we Pakistanis think of the local elections in Pakistan recently--and Musharraf.

Attitudes to Musharraf range from the "necessary evil" as you said about the Saudis (not being sarcastic here; just commenting) to a straight "any diversion from democracy is bad in the long term". And that tinges most reactions.

My personal take is that dictators (military or otherwise; generally people who don't want to give up power--Pakistan has had one civilian Martial Law Administrator) like this have a productive, progressive phase and then, as time passes, the exegiencies of keeping power lead to their making compromises and deals that make things, on balance, worse for things like human rights, the rule of law, and so on. I think it was on this list that someone pointed out that even Saddam had a phase that built up Iraq into an industrial power with pretty good social indicators. But the later phases lead to unhealthy distortions in the rest of society. The same would apply to what limited knowledge I have of the arc that the regimes of Anwar Sadat, and Siad Barre, for example, took. Or even elected parties in democracies that decide they don't want to let go. Take a look at what happened in Mexico when the PRI held on to power for decades. Or in India with the Congress. In those two cases, things are turning around now; but the unhealthy things that have come up are complicating things.

That's why, IMHO, a healthy democracy is better in the long term--even if right here, right now, it's rather dysfunctional. And that is what leads people like me to say that things we might see as temporary "necessary evils" like the House of Saud, the Shah of Iran, Zia, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Marcos--dare I include Saddam in the list; for the West's support of him was also based on similar logic--are NOT what people who want to support "freedom and democracy" should condone.

[First published on my individual blog at: http://ifaqeer.blogspot.com/2005/08/on-local-elections-in-pakistan.html.]

"A PIECE OF RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY"- Book Review

2005-08-23T19:46:00.000-07:00

"Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam and the Crusades"
by Robert Spencer
REVIEWED BY S. Farooq Hasnat, Ph.D.

Barnes & Noble

Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat, a University Professor, August 22, 2005,
A PIECE OF RELIGIOUS BIGOTRY
The book “The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam (and the Crusaders)" by Robert Spencer is outright offensive, racist and based on bigoted propaganda. The lack of author’s knowledge about Islam is glaring as the book is written under the influence of extremist views, with a sinister purpose. It is more of a piece of propaganda against Islam, than anything else. The Americans are people of conscious, fairness and moderation, and such a piece of religious bigotry does not reflect the noble American culture. Does Robert Spencer intend to start a religious war in this already tumultous world? After reading Robert Spencer’s book, one feels that there is no difference between the thinking of Osama bin Laden and the author – both are advocates of hate and religious bigotry.

MANY FACES OF GLOBAL TERROR

2005-08-11T20:23:00.000-07:00

By Syed Farooq Hasnat, Ph.D.

As the war against international terror continues, it has generated a variety of dimensions, many beyond the scope of initial estimates. The latest bomb blasts (July 7) in Britain, send a message that this dilemma is not confined to the Jihadi outfits in the Muslim countries alone, but has its placement, even within the Western societies. In other words, the phenomenon has acquired many faces and features, each having its own dynamics and explanations. All the four London bombers were British citizens by birth, educated in the British school system and integrated members of the British society. If ever they visited a Pakistani Madrasa, it was for a short duration and it is inconceivable that they could be brain washed in such a period of time. No doubt they took out their frustrations in a wrong way, but was it a part of international Jihadi network? Or they acted for some home grown reason. These are the questions that remain hidden in the puzzle that exists at global level, and in this “fog of rhetoric”, little seems to be clear. On its part, the West has hyped up the tempo of attention against international terrorism, mainly to gain its military, economic and strategic interests – though a genuine concern for their national security must be recognized. Some of the extreme right in the United States have advocated for a global empire. Neoconservatives, as William Kristol, said on Fox television recently that, “if people want to say we're an imperial power, fine." But everyone in the U.S. does not conform to this idea. There is a valid fear expressed in the existing circumstances that as the trends show, there is a good possibility that “the world shall plunge headlong into a bottomless abyss of reaction and counter-reaction whose horror the human mind cannot comprehend.” Representing a more comprehensive view, a Pakistani physics Professor, Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy warned that two nascent fundamentalisms - that of George W. Bush and Osama Bin Laden - are heading toward a dreadful collision.”
Fearing a widespread backlash immediately after 9/11, a variety of scholars in the Muslim societies struggled for a definition of the very word terrorist and more so Islamic terrorist. Now, there has been so much rapid transformation in settling down to this non-state monster that new fears and suspicions have overtaken the debate on the definition. In fact, the definition by itself has become irrelevant. War against terrorism revealed many paradoxes within the Middle Eastern countries, its weaknesses and pressures to open up their societies. Some leaders ducked to gain time, while struggling for their own survival. While others, veiled their self-interest as national interest, camouflaged by an impression that their each act is meant to strengthen an alliance against global terrorism. Such duplicity between the competing interests hinders an over all efforts to combat global terrorism. At the same instance, it holds back a national effort to build democratic and national institutions in the country. In military dictatorships like Pakistan and Egypt, the elements of extremism is all over the place, religious being one of the many faces of the tendency. The main source of intolerance and bigotry comes from the dictatorial structures themselves, who under the guise of confronting terror have cleverly strengthened the state authority for their benefit.
Although the acts of terror are spread over a wide canvas, but each event and situation has its own dynamism. The suicide bombers in Iraq are motivated by reasons that are different from London or bombing at the Egyptian resort of Sharm al-Sheikh. However, there is no denial to the fact that the modus operandi of these terrorist acts has common premises. These are influenced by the symbolism of Osama bin Laden, although the carriers might not be even aware of him, being alive or dead. Nevertheless, the symbolism marches on, hard and real. In this case, religion has become a convenient vehicle to legitimize the acts of desperation. It might be Eric Rudolph, who bombed the abortion clinics in the United States or the acts of Shehzad Tanweer and his companions that killed scores in London, or Eden Nathan Zaada, from the Jewish settlement of Tapuah in the West Bank, who spared bullets on innocent Arab passengers - the basic underlying principle remains the same, yet disjointed from each other. When it comes exclusive to the Muslim acts, it is recognized by the London police that the July bombing though “bear the `hallmarks’ of al-Qaeda but that could still mean the bombers were inspired and influenced, rather than directed, by it.” The video message of Ayman al-Zawahri is being interpreted more as an “opportunistic attempt by al-Qaeda to exploit the London attacks as a vehicle for pushing its own agenda”.
Dominic Casciani of the BBC, interviewed British Muslim youth to find out their reactions, regarding the kinds of frustrations that they have, living in the British society. His account of August 4 is revealing and goes deep into the relationship between extremism and the society. A youth worker who has worked in some of the poorest communities in the UK report on Muslim youth, "I've been working with young Muslims and they're angry - really angry and nobody wants to talk about this," he says. "When you go up north and see the conditions, it's like two different countries - and they feel that. The alienation complex comes down to the lack of a cohesive and confident society. Some of them see Osama Bin Laden as a bit of a hero - they see the Palestinian suicide bombers as strong - it's not because terrorism is an Islamic thing, it's about defiance - giving the finger to the West and authority. But it doesn't have to all be bad news. All it takes is a bit of thought from government.”
In the present war against terror, the Muslim societies in general have been elusive, in providing an explanation. Regarding the rise of militancy, various apologetic arguments are presented by the analysts of these societies in general and Pakistan in particular. Some of the leaders of the Muslim countries, for the sake of convenience, do not make a fair distinction between different shades of Islamic groups. In Pakistan and elsewhere there are those that remain a part of the political process, with well defined political agendas, while others rely purely on sabotage, killings, hate and bigotry. The latter does not believe in a peaceful participation in country’s political process, are obscure and can be categorized as extremists or even terrorists. There is also a third category of extremist religious group, which are sectarian in nature, confining their murders, within the community. This deliberate mixing up of groups by the elite has created more problems than presenting a solid solution against terrorist groups and their acts. By alienating various groups within their society and narrowing the support base, these regimes have provided more ground to the extremists. But this is how dictatorship works.
The dynamics of global terror campaign is having a significant impact on global politics as well as strategies. More fearful is the thought that what if these groups get hold of a “dirty bomb”. Its consequences are frightening and beyond imagination. U.S. Republican Congressman from Colorado, Tom Tancredo had said that in case of a terrorist nuclear attack on the U.S., Mecca should be bombed. Responding, a Syrian political analyst Ahmed al-Haj Ali held that, "American mentality imagines that a religion is attacking another religion, and here lies the danger." Associate Press writer Diana Elias, warns that such sentiments, “comes from our Americans' general misunderstanding of Islam, American jingoism, the constant suggestions of religious crusade by American leaders, or deep fear-filled wounds of a young country which has little recent memory of enemies coming to our home turf, this line of extremist response should be addressed. Why is it, after all, that Americans are more afraid of Muslims with bombs than other types of terrorists? It must come from somewhere.” But there are saner voices in the Western world as well. Way back in September 2001, French President Jacques Chirac called not to confuse between the Muslim communities and fanatic terrorist groups. He said that it is not only “wrong in logic but also dangerous in consequences.”
The responsibility of defusing Global terror lies with both, the Muslim communities and the West, to show tolerance for each other and strive together to locate the reasons for extremism.

Shahzadi Zamurred--India-US Defense Pact & Its Dimensions

2005-07-26T13:48:00.000-07:00

Shahzadi Zamurred
Lecturer
College of Lahore

The U.S. and India signed a 10 year defense pact on 29th June 2005, which is known as the “New Frame work for US-India Relationship” (NFDR). The pact was signed between the US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and India’s Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, during his visit to Washington. As a follow-up, the Indian prime-Minister Manmohan Singh visited US from 18 to 20th July.
The pact deals with issues of cooperation on missile defense, joint weapons production, and transfer of sensitive military technology. Prime Minister Manmohan said that “the US and India have entered a new era, we are transforming our relationship to reflect our common principles and shared national interests”. The observers are of the view that this pact will not only help to enhance military capabilities of India but will also unwrap new horizon for trade between the two countries. This new agreement would provide new frame work for the U.S.-Indian defense relationship. Through this pact the Indians will get U.S. concessions on nuclear and space technology transfer to India. The pact also has economic & cultural dimensions, inducted in the historical and geo-political logistics. It will boost the security initiative, which in turn will open the ways for the co-operative military “research development, testing and evaluation.” The NFDR envisages joint and combined exercises and exchanges between the both sides for navel pilot training. The U.S. had imposed the restrictions for such interactions, after India conducted nuclear tests in 1998 and became a non-declared nuclear state. Defence Minister Mukherjee had said, in his speech in Washington “I feel there is a possibility of a change.” He told reporters that he is expecting that the military technology restrictions should be dropped, otherwise these barriers will diminish further trust and co-operation growth.
It seems that the defense pact between India and the U.S. is the result of the American anxiety over the increase of the Chinese power. It also appears that the relations between the two nations are designed in the same manner as during the cold war was between the United States and Pakistan. As for China’s geo-political issues are concerned, both China and India require fuel resources for their growing and rapidly industrializing economies. Both also need to have oil from the Middle East. Both will be monitoring the Strait of Malacca, as an economic lifeline.
The U.S. can gain another adventure through its well placed strategic position with India. The U.S. companies will prefer to go where they will find the greatest and easiest opportunities to make money. India provides opportunities for enhancement of U.S. competitiveness through outsourcing and expansion of market. It is in the vital interest of the U.S. to help India expand its markets and that India to become an alternative to China, as a manufacturing hub. Those mutual interests make both countries move towards each other, which was not so during the cold war period. On the other hand, India has to keep in mind that the U.S. is against Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Moreover, India is still heavily committed to buy the Russian military equipment, and to develop new weapons with the help of the Russians.
During Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visit to India in March 2005, the United States discussed ways to assist India, to become a major world power in the 21st century. In "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" released in September 2002, President Bush said: "The United States has undertaken a transformation in its bilateral relationship with India based on a conviction that U.S. interests require a strong relationship with India. We are the two largest democracies, committed to political freedom protected by representative government. India is moving toward greater economic freedom as well. We have a common interest in the free flow of commerce, including through the vital sea lanes of the Indian Ocean. Finally, we share an interest in fighting terrorism and in creating a strategically stable Asia”. This indicates the further strategy of U.S., which is to set its influence felt in South Asia. History shows that the Americans have always been concerned for its Geo-Political significance, in the region.
On the other hand, if we look at the strategic equilibrium of South Asia we realize that it continues on the verge of destabilization. Pakistan has serious reservations with the defense pact for joint weapons production between India and U.S. At the time when Pak-India relations are moving for betterment, the pact will definitely have a negative effect. Some of the steps that Pakistan and India have taken to defuse tensions are as follows: First, the Pakistani and Indian officials held talks on nuclear confidence-building measures (NCBMs) to promote nuclear risk reduction and to finalize a draft agreement on pre-notification of missiles testing by them in Islamabad, last December. Second, they are discussing a proposal to cut troop on the Siachen glacier, the world’s coldest and highest battlefield. Third, the issue of Kashmir is also seen as moving ahead. In this context, the spokesmen of Pakistan said that Pakistan has already conveyed its concern to the U.S. over “negative consequence of the induction of new weapon system” such as missiles defense. Pakistan’s priority is to ensure its defense capabilities and respond appropriately to put right any imbalance.
We must remember that power attracts power; but when a less powerful state is favored by a developed state, then it’s clear and obvious that the particular state has some peculiar interests.
-======================

PAKISTAN-AFGHAN RELATIONS IN MURKY WATERS

2005-07-24T15:23:00.000-07:00

By

Syed Farooq Hasnat, Ph.D.

In June and July the American troops and the Afghan government functionaries, came under a series of armed attacks, shattering the comparative calm in Afghanistan. These vicious and daring assaults indicate that the much awaited parliamentary elections in September will not be free from trouble, and that the menace of Taliban still exists, as a potential future challenge. Contrary to what was the forecast in the past, these assaults specify that the war against terrorism in Afghanistan is far from over. The latest resistance inflicted a number of causalities on the American troops, raising the total of dead to 150, since 2001. There are nearly 15,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, with an additional battalion poised for that war torn country.
The heavy reliance on the American forces indicate the lack of organized Afghan security structure, i.e., even after more than four years of the elimination of the Taliban administration and the Afghan army remains far from adequately trained. President Hamid Karzai largely depends on the U.S. commandos for his personnel security and his opponents taunt that he is just a Mayor of Kabul, as his authority does not extend beyond that city. Although Karzai is a Pashtun but his government is dominated by much detested and suspected Uzbeks and Tajiks, minorities. Afghanistan still remains ethnically subjected as well as a competitive society with blocks of authority in various ethnic regions of the country. The law and order in Afghanistan has always been far from satisfactory and the pace of development remains extremely slow. According to an opinion, “this remained an area where, unfortunately, the Karzai government and the International Security Assistance Force have failed to deliver, as security beyond Kabul is virtually non-existent.” In particular, the Zabul Province and the adjoining areas of Kandahr and Uruzgan Provinces have become strong holds of the militants. It is estimated that in these areas, the Taliban are much organized with no shortage of men, weapons and finances. The situation in Afghanistan is described by some as, “one of barely managed chaos”.
Before the attacks, it was estimated by the U.S. sources and the Afghan government that insurgency had faded away and that the Taliban had lost their clout in the country. The main reason given was that last October, Presidential elections took place without hindrance and that during the winter of 2004-5, there was little or no activity from the Taliban. However, since April of this year 45 U.S. military personnel were killed by the suspected Taliban, while hundreds of Afghan soldiers and civilians died in armed clashes. It was said that the Afghan militants were using the same tactics of attack as the Iraqi insurgents. These activities panicked the fragile Afghan government, as well it exposed its vulnerability.
Accompanied by the hype in militancy, came a volley of direct and indirect blames on Pakistan. Included, in that rhetoric was the statement of Afghan-American U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalizad. He vehemently said that Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden were somewhere in Pakistan. He however, could not substantiate his allegations with details and evidence. His claim that the militants have infiltrated from Pakistan, in an organized manner, was termed as baseless and irresponsible by Pakistan. Ambassador Khalizad’s charge was followed by statements by the Afghan government officials, the official controlled news media and President Karzai, himself. In Pakistan the reaction was sharp and forthcoming. Apart from a strong statement from government representative, terming these charges as irresponsible and without evidence, the un-official electronic and print media started to question the rationale of Pakistan’s complete commitment towards war against terrorism, in this part of the world. One of the leading Pakistani daily remarked, “It’s time Pakistan should rethink its policy of cooperating in the War on Terror and being rewarded only with slurs”.
The present crisis was defused with the intervention of President Bush, who persuaded both the countries to focus more on war against terrorism, than finding faults with each other. These developments further confirmed that bilateral ties between the two neighboring countries have become a matter of triangular relations, aggravating with the spread of global terrorism – becoming more problematic, with every reversal. Pak-Afghan relations remain a matter of serious concern for the United States strategic planners, as long as militancy continues to dominate the region.
Pakistan maintains around 80,000 troops in the tribal and adjoining areas, with Afghanistan. The borders are completely sealed, with latest reconnaissance devices and the Taliban entering Afghanistan in an organized manner is inconceivable. The main weakness lies with the Afghan security apparatus itself. A glaring example is the escape of four Afghan prisoners from Bagram jail, a facility that is heavily guarded and is under the direct control of the American troops. The escape was not possible without the cooperation of the Afghan soldiers, on duty. Till now there has been no trace of the escapees, who were known for their hardened ideology and considered extremely dangerous. It is easier for the Afghan administration to blame Pakistan for their security lapses, as little efforts are made by Kabul administration to establish its control in areas that are beyond the city of Kabul. Apart from that the Pashtoon population is kept alienated by the Tajik-Uzbak alliance in the government. All Taliban might be Pashtoons but all Pashtoons does not confer to the ideology of the Taliban. In the close knit tribal society of Afghanistan, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the two. Sometimes it is deliberately done so, to keep the majority of the Pashtoons, who are more than fifty per cent of the Afghan population, away from the mainstream politics.
Since the 1980s, Afghanistan is coupled with Pakistan in a number of ways. The basis being that no matter what happens in Afghanistan it has direct fallout on the Pakistani society, whether as a result of regional compulsions or so chosen by the Pakistani establishment. The flurry of attacks on the Afghan government troops and the American military deployments during these months raised many new questions. These were not only in regard to Afghanistan’s internal security but also relates to the fragile relations between the two neighboring countries. At least, as a part of a policy pronouncement, Kabul recognizes that its security is closely allied with that of Pakistan. On the eve of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s one day official visit to Kabul on July 24, these sentiments were reflected in Afghan Foreign Ministry statement saying that “friendly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were "in the national interest of both countries and an essential component to promote stability in the region". On several occasions, similar statements have also been made in the past. But, when pressures increases, the level of relations between the two countries come back to a naught.
The Afghan government continues to suspect Pakistan for being supportive of the militants in their country and in the present circumstances, there is little chance that Kabul could be convinced otherwise. The focal point of these relations remains around the conflict between Taliban and the Afghan security setup. Pakistan is dragged in the Afghan quandary, when it fails to manage the operations of Afghan related militant groups in its own society. Therefore, when it comes to Afghan militancy, the part of the problem comes from within Pakistan. Musharraf’s government is seen by many as ineffective, as well indulging in dubious policies, whether sectarian or otherwise. The General’s July 21 address to the nation vowed to eradicate militancy in Pakistan, but is regarded by observers as nothing more than his January 12, 2002 declaration to take charge of extremism and militancy in the country. The present “awakening” of Musharraf is attributed to July 7 London Bombings, in which the suicide bombers were alleged to have visited a Pakistani madrassa.
On its part, the Afghan society always presents itself in a package, carrying with itself a variety of dynamics and variables, which most of the time is difficult to manage by normal means. The past experience shows that the Afghans have yet to learn, solving their conflicts and accommodating the other point of view while running the government affairs. They have no experience in the modern concepts of legislative bodies, political parties or a structured judicial system. Whatever little they have, is confined to Kabul. In sum, there does not exist a political culture on whose foundations a modern society could be constructed. More so, with the brain drain since 1979, that went on unabated, the Afghan society lacks an indigenous expertise to manage their country. Experience has proved that a divided Afghanistan, devoid of any functional institutions, is incapable of reaching any political solution. As a reaction, the Kabul administration starts’ looking for a scapegoat and Pakistan is invariably there to be singled out.
There is little hope that the forthcoming September parliamentary elections would provide a substantial betterment of the overall situation. Pakistan would continue to receive the fallout of the Afghan mismanagement, unless the government takes immediate strict measures to eradicate the Afghan linked militants. The noted aspect is that Pakistan has lost its creditability to perform any meaningful role in the divided and volatile Afghan society. Because of intense past interference in the Afghan factional conflict, Pakistan has conceded most of its neutral ground and is branded as an active partner in the existing militancy. In fact the Pakistani establishment is visualized as a major part of the problem. This view is also shared by some American officials, who regard Musharraf not doing enough to stop the recruitment of the Taliban cadres. After all, Ambassador Khalizad is nothing more than a mouthpiece of the Bush administration.
In the circumstances, it is required that Pakistan makes drastic adjustments in its Afghan related attitudes and put its own house in order. That would provide an opportunity to depart from its defective perceptions of the past and set the record straight. Pakistan has got another chance to amend its follies. It still has an opportunity to exit from the “Afghan muddle” that it had partly created for itself.

Is Urdu Ready for the Information Superhighway?

2005-07-23T02:16:00.000-07:00

July's cover story in Spider magazine (the Dawn Group's Internet Magazine) is titled "Sifting Scripts: Is Urdu ready for the information superhighway?".

Details and links are on the "Urdu ke Naam" blog:

http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/07/is-urdu-ready-for-information.html
[Main blog at: http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/ ]

The cover package includes a story on the Urdu blogosphere by yours truly:

http://www.spider.tm/jul2005/cstory2.html

Adaab,
iFaqeer

An Evening with Imran Khan

2005-07-18T22:03:00.000-07:00

Famed cricket hero, heart throb, hospital founder and politician, Imran Khan spoke in Santa Clara on Saturday night. It was quite a performance, given that he had just flown in from London and was held up for two hours by the Homeland Security folks.

Imran was the key note speaker at a Forum on Human Development in Pakistan. It was held at the Santa Clara Marriott, in the heart of Silicon Valley. About 800 people listened intently to him as he spoke.

Afterwards, there was a Q&A session. No one wanted to ask the first question so I asked: "Will Gen. Musharraf be in power after 2007." He said, the general will do his best to stay in power. He said that is the problem with dictators. They have no exit strategy and keep on inventing excuses for staying on. He said the general had destroyed all civilian institutions in the country.
When asked how could Pakistan get back on the road to success, he said by having an independent judiciary and an independent election commission.

He commented on the major changes he had seen in India between the time he first visited that country and now. He attributed it to the rise of a two-party system and an independent election commission.

Imran said that in Pakistan the military has equated national security with the number of F-16s and nuclear weapons in its inventory. He talked at length about the poverty of people in Pakistani villages and how much more needed to be done to bring the country up to international standards.

He was asked if he would like to become the next president of Pakistan. He said he would like to become a prime minister with executive powers, as envisaged in the constitution, and not like Shaukat Aziz, who has no powers and is a puppet of the khakis.

He cited a study by ex World Bank economist Shahid Hussain that found corrution was widespread in Pakistan. The local police and judiciary were at the top of the list. He said it was no surprise that there was no justice for the poor and underpriveledged in Pakistan.

When asked who was his role model in Pakistani politics, without any hesitation he said it was Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

He also got three questions about cricket, none of which he answered. For those questions, he invoked his jet lag.

At the end, as he came off the stage, he was mobbed furiously.%

WikiPakistan: A Pakistan Information Database

2005-07-17T04:18:00.000-07:00

I am writing to introduce a project I have "founded". I put that in quotes because I don't really own the project; it is a public resource. And it is partially a further development of the idea behind the "Comprehensive Science and Technology Database of Pakistan (CSTDP)" by PakSEF.

The idea behind this project is to have it open to the public and for no person or organization to have too much of a stamp or ownership.

Here's the intro:

Pakistan Wiki, Wiki Pakistan!, PakWiki, WikiPak, call it what you will, it is now live:

http://Pakistan.WikiCities.com/

(You may want to avoid "Paki Wiki", since in some parts of the world, that first word is seldom used in affection.)

The basic idea is a national project. A "Pakistan Information Database" to which everybody can and does contribute. And that's where you come in; the site is currently just a skeleton, and it is you, the Pakistani, the member of Pakistan's diaspora, or just someone intrigued by the country and the region that can help collect information. You can read more at:

http://Pakistan.WikiCities.com/wiki/Pakistan:About .

At a time when we have, on the one hand, the world discussing the need to engage with Muslims and Islam and, on the other, the outsourcing and offshoring juggernaut rolling through India, next door, and into Pakistan, there is a serious need for real information about our country. It is, after all, the second largest Muslim nation in the world.

But where would you turn if you wanted to find out more about each of those Madrassas in the headlines? Or if your company was starting a development office in Lahore and you needed to find a list of websites to advertise jobs on. Or find out how to register a subsidiary there? Or to find a charity that helps kids get an education and not a job? Or the people actually working on issues like Honor Killings?

The fact is, often we Pakistanis ourselves--both at home and abroad--don't have a way to find the real information we need. Information about what the picture outside of our own circles or what CNN and the Business Plans of IT enterpreneurs show us.

This, however, is not envisaged as just a "feel-good" project. The aim is to treat Pakistan like a real country, not a utopia that we wish it was, or a disutopia that is the reason we live somewhere else. We are hoping to use the collaborative power of a wiki as well as its categorization and indexing features to harness the combined knowledge, energy, and wisdom of the Netizens in Pakistan and around the world--both Pakistani and non-Pakistani--to achieve that aim.

This project is not an effort to dismiss or replace some of the fine efforts that other groups and individuals have carried out in relation to Pakistan. It is envisioned as a central place to link them together and build a community around collecting and organizing information about Pakistan. You will find some of these projects listed at:
http://pakistan.wikicities.com/wiki/Sources_of_Information . Please add your favorites if you have any.

Please consider getting involved. Basically, visit the site and, when you see a page you can add something to, or correct, just hit the "Edit" button/tab at the top. If you do stay for any length of time, please create an account, so you can keep track of things you want to. You can find a list of pages other visitors/editors have requested at: [[Pakistan:Requested]]. Just click on a link to create the page and add information. Or hit Edit at the top of that page to add items you would like information on.

This wiki aspires to cover every aspect of Pakistani life; so there is always something you can add--or are the best person to help us perfect. What's your vocation? What do you know about what's happening in that field in Pakistan and the diaspora? What do you know? What do you want to find out? What are your hobbies and interests? What can you help define--or ask--in those areas?

A few quick housekeeping notes:

The question of who owns WikiPakistan! content might come to mind. All WikiPakistan content, unless otherwise stated, is under GFDL (See:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GFDL) and new contributions are understood to be under the same license unless otherwise stated.

WikiPakistan! is hosted at WikiCities (http://www.wikicities.com), a project of the Wikia Foundation. This is the same community that runs the Wikipedia itself, an Open-Content encyclopedia of knowledge. The English version of Wikipeida is at http://en.wikipedia.org and there is also a nascent Urdu project at: http://ur.wikipedia.org .

We are trying to figure out the the right format for events; news; and updates from groups, corporations and individuals. Please feel free to send feedback via the "Community Portal". Or start something on the wiki and other users can pitch in and discuss.

You can reach the founder of WikiPakistan! at iFaqeer@gmail.com .
There is also a mailing list associated with the wiki and linked from the website itself.

Let's document Pakistan!

With warm regards,

iFaqeer

Does the Qur'an Teach Violence?

2005-07-15T17:38:00.000-07:00

In light of the tragic and very unfortunate bombings in London, I thought it important to post this op-ed piece by Dr. Khalid Siddiqi. It was written three years ago but is very relevant to the situation we face today.

Islam does not abet or condone violence. It condemns it. Under no conditions does it justify the killing of innocents.

The term "Muslim terrorist" is an oxymoron.

Does the Qur’an Teach Violence?
Khalid Siddiqi

Since 9/11, many writers have associated Islam with terrorism, since some terrorists have quoted from the Qur’an to justify their acts of mass murder. This is wrong. The terrorists have neglected the exhortations to peace and mercy that almost in every case succeed the verses calling for war.

The Qur’an is believed to espouse violence because of its frequent references to jihad, which does not mean holy war but struggle. The greater jihad involves a struggle against one’s self, and is a life-long activity for every Muslim. The lesser jihad involves the taking up of arms in self-defense. The Qur’an says, “Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress limits, for God does not love transgressors.”

Islam does not sanction offensive warfare. During the life of Prophet Muhammad, it was his enemies in Mecca that thrice brought the fight to him in Medina. At the conclusion of the first of these battles, he reminded his companions that they were now returning from the lesser jihad against the enemy to wage the greater jihad against the self.

The conditions under which fighting in self-defense is allowed are very stringent. One must be deprived of the right to live and to earn one’s livelihood. Individual acts of vigilantism would create anarchy, and are prohibited. Even the community is not allowed to transgress limits, and attack women, children, or unarmed civilians. The Qur’an adds, “But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression.”

It is a common misperception that the Qur’an asks Muslims to kill Jews and Christians. In fact, the Qur’an addresses the believers among the Jews and Christians with great respect, calling them “the people of the book.” Former President Jimmy Carter wrote about the common family ties among Jews, Christians and Muslims in The Blood of Abraham in 1985. It was this broad vision that brought about the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. Pope John Paul says, “The religiosity of Muslims deserves respect. It is impossible not to admire, for example, their fidelity to prayer. The image of believers in Allah who, without caring about time or place, fall to their knees and immerse themselves in prayer remains a model for all those who invoke the true God, in particular for Christians.”

It is another misperception that the Qur’an forbids friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims. In fact, the Qur’an urges Muslims to make peace with their enemies, saying, “It may be that God will grant love (and friendship) between you and those you (now) hold as enemies.”

The Qur’an has been called a compilation of contradictory writings, even though a fifth of the world’s population regards it as the word of God. Marmaduke Pictkhall, an English scholar of the early twentieth century, said it best, “The arrangement of verses in the Koran is not very easy to understand, but it is not haphazard, as some have hastily supposed. Closer study will reveal a sequence and significance. The inspiration of the Prophet progressed from inmost things to outward things, whereas most people find their way through outward things to things within.”

Critics of Islam have argued that the Qur’an asks Muslims to follow it blindly and resort to fanaticism. Yet, in the words of linguist Thomas Cleary, “Islam does not demand unreasoned belief. Rather, it invites intelligent faith, growing from observation, reflection and contemplation, beginning with nature and what is all around us. Accordingly, antagonism between religion and science such as that familiar to Westerners is foreign to Islam.”

It is a fact of history that Islamic civilization eventually nursed Europe out of the Dark Ages, laying the foundation for the Renaissance. There is no question that the Muslim world is now passing through a difficult period, suffering from high rates of illiteracy and poverty, in addition to political oppression. Even then, most of the world’s 1.2 billion Muslims are living in peace. This month, they will be engaging in the fasts of Ramadan, and reciting the Qur’an in long congregational prayers every night.

It is unfortunate that small groups of Muslims have embraced terrorism as a political doctrine, even though it is forbidden in Islam. Their misguided acts should not be used to cast aspersions on all Muslims and on their scripture.

Dr. Khalid Siddiqi is a professor of Islamic Studies and Arabic Language at Chabot, Ohlone and Mission Colleges in the Bay Area, where he also directs the Islamic Education and Information Center.

Pakistan ranks at the bottom of the class

2005-07-14T18:36:00.000-07:00

ISLAMABAD, 14 July (IRIN) - Pakistan ranks last out of 14 countries in the Asia-Pacific region in terms of education, according to a new regional report compiled by a network of development organisations working in the education sector.

The Asia Pacific Report Card on Education for All, entitled, 'Must Do better' has been published by the Asian South Pacific Bureau of Adult Education (ASPBAE), a network of 200 bodies involved in formal and non-formal adult education. It has been compiled jointly with the Global Campaign for Education, a coalition of developmental organisations in over 100 countries. The paper examines and analyses the commitment of government in developing countries with respect to various aspects of basic education.

"Bottom ranking paints a pessimistic picture but at the same time it shows where we are weak and need to put [in] effort. This report serves as a wake-up call for our leaders as well as citizens alike, to make education for all a reality," commented Tracey Wagner-Rizvi who works in the Pakistani capital, Islamabad with the country's leading child rights body, the Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Child (SPARC).

The countries of Asia-Pacific region have been graded and ranked to depict their commitment to basic education based on their performance in five main subjects: basic education, state action on free education, inputs and resources, gender equality and overall equity.

Pakistan's leader, President General Pervez Musharraf's performance has been summed up as 'Back to Basics'. Isalamabad has been criticised for spending the lion's share of its GDP on the military at the expense of the education and health systems.

"Pervez spends less per pupil than most of his South Asian neighbours and charges user fees in full. Such low spending delivers very poor results: two out of three Pakistani adults are illiterate, while four out of ten children are missing primary schools," the report states.

Thailand holds the top position in the region, with an 'A' grade, while Malaysia comes second with a similar grade. Sri Lanka is awarded a 'B' grade in third position. The Philippines and China both hold grade 'C' in fourth and fifth positions respectively.

Vietnam scores a 'D' grade in sixth position, while Bangladesh, Cambodia, India and Indonesia are all ranked at grade 'E.' Nepal, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Pakistan occupy the bottom four positions with 'F' grade.

"At the moment, a lot of money is being put into the education sector through donors and local resources. There has to be a committed effort and also accountability, if we're to achieve the 'Education for All' targets of [Millennium Development Goals] MDGs," said Rizvi.

Review of Husain Haqqani's book (Dawn, July 4)

2005-07-06T14:56:00.000-07:00

Spread of fundamentalism and democracy

By Tariq Fatemi

HOW come a state that was created by the freely expressed will of the people, through various forms of participatory elections, has had to endure decades of unelected, authoritarian rule, from those who have shown scant regard for even the pretence of democracy? And, how come this same state, whose birth was bitterly and vociferously opposed by the religious parties, has now come to accept a primary role for these fundamentalist religious groups?Finally, why and how did the United States, while proclaiming and preaching its strong attachment to democracy and the rule of law, nevertheless prefer to sustain and nurture authoritarian, fundamentalist regimes in this country?These are questions over which many a Pakistani has agonized for years, wondering when and how things went wrong in their homeland for which millions sacrificed all they possessed. We now have as good an answer as any we are likely to get.

Husain Haqqani, a well-known Pakistani journalist, who had the unusual distinction of gaining the confidence of two of the country’s most bitter political rivals (Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif), has obviously spent his years in Washington DC to good purpose, as evident from his book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military released recently by the Carnegie Endowment.The book should be welcomed for both its content as well as its timing, by political analysts and common citizens of this tormented land. Simultaneously, it should merit consideration by the establishments in both Pakistan and the United States, given the fact that not only is Pakistan the recipient of massive amounts of assistance from the US, but that Washington has declared Pakistan, and more importantly its military ruler, General Musharraf, as a lynchpin in American plans for combating global terrorism.Mr Haqqani paints a wide canvas, in which he not only deals extensively with the role of the Islamic parties and the armed forces in the evolution and development of the country’s politics, society and the economy, but goes back to the very origins of the country’s quest for security and an identify.

In pursuit of this ambitious objective, he seeks to examine all those postulates which became sacred over time, not because they emanated from the people, but because it was to the advantage of the ruling circles, to perpetuate these myths and turn them into shibboleths.A stage was reached where Mr Jinnah’s important policy pronouncement was altered to suit the whims of the rulers. Therefore, it is imperative to know the tragic events that led to the evolution and development of a polity that became religiously extremist and socially bigoted, that in turn transformed the country into a fundamentalist state, where the military claims for itself the unquestioned right to rule. And in this most bizarre mix, the United States became not only a key player, but one whose influence continued to grow, even at times when the two appeared to be drifting apart. No wonder then, that though Pakistan has been one of the major recipients of American largesse, the country’s vast majority has a hostile view of the US.Of course, many of the things that Haqqani writes about have been known or suspected for years.

To see the confirmation of these misgivings, by reference to source material, is deeply disturbing. Should we then be surprised to learn that the army chief decided way back in September 1953 to visit the United States “at his own volition”, so he could offer Pakistan’s “services to serve US interests as the West’s eastern anchor in an Asian alliance”.Or, that Gen Ayub had discussed with the British envoy his plans to topple the civilian government “because the time had come for him to act”, and presumably was encouraged to do so. And, notwithstanding his own aversion to religious rituals, Ayub recognized early on the usefulness of injecting Islam into the body politic of the country. Therefore, while abroad, he presented himself as an Ataturk, while at home, he “moved Pakistan further along the road of a state-sponsored ideology”.It was however under Pakistan’s second military spell that the regime not only co-opted the Islamists into the state machinery but made them and the military, the guardians of state ideology. That this should have been done by Gen Yahya, who in his personal life showed scant respect for the precepts of Islam, made it even more cynical.Bhutto did succeed in “creating a new Pakistani order in which secular civilians attained ascendancy”, but he failed to protect it against “the onslaught of the mosque-military combine..... because of his compromises with the forces of obscurantism and his desire for a large military beholden to him”. Thereafter, Zia ul Haq not only “attained power as a result of the mosque-military alliance, he also worked assiduously to strengthen it over the next 11 years”.On Afghanistan, the book tells us that much before the Soviets had installed Babrak Karmal in Kabul, both Pakistani and American intelligence were already funnelling in men, money and material into that country.

However, it was Gen Zia, who having seen his two military predecessors stumble into war with India, and thereafter lose American support and finally their power, who realized the folly of repeating the same mistake. He was fortunate in having the brilliant strategic thinker, Yaqub Khan as his close confidant and counselor. The latter had the foresight to point out the dangers of a conflict with India, especially at a time when we were already engaged in a war-like situation with Afghanistan.General Musharraf, too, having engaged in the Kargil encounter and seen its fall-out, realized early on that “the semblance of good relations with India had become a prerequisite for Pakistan’s security relationship with the US”. He, therefore, made normalization with India his major goal. This has not only earned him kudos in Washington, but made it possible for the resumption of American arms supply to Pakistan.Significantly but tragically, the two civilian political leaders who were the most enthusiastic supporters of a strong military and went out of their way to prevent its humiliation met inglorious ends. True, both Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif made many mistakes, including ‘their refusal to compromise and work with each other”, but it is equally true that the “civilian leaders might not have blundered into many of their bad decisions if they had not had the mullahs and the military narrowing their options”.That the Americans have always had a preference for military rulers in Pakistan is well-documented.

Nevertheless, to see fresh corroboration of this is an eye-opener, to any who suffers from the illusion that the US is committed to democracy and the rule of law.Our military rulers, aware that American policymakers focus much more on the failings of politicians than on their shortcomings, make it a special point to cultivate the Pentagon. In this context, the roles played by Generals Zinni and Frank to facilitate General Musharraf’s acceptance in Washington is fresh confirmation of this perception. Relevant here is also the observation of the American historian Dennis Kux, who in the context of the 1990 aid suspension has written that “the Pentagon was especially sorry about the rupture in cooperative security ties”.Even more revealing are the aid statistics. Between 1954 and 2002, the US provided a total of $12.6 billion to Pakistan. Of this $9.19 billion was given during 24 years of military rule, while only $3.4 billion was provided to civilian governments covering 19 years.Admittedly, American support for Pakistan’s military regimes has not made the task any easier for Pakistan’s weak, secular civil society “to assert itself and wean Pakistan away from the rhetoric of Islamic ideology toward issues of real concern for the citizens”.

But is there any lesson in all this for the present leadership, should it ever wish to disengage itself from its involvement in national politics? Ironically, it may be the counsel of a senior general, who was one of the foremost proponents of the army’s rule, that it may wish to recall.In 1969, Major General Sher Ali Khan had advised Gen Yahya that the army’s ability to rule lay in its being perceived by the people as “a mythical entity, a magical force, that would succour them in times of need when all else failed”. It is for the current rulers to determine if any of that myth or magic remains. But they are patriots. They have to recognize that continued denial to the people of their inherent right to be governed by a freely and fairly elected government, that is accountable and answerable to them, amounts to preventing the inevitable march of history.They must also realize that the alliance between the military and the Islamists “has the potential to frustrate anti-terrorist operations, radicalize key segments of the Islamic world, and bring India and Pakistan to the brink of war”. There are other dangers as well, arising primarily from the regime’s willingness to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of US global concerns.

Do we not realize that we are receiving military and economic aid from the Americans only because we have made Pakistan, “a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location”.The US, too, must abandon its preference for quick, short-term, transient advantages for long-term, permanent benefits. It must recognize its past mistakes, and then embrace strategic choices, such as strengthening civil society, encouraging secular political parties, nurturing forces of peace and moderation and insisting on democratic values and the rule of law everywhere, but certainly so in countries that seek American support and assistance. It is only then that the Americans will be perceived as “friends and not masters”.

Is Pakistan a democracy?

2005-07-02T08:48:00.000-07:00

Dear Friends,

In my mind, this is the question of the day. People around the US are celebrating the continuation of America's strong democratic traditions on the July 4th holiday. It is time to ask why America's strongest ally in the war on terror is not an equally strong ally in the battle for democracy.

Ahmad

Daily Times - Site Edition
Saturday, July 02, 2005
VIEW: Is Pakistan a democracy? —Ahmad Faruqui
The “boots on the ground” all wear khaki. The best that can be said about those boots is that they tread softly. Under a post-modern military dictator, Pakistan appears to have perfected the art of enlightened militarismMy friends in America often quarrel with me when I say that Pakistan is not a democracy. Our discussions quickly devolve into one of three arguments. The first one is that Pakistanis don’t want democracy, since they have had uniformly bad experiences of it. The second one is that General Musharraf is an enlightened ruler so why bother looking for anyone else. Finally, I am told that Pakistan is already a democracy. The first argument implies that because Pakistanis have had bad experiences in the past, they have given up on democracy. That is surely not the case. The University of Michigan survey cited in an earlier column showed conclusively that Pakistanis want the right to choose their own rulers and to get rid of them if they don’t like them. Some argue that Islam does not allow for democracy. This is clearly false since Pakistan is governed by a constitution that calls for parliamentary democracy and many other Muslim nations including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey have democratic governments. Still others have argued that poor and illiterate countries cannot be democracies but the presence of democracy in India belies this thesis. All this does not mean that democracy is a panacea. There is no dearth of bad democratic leaders in Pakistan or elsewhere. But if democracy lets in bad leaders through the ballot box, the same mechanism also provides for their removal. The ballot box is a much better means for removing bad rulers than a coup d’etat.The second argument overlooks the fact that a military dictator, regardless of how benevolent and competent he might be, is a ruler with no checks or balances on his or her powers. History has shown that most such rulers ultimately become despots and tyrants and as witnessed in the case of Pakistan, none leave their post voluntarily. Moreover, there is no guarantee that future military rulers will be benevolent or competent. This too has been discussed in prior columns. Thus, in this column, I focus on the third argument, that Pakistan is a democracy. To settle the debate, we need a definition of democracy. Perhaps Abraham Lincoln said it best, when he dedicated the national cemetery at the battlefield of Gettysburg on November 19, 1863 and said that democracy was a “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” In the fifth century BC, Greeks coined the word by combining demos (people) and kratia (to rule). To them, democracy simply meant “rule of the people.” The earliest democracies were practised by small city-states such as Athens where each citizen participated in the law-making. Today, a democratic dispensation includes political parties that contest elections and a polity in which individuals are treated equally and enjoy constitutional rights and freedoms as well as duties. Thus, democracy is a form of government in which supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation that usually involves regular elections.It is important to note that elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a successful democracy. They have often been used by dictatorial regimes to give a false sense of democracy, internally and externally. Authoritarian rulers such as Hosni Mubarak, Ferdinand Marcos and Saddam Hussein have imposed restrictions on who can stand for election, limiting the laws that can be brought before parliament, by using unfair voting practices and falsifying results. When making a transition from dictatorial to democratic rule, it is equally necessary to create a democratic culture in which a “loyal opposition” can exist. All sides in a democracy need to share a common commitment to its basic values. The ground rules of society must encourage tolerance and civility in public debate and the losers must accept the judgment of the voters when the election is over, and transfer power peacefully. The losers are safe in the knowledge that they will not lose their lives or liberty, but can continue to participate in public life. They are loyal not to the specific policies of the government, but to the fundamental legitimacy of the state and to the democratic process itself.Another feature is that parliament has sovereign authority over all government expenditures (including those of the military) and to impose taxes. The judiciary has the power to declare military coups unconstitutional and to uphold the rule of law while settling disputes.Good governance should not be confused with democracy. A benevolent dictator might be selfless and less corrupt than all prior civilian rulers. He may well act in the national interest, pursue sound economic policies that result in rapid economic growth and development, lower the poverty level, encourage freedom of the press, push a liberal social agenda and establish peace with neighbours. But none of these conditions individually or collectively converts a dictatorship into a democracy. Pakistan experienced rapid economic growth during the Ayub and Zia dictatorships but that did not transform either ruler into a democrat, even though both tried to surround themselves with the trappings of democracy. Musharraf is pursuing many sound social, economic and political policies but this does not make him a democrat.The people of Pakistan do not have the ability to understand, let alone challenge General Musharraf’s edicts, such as his decision to place Mukhtar Mai on the Exit Control List. Yes, there is a parliament that makes laws and there is a judiciary that dispenses justice. There is even a civilian prime minister with a cabinet of civilians. But none can prevail against the writ of the Praetorian state.A supra-constitutional executive exists outside of legislative and judicial purview. At the federal and provincial levels, the real power resides with the army chief and his corps commanders.A couple of analogies come to mind. A woman cannot be half pregnant. An individual cannot be half married. And so it is with countries. They can either be democracies or dictatorships. They cannot be both. There is something to be said for the dictatorships that govern China, Myanmar and North Korea. They do not claim to be democracies.Politics has been called the art of the possible. Thus, nuances matter. But they do not change the ground reality of Pakistan’s polity. The “boots on the ground” all wear khaki. The best that can be said about those boots is that they tread softly. Under a post-modern military dictator, Pakistan appears to have perfected the art of enlightened militarism.Dr. Ahmad Faruqui is director of research at the American Institute of International Studies and can be reached at Faruqui@pacbell.net
Home Editorial

A CHANGED LANDSCAPE OF KASHMIR CONFLICT

2005-06-30T15:22:00.000-07:00

S. Farooq Hasnat, Ph.D.

For more than one and a half years, General Musharraf has been bending backwards to accommodate the Indian leaders. His declared intention is to resolve the main dispute of Kashmir, during his tenure in office. On one occasion he said that the dispute can be resolved in two weeks. To engage the Indian leadership, he took a number of steps, including self inviting himself to Delhi and to let loose control over travel between the peoples of two Kashmirs. Along with that, meetings between the officials of the two countries were initiated to look into Siachen Glacier, Wullar Barrage, Baglihar dam and others disputes.
The critics of Musharraf’s policy of reconciliation towards India argue that although he presented many concessions, one after another, he got little in return. It is further said that in real terms, a tacit understanding with India has been undertaken that the Line of Control (LoC) will be converted into an international border between the two countries. The General refutes these allegations and says that his proposals do not negate the principled stance of Pakistan. As a result of these developments, the tensions between the two countries eased out, but so far no substantial progress has been made, either on “minor” issues or on Kashmir itself. However, the single most significant headway was the two-week long visit of the nine Kashmiri leaders, of which five were from the “moderate” wing of All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. The snag of the visit was the absence of Syed Ali Geelani, leader of his own faction of the Hurriyat. He declined the Pakistani invitation by saying that he had decided to present his “resentment” of what he called Pakistan government’s “deviation from its stand on Kashmir”. He further said that India has not shifted from its standpoint on Kashmir and he was not sure that what he will bring back from the Pakistan visit. It was felt in Pakistan that Geelani’s decision had dampened the initiative to start a dialogue with the Kashmri leaders in held Kashmir. After all, Syed Ali Geelani was the one who once called himself “a proud Pakistani”. Another key Kashmiri, Shabir Shah wrote, “Kashmiri” in the Indian passport application’s citizenship column, and was refused the passport.
The Hurriyat leaders’ visit to Pakistan changed the whole landscape of the Kashmir dispute, when they clearly made home heir point that any future solution of the Kashmir issue must be initiated by the Kashmiris, themselves. They further said that they would not accept, as has been a practice in the past, that Kashmir be conferred as a territorial dispute between Pakistan and India. Hurriyat’s key spokesman and Held Kashmir’s spiritual leader, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq even denied the relevancy of the 1948 resolutions, of the United Nations Security Council. These utterances made irrelevant the long drawn position of Pakistan, for which it worked hard for five decades. Mirwaiz, on his return to Srinagar, wrote an article in the Hindustan Times, saying that it will not be acceptable to split Kashmir on the basis of “religion, ethnic or regional divisions”. He further wrote that his group intends to continue a dialogue with Pakistan as well as the Indian leadership, on separate tracks. According to him, “this will give Kashmiris a sense of genuine involvement, a must for any progress towards resolution”. Mirwaiz made it clear that attempts to converge the LoC into a permanent international boundary would be a reprehensible action.
These remarks by the Kashmiri leaders sent ripples across the relevant circles in Azad Kashmir and Pakistan. There is no doubt that one main fallout of the Hurriyat visit is that the initiate has been taken away from Pakistan and the Kashmiris themselves have taken the drivers seat. While addressing thousands of Kashmiris, at the mosque in Srinagar, after his return from landmark 14 days visit to Azad Kashmir and Pakistan, Mirwaiz declared that General Musharraf told him that “any solution acceptable to the people of Kashmir will be acceptable to Pakistan," This is not what the Pakistani military leadership had expected. After all it marginalized Pakistan’s position and the circumstances are moving fast towards the conception of an independent Kashmir. Another aspect to be considered is that whether the gestures by the Indian government are to defuse as well confuse the issue or are serious attempts to sole the dispute, as according to the desires of the Kashmiri people. Representing this view point, a noted Lahore daily, The Nation wrote in its editorial of June 22, that “the whole idea behind the façade of Indian sincerity in resolving disputes one hears so much about, is to achieve normalization with Pakistan, extract the maximum concessions from it in the economic and commercial spheres and stabilize peaceful conditions in the Subcontinent. It seems under the impression that it has found the present government in Islamabad a willing partner.” Many in Pakistan feel that the establishment fell prey to its own maneuvering, where before the visit, little or no homework was done. It is also believed that confused, unclear and foreign formulas were destined to meet this fate.
To a certain extent, the grievances of the Kashmiri leaders are valid. The Kashmir dispute was dealt by both the warring neighbors as purely a territorial dispute. Whenever, and at what ever level the matter was discussed, the role of the Kashmiri people was ignored. It had become purely an issue within the larger range of Pakistan-India bilateral relations. More than 80,000 Kashmiri lives have been lost and countless women raped, since the 1989 home grown revolt against the 700,000-strong Indian forces, but these gross human rights violations remained part of the bilateral dispute. On its own merit, these were never taken seriously by the Pakistani establishment.
Another rash act of the Pakistani military establishment came when in early 1990s, they inducted foreign militant elements in the genuine freedom struggle of the Kashmiris. Once the Soviet left Afghanistan, it was thought appropriate by the establishment to divert the Jahidies to Kashmir. That blemished the legitimate Kashmiri struggle and brought a bad name to the just cause. The international support soon dwindled and even Pakistan’s traditional allies refrained from supporting the Kashmiri cause. At the same moment, as a result of the Jahidi fallout, the Pakistani society suffered tremendously, in the shape of rising militancy and violence. Steve Coll, a scholar of Pakistan policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir writes that the “infrastructure needed to produce Jihadists proved corrosive for Pakistani society, a development not appreciated at that time by those who developed the strategy. As it turned out, a heavy price was paid for the reliance on groups whose members were deeply committed to Islamic fundamentalism. Often under official patronage, these groups began to penetrate Pakistani society.”
The settlement of the Kashmir dispute will always be difficult, as stakes are very high for India, for Pakistan and for the freedom fighters. It has to be accepted that the lingering Kashmir dispute is highly complex as well as emotionally charged, for all the concerned parties. Moreover, the post-9/11 world, where the Americans are enforcing their agenda, makes even a genuine Kashmiri armed struggle for freedom more difficult. It is in this context that an assessment as well as solution for the Kashmir dispute is to be made.
There are certain compulsions that must be mentioned under which Pakistan has to operate. The days of Pakistan supporting the freedom fighters armed struggle, either tacitly or otherwise would not be accepted by the norms of the new International value system. The era of Jihadi groups is over. The manner in which these factions operated – links with the Talibans, Al-Quaida network and the sectarian killings in Pakistan are the reasons, which would make the armed struggle in Kashmir – a less relevant option. Nowhere in the future would the world community accept these groups as a valid means of struggle for the right of self determination. In the past, the Pakistani policy makers mishandled the Kashmir freedom struggle and today the Kashmiris are forced to change their course for freedom, where even the meaning of freedom has to be rewritten.
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Is militarism irreversible in Pakistan?

2005-06-18T23:20:00.000-07:00

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-6-2005_pg3_6
Daily Times - Site Edition
Sunday, June 19, 2005
VIEW: Is militarism irreversible in Pakistan? —Ahmad Faruqui

Musharraf believes that Pakistan needs the big stick of the military to survive as a nation state. Deep down, one senses an authoritarian conviction that the people cannot be trusted to choose their own leader

After watching cricket with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his native Delhi, General Pervez Musharraf proudly declared to world acclaim that the peace process with India was irreversible. But he has yet to declare in Islamabad that Pakistan’s move towards democracy is irreversible. During his recent tour of Australia and New Zealand, he said Pakistan was already a democracy, but for his having to wear a uniform to safeguard it. Conveniently, the general’s four stars are never visible when he travels abroad. They are meant to shine and intimidate fellow Pakistanis at home, especially the khakis. He knows the day he doffs his uniform, he would rule at the mercy of his army chief. Even the taxi driver in Karachi knows this iron law of Pakistani politics.

Why, one must ask, is Pakistan still governed by its military, in the sixth decade of its life? Like the one field marshal and two generals who preceded him, Musharraf believes that Pakistan needs the big stick of the military to survive as a nation state. Deep down, one senses an authoritarian conviction that the people cannot be trusted to choose their own leader. As Ayub famously said in the early-1960s, it is the duty of the khakis to “save the people from themselves”. He forecast that Pakistan would be ready for true democracy two generations later. Well, that time has now come and there is still no sign of democracy of the kind that exists in India or even the kind that is exercised in the theocratic state of Iran. The generals, like the British imperialists whose uniform they wear, believe that Pakistan is a collection of warring tribes that cannot self-govern. This is an ideological premise. Next comes the issue of self-interest. The generals have fallen in love with the benefits of militarism that continue to enrich them even after they retire. Surely Jinnah did not create Pakistan so that the Khaki Raj would replace the British Raj. A furious debate continues to rage in Pakistan (and recently in India) on whether Jinnah was a secularist or a closet theocrat. But there is no debate about whether he wanted to establish a democratic or a militarised nation - the answer is obvious.

So the debate that needs to occur is who derailed democracy, the civilians or the military? It is often argued in the West that the military is the only strong institution in Pakistan that can hold the country together. But this argument confuses cause and effect. An overweening military has prevented the development of strong civilian institutions. Had Jinnah lived, it is unlikely that the dispute over Kashmir would have persisted for half a century, resulting in the diversion of billions of dollars to the military. It is this large military force that has crippled civil society in the country.In India, the military is strong but its strength has not come at the expense of civilian institutions. Indeed, strong civilian institutions in India have kept the military out of politics and kept it focused on its core competency. India’s military failures, unlike Pakistan’s, have been openly studied, critiqued and analysed, leading to improvements.

Today, Pakistan is a country on the edge, being held together by its nuclear bomb programme on the one hand and on the promise of F-16s from the US on the other. Both are relics of an irrational and un-winnable conflict with India. Neither is going to help the nation survive, because myriad internal problems are chipping away at its national identity.Stephen Cohen’s candid assessment of Pakistan’s political future to the US Congress is worth noting. From a US perspective, Cohen said the main problem is not whether or not Pakistan is serious in pursuing terrorists but “Pakistan itself and its faltering political system, its dysfunctional social order, its dangerous sectarianism, and its grossly distorted political system.” Pakistan, he said, is one of the few states that have achieved “sustainable failure”. Perhaps sustainable failure is a core competency of Pakistan’s. Sadly, such core competencies do not lend themselves to generating revenues in global markets.

About mid-way into his rule, General Musharraf laid out the formula for making democracy irreversible: “To keep the military out, you have to let the military in.” While to everyone else this sounded like asking the fox to guard the henhouse, it provided the impetus for the misbegotten National Security Council (NSC), patterned after its Turkish namesake.At a time when Pakistan seems to be inching deeper into the abyss of militarism, Turkey is pulling out of it. This is partly out of pressures arising from its desire to join the European Union. Last year, the European Parliament noted that the Turkish military still has “inappropriately large power” in that country’s polity and called for stricter civilian control of the security sector as a prerequisite for Turkey’s membership in the European Union.In response, Turkey passed a constitutional amendment that curbs the military’s powers. For example, special accounts that had long been used to finance commanders’ pet projects have been terminated. Military courts may no longer prosecute civilians in peacetime and allegations of torture by the military will be investigated and prosecuted promptly. Most tellingly, structural reforms have been passed to curtail the powers of the overarching NSC. It has been enlarged to give civilian ministers a majority and the enabling legislation has been amended to prevent abuse of the NSC’s advisory role and decrease the frequency of its meetings. The prime minister is now authorised to appoint the NSC secretary-general, who sets the agenda and the tone of the council’s work. All of this must make Shaukat Aziz envious.

Turkish democracy seems increasingly vibrant just as Pakistan’s is becoming increasingly flaccid. In his Congressional testimony, Cohen laid out three conditions for Pakistan’s political development. One, it should hold free and fair elections in 2007 in which exiled leaders of the two leading parties are allowed to participate. Two, the army should end its “comprehensive interference in domestic politics.” And three, President Musharraf should give up his army job well before the elections. There are no signs that any of these conditions is about to be fulfilled. In Pakistani politics, it is militarism and not democracy that is on the march.

Dr Ahmad Faruqui is director of research at the American Institute of International Studies and can be reached at Faruqui@pacbell.net
Home Editorial

Cricket, and transcending cricketing matters!

2005-06-18T14:27:00.000-07:00

Folks:

This is a piece that was first published in DAWN right after the Indian cricket tour to Pakistan last year. While we have come some way since then as a team, I have little hope of any structural improvement of the game in the country if we were to continue being ad hoc in our approach.

Therefore, I see the piece still holds true for it substance, and actually goes much beyond just the game of cricket!

Does anybody else feel that a similar thought-process and appropriate implementation in other affairs of the general running of the country would yield positive results?

Takes, anyone??

More than just cricket

By: Mohsin Hafeez

Sitting in a state of utter disbelief way into the night of March 30, 2004, in a quiet, suburban town of the San Francisco Bay area, the potential early morning staring me in admonishment, I saw the Pakistanis falling in that fight against the Indians like a ton of bricks. And, like a ton of bricks they did fall- on the Pakistan Cricket Board. Ramiz Raja and his boss, Sheheryar Khan, certainly have work cut out for themselves.

In a related piece ‘Triumph and Defeat” on cricinfo.com, an Indian writer referred to our team as Inzimam’s ‘pussycats’ as opposed to Imran’s ‘cornered tigers’ of the 1992 World Cup fame. I have been a great advocate of trying to see beyond the immediate as therein lies the reality. It couldn’t be truer in this case. We are all extremely proud of the talent we produce in the low middle-class streets of our country, and proud we ought to be. There is no doubt about the merit of such players, as we have witnessed in the last few decades. However, there has been something tantalizingly missing in the Pakistani cricket team, barring the time-period when we had Imran Khan and then, to some extent, Wasim Akram, as our captains. I see it as the ability to persevere, to fight against all odds with a sense of discipline, and to stay focused and committed. It’s unfortunate to see the deterioration of our social fabric transcend so aggressively to cricket, as evident in the overall, personal traits of the players.

Without being philosophical, what works in everyday life works equally well in a sport. One goes to work, interacts with people as in a team, achieves (or tries hard to) whatever goals and objectives one has professionally, and brings food on the table for the family. Now this is work, and there is no reason that playing a sport should be any different. Yes, there is all this exuberance and exhibitionism about being a celebrity but it does not -and should not- take away from the fact that this engagement is a celebrity’s livelihood, the success of which depends, and should, entirely on the performance of today as opposed to some one-off stunt or a predestined notion.

Sports is an important element of any civilized country’s nomenclature. There is significant money involved-if there is not enough, there really ought to be- and it acts as a catalyst in the overall economy of any nation. It is an industry, and like any industry it needs proper management. Sadly, we see this as a totally alien concept in our country, or, just like most other disciplines, it merely gets lip service, what with all the hoopla attached to a separate Ministry of Sports and the rest. It surely is a great way to please and to woo some of the sycophants and turncoats, of whom there is no dearth, to partake of the running of the government.

It is not, therefore, surprising to see where we are. Unfortunately, our cricketers think the world is their oyster, and that they are a gift to the game of cricket just because they have the capacity to throw deliveries at close to a 100 miles per hour or to bash any bowler in the world based on their past records and reputation. This is the crux of the issue. Imran Khan, in a related program ‘Straight Drive’ clearly said, and I couldn’t agree more, that the subcontinent is notorious for being obsessed with collecting individual records and then basing one’s confidence level on them rather than self-discipline. It’s all very well to achieve milestones but team-spirit is the emotion, along with discipline, that wins matches. It’s a mind-game and we need to inculcate the right, positive attitude in our team before we can go back to the times of the great Imran Khan.

The entire domestic structure of cricket needs an overhaul. The way we produce talent can be natural but we can surely do a better job of nurturing it. Cricket is not only ‘cricketing skills’ which one may acquire or inherently possess. There is more to playing cricket than meets the eye. A whole lot of it has to with what happens in the backdrop, the off-ground coaching being a critical piece to it. We need disciplined team players with no attitudinal roadblocks more than we need individual heroes. We have had more than our fair share of them. No more self-professed heroes, please!

For starters, we can begin by promoting the game at local school levels by arranging inter-school tournaments. This will do two things: one, give the control to authorities to pick and nurture talent at the outset, and two, ensure there is at least basic education among all players. The significance of basic, good education cannot be overemphasized. It makes all the difference in how one approaches one’s game and what one does in each and every changing scenario; in short, be ‘situational.’ Our players don’t need the coaching of being able to produce a beautiful flick off the bat going down the leg side as much as an indoctrination of what wins matches and how to play sensible cricket. This will also help produce good leaders, a rare commodity among the current crop of players. There ought to be a series of classroom sessions for a team of youngsters going on a regular basis to instill in them a sense of seriousness about playing the big games. They need to be taught the value of fighting back, irrespective of the end-result of the game, and playing positive, sustained cricket in any situation. In addition, the value of being able to at least communicate in the international arena cannot be ignored.

This can be achieved by opening a Cricket Academy which works in a regimented fashion as opposed to the chaotic ways of life we are all so used to and take pride in. After all, there are institutions in Pakistan that develop first-class officers. Why should we differentiate between one profession and the vocation of cricket is beyond understanding to the reasonable mind. Should cricket be an avocation rather than a vocation? If the answer is in the affirmative, then we cannot expect to improve on the domestic cricket structure.

Concurrently with the above proceedings at the Academy, some of the players will graduate to playing first-class cricket and others will become subject to the Peter’s Principle (‘failing upwards’ or ‘rising to one’s level of incompetence’). The successful ones should then be put to even tougher tests, including not only how well they play their strokes but also how they fare under pressure.

In today’s competitive world, which is getting increasingly brutal, we have to move with time and be progressive. We cannot put the clock back and stay within the comfort zone of the yesteryear. If the coaching needs to be specific to skill, so be it. And if we need to hire a specialist to impart this knowledge, then let’s go and get someone qualified. Does it really matter that that person has spread the wealth in cricket terms by coaching an international, budding player? After all, the resource is universally available and whosoever takes the initiative gets it first. Kudos are due to the one who learnt it so well that it left the so-called seasoned Pakistani batsmen totally baffled.

Not all is lost, however; so, there is no reason for remorse. Taking a cue from my uncle, the late Yunus Said, the perennial optimist to the core on Pakistan and all that had to do with her as a nation, including, of course, cricket, there is still tomorrow to come in everyone’s life, and so it will in Pakistani cricket. We can either look forward to it in hope of learning a thing or two and taking corrective action or dread it in despair and continue being defensive. The choice is ours.

(The author is a banker in the San Francisco Bay Area. In addition, he is an adjunct professor of marketing at his alma mater Golden Gate University and serves on its Alumni Board of Directors.)

Pak's image abroad

2005-06-18T11:17:00.000-07:00

I can see Musharraf's viewpoint on not wanting to project the retrogressive image of the country abroad. What I have an issue with is his own wishy-washy approach to eradicating women's, or for that matter, the extremist issue. I see lack of consistency and actions invalidating the overall policy that the government purportedly follows.

Is this treading the fine line of politics or lack of sincerity or just a simple matter of lack of courage of conviction?

Any thoughts?

How Musharraf is protecting the image of Pakistan

2005-06-17T21:56:00.000-07:00

www.dailytimes.com.pk
Daily Times - Site Edition
Saturday, June 18, 2005
I stopped Mai from going abroad: president

AUCKLAND: President General Pervez Musharraf said on Friday that he ordered a travel ban on Mukhtar Mai to protect Pakistan’s image abroad.Gen Musharraf said Mukhtar Mai, the victim of a punchayat-ordered gang rape, was being taken to the United States by foreign non-government organisations “to bad-mouth Pakistan” over the “terrible state” of the nation’s women. He said NGOs are “Westernised fringe elements” which “are as bad as the Islamic extremists”.He acknowledged that he placed the 36-year-old on the list of people banned from leaving Pakistan while responding to media questions during a three-day visit to New Zealand.“She was told not to go” to the United States to appear on media there to tell her story, Gen Musharraf told the Auckland Foreign Correspondents’ Club. The government lifted the travel ban on Wednesday after Mai appealed to Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz. Musharraf said atrocities are perpetrated daily against women in developing nations round the world - “in Kashmir and many other places”.“I don’t want to project the bad image of Pakistan,” he told the journalists’ club.“I am a realist. Public relations is the most important thing in the world,” he said, adding that media misperceptions would discourage tourists from travelling to Pakistan.“Pakistan is the victim of poor perceptions. The reality is very different,” he said. He defended his regime’s treatment of women, saying it was working for their emancipation. Rape was not “a rampant malaise Pakistan suffers from every day,” he said. He said he was on the side of women and was trying to bring rapists to “justice in the strongest form”. His government was encouraging the emancipation of women through education and by reducing high death rates for women and children. Women’s right were also discussed during earlier talks with New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark. “This is a country with many women in powerful positions so we do take an interest. So I certainly have been satisfied today that President Musharraf shares that concern and would like to see his country move,” she said. As well as Clark, New Zealand’s top judge, parliamentary speaker and top business leader are all women.
Home Main

Urdu's New Spring on the Internet

2005-06-17T04:06:00.000-07:00

For those not familiar with it, Urdu is the language associated with the Muslims of South Asia--fully almost half of the world's Muslims. It is the language in which the madrassas of Pakistan and India operate. The official language of Pakistan, a country that needs no introduction to most readers in this day and age, it is also the language in which a great volume of literature, especially poetry, has been written--a lot of it with Sufistic content or undertones.

On the Internet, Urdu has had a presence for a while. But up to now, it has been in the form of content created using specialized software (like the ubiquitous "InPage") and then converted to a graphic format (like GIF or JPG) and then placed on a website. The content itself has usually been in the form of poetry, literature, or news and current affairs that has been created for another medium--or in another time-- and "re-purposed" for the Web. Original content creation specifically for the Internet has been very tentative; though we have had some poets use the Web as their first or main outlet and some news sites, etc. have come up.

But all that is changing. In the last few months or so, I am tracking a blossoming of Urdu language for blogging and other live discussions, and original content being developed for, and often on the web.

Blogs, of course, are where everything "is at" nowadays. And blogging in Urdu seems to have been triggered by the direct support for Urdu script that is available in Windows XP and the phonetic keyboard developed by the CRULP (the Center for Research in Urdu Language Processing at the National University of Science and Technology in Pakistan). A follow-up piece to this one will lay out the how-tos of this. Please watch this space and feel free to get in touch with the author/editor of this piece.

By way of background, this phenomenon has been preceded by the explosion of blogging in Farsi. And yes, I use that word advisedly; if what is happening in Urdu now is a "blossoming", then what has happened in Farsi is an "explosion". Farsi is reputedly now the third most popular language for online journals, and Farsi blogs are to the political scene in Iran what printed pamphlets were to revolutions in the early 20th century. But I digress. You can follow the links earlier in this paragraph to catch up on that discussion. Back to Urdu.

Here's a short round-up of things that will provide you a lay of the land, so to speak.

There is now a list of Urdu blogs:

http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/listed-at-urdu-blogs-directory.html

The above link is to a post is from "Urdu ke Naam", a collaborative blog that includes contributions by the current author, and announces that blog's being included in the list. A closer look at that blog entry will also point to a page--on, what else? a blog--that describes how to start blogging in Urdu. And one that provides templates for setting one up.

The comments on that post above also mention "Urdu Planet", a site that aggregates the content of a lot of Urdu and Urdu-related blogs in one place:

http://urdu.zackvision.com/urduplanet/

The list of blogs that page points to is hosted on the "Urdu Wiki":

http://www.sovereign-renditions.info/urduwiki/UrduHome

For readers not familiar with them, "wikis" are a wondeful new class of websites which are great for colloboratively creating content and gathering infromation. The "Urdu Wiki" has become a good place for the community forming around this whole phenomenon of Urdu on the Web. Among other things, it has pages where the community is starting to do some of the work on developing and fine-tuning the terminology for computer usage, for example. To use another link from Urdu ke Naam, see:

http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/technical-terminology-in-urdu.html

South Asian readers will remember that, till very recently, this kind of list was sent around as a joke, with satirical translations of Windows features into Urdu, Punjabi, or what-have-you. Now we are working on the real thing. And I do mean "we"--anyone can participate. I wish everybody would.

Which brings us to the next topic. A real encyclopedia in the language. The Wikipedia community has set up an encyclopedia in Urdu. Everyone can and should participate; it is a wonderful way to engage the Urdu-speaking community and Urdu lovers with the Internet, while helping the collection and growth of knowledge in Urdu. The address to get to it directly is:

http://ur.wikipedia.org

By way of background, here's a link to an earlier post by the current author on this topic:

http://ifaqeer.blogspot.com/2005/02/wikis-and-encyclopedia-in-urdu.html

One could see a conflict, or redundancy between the above two projects--but I dont. Here's why: One is a place for collaboratively developing content about Urdu and related topics, while the other is a real encyclopedia about anything and everything (or aims to be, anyhow) in Urdu. A project that, to my knowledge has not successfully been carried out since before colonial times.

To give you an example of the kind of discussions that are starting to happen as the use of the language starts to mature in its use on this medium, see the following posts on "Urdu ke Naam":

http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/urdu-speaking-wikipedia-users.html
and
http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/on-being-saahib-e-zubaan.html

Before I close, a few specific observations:

The community I am talking about spans India and Pakistan. Which, IMHO (in my humble opinion), is a good thing. It is good for the health of the language and intellectual strength of the community using it, as well as for world peace. The interesting thing is, the only tensions that arise in this online community do not arise out of national differences, but about things like the strong feeling amongst some users that the Urdu script should be the only one used for such discussion. (See the comments under the main post at http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/genres-of-urdu-poetry.html and then the current author's own post at: http://urdu-ke-naam.blogspot.com/2005/05/blog-post_11.html)

Secondly, from where I sit, the discussion of just a couple of years ago about whether Urdu is on its way out in India (see, for example, the 2003 article on Chowk that has been making the rounds on e-mail again recently) is moot. Some of the most passionate members of this community are currently based in Hyderabad, one of the historical "homes" of the language.

Another interesting thing is that the diaspora of Urdu speakers and lovers around the rest of the world is the furthest behind in this regard. Most people one talks to around Silicon Valley, for example, start the discussion with a "but I can write Urdu now, in InPage (a software for desktop publishing in Urdu)". When, after a few minutes of explaining that what is being talked about is exactly that one now does not need specialised DTP software and can employ the Urdu script anywhere in their day-to-day computer use, you can practically see the lightbulb go off above people's heads. What follows is requests for "how to" and so on.

And lastly, an expression of humility. I write this piece not to take credit for any of this, but to pay homage. The people in the trenches, doing the real work, are people like Asif Iqbal, father of the Urdu Wiki mentioned above; Danial, a blogger in Karachi; Umair Salaam, who makes a rather credible claim to have started the first blog in Urdu; Qais Mujeeb and Manzoor Khan, founders of "Urdu ke Naam"; Qadeer Ahmad Rana, the 19-year old student in Multan, Pakistan who finally scolded and shamed the current author into learning how to write in Urdu. (Wish him luck, he's in the middle of exams now.) Heartfelt khiraaj-e-thehseen and nazrana-e-aqeedhath to them. For these are the "Asathaza", the founding fathers, as "hamaari zubaan" moves into a new medium.

Adaab,
iFaqeer

PS: Shapar86, my apologies for writing another piece in English, but I really wanted to reach an audience outside those that are already set up to read and write in Urdu.

NOTE: Versions of this article have appeared in my column in Al-Mizaan and at my own blog (http://iFaqeer.blogspot.com/) and http://Urdu-ke-Naam.blogspot.com/.

Is there a gas pipeline in Pakistan's energy future?

2005-06-15T12:35:00.000-07:00

A tale of three gas pipelines
Zaheer Jan

A pipeline geared to providing natural gas to Pakistan and India couldn’t come at a better time. After the discovery of the giant Bombay High Oilfield in 1974, India has not made any significant discoveries of oil or gas resources. India’s energy needs are increasing in a geometric progression as its economy continues to grow rapidly. Concurrently, Pakistan’s main energy supplier, the Sui Gas field discovered in 1952, is also petering out. According to a report released by the government of Pakistan, Pakistan will face major shortages of oil and gas by the year 2010. Pakistan’s natural gas needs will exceeds available resources by 0.2 bcfd (billion cubic feet per day) by 2010. The shortage will grow to 1.4 bcfd by 2015 and 2.7 bcfd by 2020. Pakistan currently produces 3.5 bcfd of natural gas, enough to meet about half of the country’s total energy needs. If needed supplies were not forthcoming to make up the shortage, the demand-supply imbalance in the energy sector would start biting into the growth rate, according to an Asian Development Bank (ADB) Report.

In India, gas demand is expected to rise from current levels of 1.8 bcfd to 11.5 bcfd by 2010. India’s indigenous natural gas accounts for only 8% of the energy consumption in the country.
With no new major indigenous discoveries on the horizon, both Pakistan and India need to import natural gas. Import of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is one option but it is not as competitive as building a pipeline to bring in gas from the Middle East or Central Asia. Three competing pipeline projects are being offered to fill the subcontinent’s energy needs.
These include, first, a pipeline from Daulatabad field in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan to India (TAPING). Second, a pipeline from Qatar’s North Dome through Oman and Pakistan to India (QOPING). And, third, a pipeline from Iran’s South Pars field through Pakistan to India (IPING).

The 1,056 mile-long TAPING Pipeline is estimated to cost $3.3 billion and will be capable of transporting 2.5 billion bcfd. However, the viability of this project is questionable. While Indian gas companies have shown interest in making investments in TAPING, the ministry of external affairs has expressed doubts about the availability of adequate gas reserves.
Turkmenistan’s domestic demand for natural gas totals 1.45-2.0 bcfd. It exports 1.0-1.3 bcfd to Iran. The remainder is currently contracted to Russia leaving very little for exports. Recoverable reserves of Daulatabad gas field have still to be established. Add to this the difficult construction logistics posed by the need to traverse high mountains; lack of suitable staging stations for supplies to construction spreads; and the volatile security situation in Afghanistan and the project becomes speculative.

The QOPING pipeline would tie Qatar into the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s Dolphin Project, an integrated natural gas pipeline grid for Qatar, UAE, and Oman. From Oman, a 720-mile subsea pipeline connection to this grid will link Oman to Pakistan. The project is estimated to take five years to build at a cost of $3.5 billion. It will be able to provide 1.6 bcfd of natural gas to Pakistan. United Offsets Group (UOG), a UAE state-owned corporation backing the project, signed preliminary memorandums of understanding with Qatar, Oman, and Pakistan. ExxonMobil also signed a preliminary agreement for the natural gas supply from ExxonMobil’s production capacity in the North Field. The total project is expected to cost around $10 billion, including costs associated with the development of more extensive gas distribution networks in the UAE and Oman.

IPING would build a 1,400-mile long pipeline from Iran through Pakistan and onto India. At an estimated cost of $3.7 billion, this project is the most economically viable of the three serious contenders. Iran boasts the world’s second largest gas reserves of 812 trillion cu ft or 15.8% of world’s total available supply. The entire route of IPING pipeline is overland. It would traverse comparatively easier terrain along Iran’s and Pakistan’s Makran Coast, pass in the vicinity of Karachi and continue on eastwards along the Rann of Kutch to terminate at the industrial city of Ahmedabad in India. While sabotage of the pipeline in Balochistan of Pakistan is a natural concern, this can be addressed by focusing on regional economic development. Before commencing work, project sponsors should get the Balochis to buy-into the pipeline through offers of employment, fuel for their settlements in the vicinity of the pipeline route and water. All these items are in short supply along the pipeline route and the Balochis currently depend upon brushwood or animal droppings to meet their fuel needs. If the Balochis buy into the scheme, safety of the project is assured. Financing for the project will not be a problem. Any number of countries and companies will line up to provide the needed funds.

Politically, however, the IPING Pipeline is the most contentious project of the three that are being floated. This is because Iran remains on Washington’s most un-favored nations list. Along with North Korea, it is a member of George Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” Any move that smacks of helping Iran’s economy enters the realm of high politics. This is where India and Pakistan, in pursuit of their own economic interests, need to use their new relationship with Washington to gain an exception.

Being the world’s only superpower, it behooves the U.S. to give the go ahead to the IPING Pipeline project in the interest of promoting regional economic integration between the Middle East and South Asia. Such a gesture would go a long way toward convincing world opinion that the Bush administration is sincere when it says it wants to pursue diplomacy over confrontation during its second term in office.

Zaheer Jan is an independent energy consultant who has served as the Deputy Chief Engineer, Transmission for the Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Company in Pakistan. He has also served as Manager of Pipeline Engineering for the $24.0 billion Alaska Natural Gas Transportation System and Consultant to the State of Alaska.

This article has appeared in Daily Times, Pakistan (www.dailytimes.com.pk)

Sharmeen Obaid honored with Livingstone Award

2005-06-15T09:05:00.000-07:00

Yesterday, the winners of the Livingston Awards were announced in New York and Sharmeen Obaid was a winner for International Reporting. She is the first non-American (and first Pakistani) to win the award.

Congratulations, Sharmeen!

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http://www.livawards.org/awards/2004winners.html
LIVINGSTON AWARDS NAMES WINNERS
New York, June 14. -- Ken Auletta of the The New Yorker, Tom Brokaw of NBC
News, and Ellen Goodman of The Boston Globe announced the winners of the
$10,000 Livingston Awards in local, national and international reporting.
The prizes are limited to journalists under the age of 35, and are the
largest all-media, general-reporting prizes in the country.
Additionally, Clarence Page of the Chicago Tribune presented a $5,000 award
named for Richard M. Clurman, the distinguished Time, Inc. journalist, and
given to senior professionals who are superb on-the-job mentors.
Winners for 2004 work are:
Local reporting. Pauline Arrillaga, 34, of The Associated Press, for "Doors
to Death", about the illegal smuggling of human beings, and a deadly
tractor-trailer run in Texas.
National reporting. Reese Dunklin, 31, of The Dallas Morning News, for
"Runaway Priests: Hiding in Plain Sight", a series about priests who leave
allegations and charges of sexual abuse, for new parishes in other
countries.
International reporting. Sharmeen Obaid, 27, of Discovery Times Channel, for
"Reinventing the Taliban", about the MMA, a fundamentalist group similar to
the Taliban, who are gaining control in the government and among the
citizens of her native country of Pakistan.
The Clurman Award for Mentoring went to John Seigenthaler, Founder of the
First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University, Nashville, and founding
editorial director of USA Today. Mr. Seigenthaler was also a journalist and
editor for The (Nashville) Tennessean, where he retains the title of editor
emeritus, and was chief negotiator with the governor of Alabama during the
Freedom Rides.
Auletta, Brokaw, Goodman and Page are joined on the Livingston judging panel
by Jill Abramson of The New York Times; Christiane Amanpour of CNN; Charles
Gibson of ABC News and Osborn Elliott, former editor of Newsweek. The
program is directed by Professor Charles R. Eisendrath at the University of
Michigan.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTACT: Julaine LeDuc, 734-998-7575

Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy
www.sharmeenobaidfilms.com

Questions for Pervaiz Chacha

2005-06-14T22:13:00.000-07:00

http://planetirf.blogspot.com/2005_06_15_planetirf_archive.html

QUESTIONS FOR PERVAIZ CHACHA
Ifran Yusuf

In some parts of Pakistan, it is customary to refer to all men of one’s father’sage as “Chacha” or “Chachaji” (literally meaning “my dad’s brother” in Urdu). Inall parts of Pakistan, one must also show utmost respect to elders.

Now that President Musharraf of Pakistan is visiting Australia, I would like to ask some respectful questions to Pervaiz Chacha. I will try to be as respectful as possible.

Chacha Pervaiz, you will be aware of the negative press that Pakistan has received as a result of its implementation of a criminal code partially extracted from the ‘hudood’ laws of Islamic Sharia.

Under the code, female victims of rape are often faced with a death sentence,while male perpetrators are free to plunder the honour of more victims.

Also, under the code, religious minorities are persecuted and accused ofblasphemy. Christian Pakistanis, some as young as 11, are placed on trial and face the death penalty for breaches of anti-blasphemy laws.

Over 50 years ago, the founder of Pakistan, “Qaid-i-Azam” (translated as “theGreat Leader”) Muhammad Ali Jinnah, declared that all citizens of Pakistan wereto be treated equally regardless of faith. Christian Pakistanis have madeenormous contributions to the Pakistani nation, including in its second religion (cricket). I have lost count of how many times Yusuf Youhana has bailed out Pakistani teams from certain defeat.

You will be aware, Chacha Ji, that recently a prominent Swiss Islamic scholar bythe name of Professor Tariq Ramadan has called upon all Islamic nations toimplement a moratorium on all hudood-based criminal punishments. Professor Ramadan believes that God’s law is fast becoming the devil’s handiwork and an instrument for oppression. His call has been supported by Islamic scholars around the world including Australia and Pakistan.

When will your government implement the views of Professor Ramadan? When will you stop God’s law from being used as an instrument for the oppression of women, Christian minorities and other downtrodden Pakistanis?

Chachaji, Muslims across the Islamic world are crying out for liberty and democracy enjoyed by their relatives living in Western countries. When will you return Pakistan to full-fledged democracy?

Chachaji, I was born in Karachi. I arrived in Australia when I was hardly 6months old. I have only ever held an Australian passport. I therefore am concerned with how Australians are treated overseas.

Pervaiz Chacha, when will your government come clean on why it detained andtortured an Australian citizen? Why did your government pass this Australian citizen onto American officials who then flew him to Egypt for more torture? How could you allow an Australian to be subjected to torture within your jurisdiction?

Chacha Ji, the Prophet Muhammad did not allow prisoners of war to even havetheir teeth pulled out. I am concerned that in this “war against terror”,prisoners from various parts of the world are being taken to countries such as Egypt, Syria and your own. They are tortured on behalf of the US government as part of a contracting-out arrangement known as “rendition”.

Tell me, Chacha, to what extent does Pakistan participate in rendition? Are there any further Australian citizens being made subject to this policy?

Apart from the torture of terror suspects, we see at village level innocentMuslim women subjected to the violence of honour killings. Women merely suspected of talking to a male stranger or committing some other cultural crimeare tried by an all-male village council of elders and sentenced to death or to be gang-raped.

Numerous cases of these abuses have been documented. Custom-based violence wasapparently stamped out from Muslim societies by the Prophet Muhammad 14centuries ago. Why has it returned to Pakistan? And what steps will your government take to ensure it is eliminated completely?

Chacha Ji, I was taught that Islam guarantees human rights and the dignity of the individual in much the same way as liberal democracy. I understand that youare here on an official state visit on behalf of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Yet the abuses of human rights and individual dignity (of which a sample have been cited above) continue to be perpetrated by police, securityapparatchiks and government officials of a nation founded as an Islamicrepublic, a nation carved out for Islamic values. How can such a nation allow such crimes to be committed in its borders, against its own people and against people of my country Australia?

Uncle Pervaiz, my government also has its share of excesses. My government only selectively advocated for Australians caught up in trouble overseas. My government throws foreigners into prison camps in the middle of the desert. My government commits numerous crimes in the name of fighting terror.

My final question is to both Perzaiz Chacha and Uncle John Winston. Terror is an enemy of liberty, freedom and dignity. How can the pair of you possibly be claiming to be fighting terror when you are helping the cause of terrorists by compromising individual liberties and abusing human rights?

(The author is a Sydney employment and industrial lawyer whose ancestors were from Delhi where President Musharraf was born. He grew up in John Howard’s electorate. He can be contacted on http://mail@sydneylawyers.com)

Jinnah was not a Jihadi writes Mohsin Hafeez

2005-06-14T18:35:00.000-07:00

'From a vantage point'
Mohsin Hafeez

The mundane activities of the day- and night- in this vast land of increasingly diminished means and seemingly infinite ends have been the only encumbrance in vocalizing what has been, and is still being, internalized for a long time. Otherwise, there is a lot to say. After all, this is the post 9/11 era, not only in America but also across the globe, and what affects the sole superpower has its ripples floating way beyond one's imagination. And we have seen this. This world is a 'global village,' as opposed to being somebody's 'oyster,' as we are beginning to see; it is not even the greatest superpower's oyster, as we shall shortly and rightly see. It is a complex web of redundant resources, yet insatiable desires, on the one hand, and stark nothingness on the other. Such are the vagaries of nature. It surely does take us all back to the basic necessity of international trade, as propounded by David Ricardo, the 19th century neo-classical economist, in his Theory of Comparative Advantage. What has really jolted me out of the inertia and stirred me to put pen to paper this evening is a series of readings in this newspaper and others where there are no bones made in casting aspersions on some of the more objective writers. Such balanced contributors have the ability to see the forest for the trees and articulate a viewpoint that, to the most part, is free from any undue influence. Much to our dismay, the criticism of such visionary writers comes from some of us representing a cross-section of the population that believes their country is infallible. While this sense of patriotism is appreciated, however misplaced it may be, let us not forget to underscore the significance of introspection. It's all very well and convenient to paint with too broad a brush the lack of fair-play displayed by the ‘wannabes' of this increasingly crafty world, just as it affords us a comfort level to condone all of our own actions and polemics. Such a cross-section tends to live in a tunnel, insulated from the geo-politics of today. For them, life is in black and white, as opposed to being open to wider interpretations. This leads them to follow a more simplistic model, as opposed to a path of incisive analyses and consequent inferences! Being still in Pakistan at the time of the nuclear detonation in May, 1998, let me, at the risk of sounding unpatriotic and an infidel to the 'simplistic' some, assert my disappointment at the decision to actuallydemonstrate the nuclear 'capability.' While the possession of nukes involuntarily may serve as a deterrent, it does not necessarily follow that it be flaunted so ceremoniously. A little situational analysis at the time, done with an inclination toward objectivity and dispassionate thinking, should have yielded a different set of recommendations. This, indeed, was an opportunity to win world acclaim, in addition to being able to leverage our balance sheet. Alas, it was an opportunity lost to the perpetuation of what our country has been plagued with over a period of decades: 'ad hocism and lack of vision.' Religion has wrongly been brought in to the affairs of the state. Fundamentalism has crept in and become inextricably interwoven in each and every fabric of our society. The need for public display of religiosity has mushroomed at a galloping pace. The choice of consumption, or otherwise, of the edibles- specifically discernible when one lives abroad- has overtaken the need to restrain the conspicuous gluttony of what blatantly, almost crudely, represents social evil. A cause of this malaise has been what is known in economics as the 'demonstration-effect,’ or simply ‘keeping up with the Joneses!’ 'Rituals' have surpassed 'spirit' by far. Paranoia reigns supreme in our psyche when this ‘global village’ calls upon us to integrate with the rest of the world. We choose to isolate, instead, under the garb of maintaining our identity. Little do we realize that the line between integration and retention of one’s identity is quite well demarcated. All it takes is being a little forward thinking. One’s faith need not be in any sort of jeopardy. Indubitably, a good part of the reason for our current inadequacies stems from this particular tendency. Now, it is not difficult to see that the retrogessiveness of the above kind is prevalent all over the Muslim community. What has it resulted in? Well, with the Muslims accounting for about 20% of the global population, is it any surprise then that they are instrumental in only about 4% of international trade? To add insult to injury, of the preceding 4%, Malaysia’s contribution is about 3/4th! Unfortunately, Pakistan’s effort to figure on the map has been undermined by vested interests of the kind described above. While we are long on being conspicuously demonstrative of patriotism, with all the public statements galore, we are painfully short on promoting the spirit of that emotion. To bring the point a little closer to home, the Pakistanis are inexcusably underrepresented in some of the more prominent professions in the US. These professions help define public policy and influence public opinion. We have doctors and engineers in abundance; however, there is a serious dearth of attorneys, journalists, business and media professionals. The result: “lack of effective Pakistani lobby in the power corridors of the Congress.” The Israel lobby is by far the strongest in the country. Let’s face it. It has not happened per chance. It has happened by design. There is hardly any meaningful area in the nomenclature of the US that has no effective representation and contribution of the Jews. The fields of banking/finance, science and technology, medicine, law, media, and entertainment are but a few examples along the line. The diversity thus makes for an easier seeping in of the Jewish viewpoint among the masses of the population and the consequent entrenchment of their value system. It is not difficult to see this viz a viz the Palestine/Israel issue at hand. By some reliable information, India is a relatively close second to Israel with respect to her support lobby in the US. Again, nothing happens by accident, especially success, and this is no exception. To their credit, the Indians have been slowly and surely making their mark in just about every field in the country. Technology is on the forefront. Knowing the growing relevance of this science, they went to work on developing this resource years ago by opening some excellent training centers and producing the human potential that has today become the envy of most of us. Playing to diversity, they have also ventured out into media, entertainment, education, banking/finance and business. This has helped them sell their beliefs in the congressional sphere, hence their strong lobby. Let there be no doubt that had our founding father stayed alive a little longer, our country would have been set a direction. Let it also be reiterated here that Quaid-e-Azam M A Jinnah himself believed in secularism. He believed in Pakistan being a modern, liberal state. Mr. Jinnah worked diligently to carve out a piece of land for us out of the geography of India. This, by all means, was an achievement of immense proportions, especially since he was thus instrumental in changing the physical contours of the planet. The rationale was to create a 'homeland for the minority Muslims' of the then India, not necessarily an 'Islamic nation.' A ‘separate country for the Muslims’ in which they can exercise their rights as emancipated nationals and an ‘Islamic nation’ are two distinct and mutually exclusive concepts. Sadly, we are missing the point. Furthermore, he gave us three principles to build our nation on: ‘unity,’ ‘faith,’ and ‘discipline.’ Unfortunately, just like everything else about this great leader, he has been interpreted out of context here as well. When he mentioned 'faith,' he referred to faith in ourselves as a nation, and faith in our destiny, not necessarily faith in a religious sense. Of course, this has been distorted to hide the real meaning. And, just so there is no room for doubt about his preference for the style of government, let me quote him from his speech to the Constituent Assembly members: "You are free; you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed...that has nothing to do with thebusiness of the State." Perception building plays a huge role in contemporary politics...more so because we have the tools to propagate an intended message: the media. Some of the channels in the US have taken this exercise to another level altogether. We have seen this in recent history. The SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) of the Foxes (Fox News) of the world are but an almost unsightly example of how sterile minds are rendered even more useless, and how marketing plays into everything these days, not just corporate business. Unfortunately, we, as a nation, have failed miserably in our own projection in the world, thus marketability. Some of it does have to do with deeds, or lack thereof, but most of it is attributed to the inadequacy of words, or the words that the world wants to hear from us: the right rhetoric! After all, marketing is a warfare wherein battles are won with ideas, words, and actions. Ostracism may well be in store for me in light of the views expressed, especially since I do live abroad and possibly deemed to have no prerogative over my homeland; however, by way of clarification, I chose to return to Pakistan after having attended university in the US and served the country for a good twelve years or so prior to emigrating to America in 1998. Even now, if and when the opportunity presents itself, I do not lag behind in speaking up for my country, be it a casual affair or an arranged talk by a sponsor. That said, I try not being tainted in my views, as all it does is literally kill credibility. The fact that such tone has been clearly demonstrated here should bear testimony to the high level of commitment in this regard. As a Parthian shaft, let me quote Mr. Jinnah again: "The story of Pakistan, its struggle and its achievement, is the very story of great human ideals struggling to survive in the face of odds and difficulties..." 'Jihad,' do we hear him say?? After all, as opposed to kamikaze missions and public execution of hatred (especially, among ourselves), isn't this what the term really stands for? Or ought to??

(This piece was first published in Dawn. The author of this piece is a banker in the San Francisco Bay Area, USA. In addition, he is an adjunct professor of marketing at his alma mater, Golden Gate University, San Francisco, and serves on its Alumni Board of Directors)

GENERAL MUSHARRAF GOES ON STRUGGLING FOR LEGITIMACY

2005-06-14T14:34:00.000-07:00

Prof. Dr. S. Farooq Hasnat

On May 18th a Pakistani official spokesman said that General Pervaiz Musharraf, who also happens to be the Chief of the Army, would continue to hold office beyond 2007. It was followed by General’s assertion that two former Prime Ministers and exiled leaders of their respective parties, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto will not be allowed to participate in the expected elections in 2007. These statements send a clear message that the General is gearing up for the extension of his Presidential tenure. He had declared himself elected for five years, as a result of the controversial 2002 referendum. In Pakistan, the military has never voluntarily surrendered power and General Musharrf is following the same tradition. A noted military analyst Hasan-Askari Rizvi explains that that this continuation will rule out the possibility of the establishment of viable democratic institutions, which are already muffled to a great extent.
Musharraf’s explanation to be in power lies in his self proclaimed indispensability against international terrorism. He sends the message that the forces of extremism would takeover Pakistan, more so its nuclear assets, once he is out of power. It can be argued, on the contrary, whimsical and illegal control would in fact encourage militancy in Pakistan. It would undermine the national political parties and would inculcate a culture of distrust and greed. All these factors taken together would further weaken, not strengthen the Pakistani society. As witnessed in Afghanistan, unstable societies are a hotbed for extremist tendencies.
The new world order presented a value system, according to which the human rights and democratic institutions were to be encouraged and enforced. By the end of the last century it became unthinkable that in countries where democratic institutions were in place could follow any other path. The emphasis was on the strengthening of the institutions; its roll back was not conceived. On 12th October 1999 Pakistan became an exception, when its military took over power, sacked the elected Prime Minister (no matter how controversial he was), dissolved the National and Provincial assemblies and suspended the constitution. This was the fourth time that the army had intervened, through Martial Law, although this time, it was not declared, as such. The promised takings of the post-coup regime were stereotypes, such as a promise of free and fair elections, bringing true democracy in the country and eradication of corruption. It was an echo of the previous military dictatorships of General Ayub Khan, General Zahya Khan and General Zia ul Haq. Soon after his takeover, addressing a press conference, General Musharraf affirmed that he would remain in office for not more than three years.
Since 1958, the direct military rule in Pakistan, is spread for about three decades. From 1985 to 1988 President Zia ul Haq installed a civilian Prime Minister, but kept the powers in his office, by grossly amending the 1973 constitution. After the death of President Zia, a political process started as a result of 1988 elections, with an expectation that future Pakistan would move towards a civil society. For nearly 11 years (1988-1999) Pakistan Muslim League, under Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan People’s Party led by Benazir Bhutto alternately shared power. Within the main stream politics, for the first time, a two party system emerged, promising that it would provide a kind of political stability that was not seen before - although, both the leaders could not use their authority to strengthen the institutions, political or otherwise. These governments lacked seriousness of purpose and agendas for the future. Their commitment to the welfare of the people was weak and the matters that affected the real lives of the people were never addressed. Whenever, the opportunity arose, these two leaders would eagerly cooperate with the military establishment. In fact, when in opposition they would send feelers to the Commander in Chief to intervene. The civilian governments failed to allow a democratic culture to take its roots in the polity of Pakistan. However, in spite of all its flaws, the political process was captivating the foundations of a democratic culture. More so, the participation of the people was being reflected, in one way or the other. It was believed that uninterrupted political process would ultimately bring a civil society in place and that Pakistan would get rid of the menace of military takeovers. The frail political governments were not all that meek. The military interference was challenged from time to time and measures were taken to take command of the armed forces. One of the fragile Prime Minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo boldly challenged the corruption and non professionalism within the Armed Forces. Just before his ouster, apart from other acts to curtail the ambitious Generals, he had ordered an inquiry of the Ojheri weaponry site blast of April 10, 1988, which was suspected to be a master mind of an Army General, pilferrating the arms, meant for Afghan Mujahideens. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October 8, 1998 removed the Amy Chief General Jehangir Karamat for his interference in politics and a naval chief was dismissed on corruption charges. The third General to be dismissed was none other than Pervaiz Muharraf, who was accused of mismanaging the Kargil adventure. No matter Nawaz Sharif wanted to clip the wings of the Generals to enhance his personal power, but these actions fit well in explaining a delicate balance between the military and the civilian authority – where ultimately the civilian governments lost the battle for control.
On its part, the military sat on the fences, putting pressures on at least three main concerns of Pakistan, namely, the nuclear issue; the Kashmir issue and the Afghan issue. The military pushed the weak political governments to accommodate the retired Generals at key civilian positions, severely compromising the efficiency of the national institutions. Apart from that the military got increasingly involved in taking control of the economic institutions of the country. Their corporate interests got more expanded with every new opportunity. With that the stories of corruption and nepotism became a house hold talk.
Immediately after the coup, Army chief General Pervaiz Musharraf, held a one and a half hour meeting with the Ambassador of the United States, William B. Milam, which according to some sources was described as “good”. It was quoted that the American Ambassador gave a patient hearing to the military ruler and, heard with interest his agenda to solve Pakistan’s unresolved issues. It was known that General Pervez Musharraf wanted to get a nod from the United States, which was the sole super power, with ability to influence the world/regional events. General Musharraf’s legitimacy as a military ruler, through a coup, could not come from the people of Pakistan and he understood that well.
Anxious as he was, the General was desperate to legitimize his rule by whatever
means. Like his predecessor General Zia ul Haq, General Musharraf’ in 2002 undertook to legitimize his un-Constitutional rule by holding a national referendum. Like General Zia, the system could not gain legitimacy by the law of necessity doctrine alone, so generously applied by the highest court in Pakistan. The referendum question was: "For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of Quaid-e-Azam, would you like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as president of Pakistan for five years?" Insignificant number of people cared to vote but the General declared himself as the President for the next five years. Interestingly, later the General admitted that the referendum was flawed but he would still keep his post for the next five years.
The Washington Post in its editorial of April 12, 2002 had suggested that the Bush administration’s support for the General in holding a referendum would be a mistake, unless he is willing to “work within a legitimate democratic system”. But political expediency of President Bush overcame all other values.
Even today, the question of legitimacy is grave for the President. He himself had admitted that the referendum in which he was the sole candidate was faulty. Still further, referendums are not meant for the purpose of electing a political office. When used for this reason, it is as undemocratic in appearance as is in practice. The wordings of the question on the ballot were so confusing that it made little sense to vote, either way. In spite of the inherent flaw in the procedure, at the eve of that legitimizing exercise, a number of questions were raised. It was argued that, “the referendum results could be termed authentic only if the next elected parliament and the provincial assemblies validate them. Secondly, the president must not amend the constitution unnecessarily. Thirdly, the newly-elected president must not manipulate the forthcoming general elections. Fourthly, once his election is validated by the newly-elected legislatures, General Musharraf should retire as the chief of army staff.” On all accounts the General failed to fulfill any of the conditions and thus even after three years questions about his legitimacy as a head of the State and government remains on the horizon, as bright as ever. The system faces the crisis of political legitimacy.
By the first quarter of 2005, the Pakistani society had become a hallmark of misrule, as widespread corruption and mediocre became the standard norm. At the macro level the issues of the legitimacy of the regime and sovereignty of the nation remains the main two concerns for the people of Pakistan. A unanimous view exists that under the repeated Military interventions, the Pakistani society has grossly worsened and help is needed in all fields. A renowned Pakistani Professor noted that the national “politics has been reduced to a mere game of chess and with the exception of rare voices in the wilderness, transcendental principles have no relevance in statecraft”. He further adds “…for all the claims of realism and pragmatism, the problems of an economy in shambles, law and order in disarray and education in tatters, and not addressed. Politics has fallen into disrepute because the practitioners of Realpolitik do not appear to have a clear vision of the chronic ills of our society. In the realm of thought, we are going in the dark”. The Pakistani society today is a sad picture of the collapse of all institutions and a widespread degeneration in the society. People have been led to short cuts, greed, and other illegal means, thus paving ways for incompetence and corruption. Nearly every program that was launched by the military government, failed to achieve its goals, education being the major victim.
Pakistan represents more of a society resembling a medieval rule, with a resemblance of the dark ages of the Muslim civilization, than a modern Islamic nation with well established structures of a civil society. Professor Stephen Cohen remarks, “If he (General Musharraf) resembles any past Pakistani leader, it is General Yahya Khan - also a well-intentioned general who did the United States a great service”. The professor further hinted that Musharraf has rented his country to the more powerful states. General Musharraf gets his legitimacy from outside as he fails to obtain from the people of Pakistan.
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The sad tale of Mukhtaran Bibi--a future we don't want

2005-06-14T09:39:00.000-07:00

June 14, 2005
Raped, Kidnapped and Silenced
By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
No wonder the Pakistan government can't catch Osama bin Laden. It is too busy harassing, detaining - and now kidnapping - a gang-rape victim for daring to protest and for planning a visit to the United States.
Last fall I wrote about Mukhtaran Bibi, a woman who was sentenced by a tribal council in Pakistan to be gang-raped because of an infraction supposedly committed by her brother. Four men raped Ms. Mukhtaran, then village leaders forced her to walk home nearly naked in front of a jeering crowd of 300.
Ms. Mukhtaran was supposed to have committed suicide. Instead, with the backing of a local Islamic leader, she fought back and testified against her persecutors. Six were convicted.
Then Ms. Mukhtaran, who believed that the best way to overcome such abuses was through better education, used her compensation money to start two schools in her village, one for boys and the other for girls. She went out of her way to enroll the children of her attackers in the schools, showing that she bore no grudges.
Readers of my column sent in more than $133,000 for her. Mercy Corps, a U.S. aid organization, has helped her administer the money, and she has expanded the schools, started a shelter for abused women and bought a van that is used as an ambulance for the area. She has also emerged as a ferocious spokeswoman against honor killings, rapes and acid attacks on women. (If you want to help her, please don't send checks to me but to Mercy Corps, with "Mukhtaran Bibi" in the memo line: 3015 S.W. First, Portland, Ore. 97201.)
A group of Pakistani-Americans invited Ms. Mukhtaran to visit the U.S. starting this Saturday (see www.4anaa.org). Then a few days ago, the Pakistani government went berserk.
On Thursday, the authorities put Ms. Mukhtaran under house arrest - to stop her from speaking out. In phone conversations in the last few days, she said that when she tried to step outside, police pointed their guns at her. To silence her, the police cut off her land line.
After she had been detained, a court ordered her attackers released, putting her life in jeopardy. That happened on a Friday afternoon, when the courts do not normally operate, and apparently was a warning to Ms. Mukhtaran to shut up. Instead, Ms. Mukhtaran continued her protests by cellphone. But at dawn yesterday the police bustled her off, and there's been no word from her since. Her cellphone doesn't answer.
Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer who is head of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, said she had learned that Ms. Mukhtaran was taken to Islamabad, furiously berated and told that President Pervez Musharraf was very angry with her. She was led sobbing to detention at a secret location. She is barred from contacting anyone, including her lawyer.
"She's in their custody, in illegal custody," Ms. Jahangir said. "They have gone completely crazy."
Even if Ms. Mukhtaran were released, airports have been alerted to bar her from leaving the country. According to Dawn, a Karachi newspaper, the government took this step, "fearing that she might malign Pakistan's image."
Excuse me, but Ms. Mukhtaran, a symbol of courage and altruism, is the best hope for Pakistan's image. The threat to Pakistan's image comes from President Musharraf for all this thuggish behavior.
I've been sympathetic to Mr. Musharraf till now, despite his nuclear negligence, partly because he's cooperated in the war on terrorism and partly because he has done a good job nurturing Pakistan's economic growth, which in the long run is probably the best way to fight fundamentalism. So even when Mr. Musharraf denied me visas all this year, to block me from visiting Ms. Mukhtaran again and writing a follow-up column, I bit my tongue.
But now President Musharraf has gone nuts.
"This is all because they think they have the support of the U.S. and can get away with murder," Ms. Jahangir said. Indeed, on Friday, just as all this was happening, President Bush received Pakistan's foreign minister in the White House and praised President Musharraf's "bold leadership."
So, Mr. Bush, how about asking Mr. Musharraf to focus on finding Osama, instead of kidnapping rape victims who speak out? And invite Ms. Mukhtaran to the Oval Office - to show that Americans stand not only with generals who seize power, but also with ordinary people of extraordinary courage.
E-mail: nicholas@nytimes.com
Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company
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Not mixing up the short term with the long term

2005-06-13T15:27:00.000-07:00

My view is that the people of Pakistan have always taken the short term view and have looked for immediate salvation, rather than taking the long term view and accepting that there will be pain to bear along the way.

This is why whenever we have a new leader, people get excited and start believing that salvation has finally arrived from the heavens. Whether that leader be Ayub Khan, Bhutto the father, Zia ul Haq, Bhutto the daughter, Nawaz Sharif or now Pervez Musharraf.

Given this prevailing frame of mind, we are always looking for an individual who can come in and clean up the mess overnight (hence the calls for Imran Khan), rather than setting up a constitutional process and forcing whoever comes into power to govern within that process. Not allowing individual leaders to change the constitution to perpetuate their own rule. In this case, we might get some corrupt or incompetent leaders but we MUST stick to the process and allow power to change hands by constitutional means (this has never happened in Pakistan except in the case of Ch. Mohammad Ali, I believe).

If the US can survive the current leadership, we have to believe that Pakistan is strong enough to survive a few years of inept or corrupt leadership as well. Democracy and the will of the people have a way of cleansing the system out but we need patience to let this happen over a period of time.

Even though I think both Benazir and Nawaz damaged the country significantly, the preferable route in my mind would have been to take the short term pain and let the people of Pakistan make the change through elections. This way, these leaders would not have been able to claim that they had been victimized by the military or the Bureaucracy and come back to power again and again. I know some people believe that Pakistan is too fragile to withstand too many years of bad leadership. But between the two terms of Benazir and those of Nawaz Sharif, the country suffered for many years. Wouldn't it have been better to let each of them complete their term and then be rejected by the people? At least they would not be in a position to come back to power now.

Abid Farooq

The algebra of democracy

2005-06-13T15:23:00.000-07:00

Dear friends,

In a way, Pakistan is a complex study case as far as democracy is concerned; and, in another way, it is very a simple case study if we look at it in its true perspective.

When Pakistan came into existence, the equation of power was somewhat like:

Political Leadership = the people

Then very soon this equation changed into:

Leadership + Bureaucracy = the people

This equation remained in action from 1950 to 1956. The leadership tried to constitutionalise the state, but during this period the equation started to change:

Bureaucracy + Military = the people

In this phase, leadership gradually phased out. Bureaucracy and military strengthened its hold on power. In 1958, with the imposition of martial law this equation totally changed. It turned into this equation:

Military + Bureaucracy = the people

This scenario continued until Pakistan collapsed in 1971. After the collapse of Pakistan in 1971 the equation changed to:

Political Leadership + Bureaucracy = the people

This equation again tried to constitutionalise the state, but the real actors immediately changed the equation to:

Military + Military + Bureaucracy = the people

After this off and on this equation has been changing from:

Military + Military + Bureaucracy = the people

To

Military + Military + Bureaucracy + political leadership = the people

And again to:

Military + Military + Bureaucracy = the people

During this whole process we find one interesting element: the politicians tried to constitutionalise the state whereas the khakis always destroyed or over rode the process of constitutionalisation of state.

If we really want to pull Pakistan out of the sink it has been in for all times, we need to bring the real equation back:

Political Leadership = the people

We can do it through constitutionalising the state. Since, we know who is the culprit (i.e., who is destroying or over riding the process of constitutionalisation), we, the people of Pakistan, because we have the biggest stake in the state of Pakistan, have to move in and apprehend the culprit. If are hoping some general (Musharraf or anyone else) or a member of the judiciary or United States or anyone else will do it for us, we are hoping against hope. The people of Pakistan have to move in and they have to take charge of the situation and constitutiolise the country by imposing the writ of constitution.

Best regards,

K. Ashraf

Thinking Beyond Imran Khan by Tarek Fatah

2005-06-13T15:19:00.000-07:00

Ahmad,

What strikes me as juvenile is the fact that despite the clichéd condemnation of the feudal, so many of us cannot shed the feudal cult of personalities.

We grew up with our middle class parents praising, Ayub Khan as good for the country, then we had otherwise educated and sensible people making six figure salaries sing accolades for Zia.

Now, after having lived and and experienced the folly of personality cults, Pakistanis who live in democratic societies, are presenting Imran Khan as the panacea to our ills!

Unless this is tongue-in-cheek attempt, I am astonished that people can seriously discuss 'personalities' instead of policies. And what distresses me is that this is coming, not from the streets in Karachi or Lahore, but from the suburbia of the US!

As far as I am concerned, any country that has seen three civil wars; the separation of its majority (bizarre concept unheard of in human history); destruction of its indigenous cultures, languages and customs, and is on a threshold of another brewing insurgency by the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), needs a serous introspection, rather than a discussion of which personality is better suited to sort the mess.

We grew up with stories of shahazadas and khalifas of the past and it seems we cannot get rid of the simplistic analysis that is the hallmark of Pakistanis.

The country was created as confederation of Muslim States and was stolen, not by Military or Feudal lords, but a civil beurecarcy that turned it into their private club from the days of Aziz Ahmad onwards.

It is probably the only post-colonial nation that honoured as its heroes those who worked for the Colonial power.

Tariq Fatah

The Genesis of Militancy in Pakistan

2005-06-13T13:48:00.000-07:00

The Genesis of Militancy in Pakistan

S. Farooq Hasnat, Ph.D.

An unruffled study has to be conducted, with the intension of revealing the real reasons for the “sudden” ascend of militant tendencies, in the Pakistani society. The broader propensity of intolerance is stretched to all layers of the State institutions, (including the military and bureaucracy) and is not confined only to the non-state actors. On the other hand, when it comes to a violent resentment, it is not restricted to the “Islamic militants” or sectarian fanatics, alone – it is rather a part of more comprehensive phenomena. More than one ideological group, are responsible for disturbing the nonviolent traditions of Pakistan. The trend of violence and extremism is reflected at all levels of societal contacts and it became more prominent as the Pakistani society moved towards the end of the last century. Militancy in Pakistan has many facets – ranging from military coups (including attempted) to sectarian killings. Also included are the ethnic related civil war situations. There is no denying in the fact that today’s Pakistan is more known for its religious fanatics than anything else. At the same instance it’s also a reality that this bigotry, originates from a variety of factors – like any other phenomena, it did not emerge by itself.
The society, as a whole has done away with the conflict management mechanisms; which should have been in the fabric of the societal relationships, in laws and in the agendas of the establishment. The social cohesion and community values, which once were a hallmark of the typical Pakistani society, have given way to exclusiveness, status and above all gluttony.
To uncover the truth, a narrow approach, which is intended for political and security purposes, must be broaden to the society in general. We have to look far behind the closed walls of the madrasahs and the syllabus that is being taught at those places. The problem lies in the extended society; the manner in which the State is being governed and the types of relief a citizen is denied, through normal economic, legal and administrative/political methods. This is accompanied by the feeling of deprivation, amongst a large majority of the people. Sponsored and encouraged by the corrupt military and civilian regimes, it has become an accepted norm to look for short cuts, strife for out of turn benefits, and to become wealthy, no matter what it takes. This practice has severely compromised merit and mediocre has replaced excellence and professionalism. All these trends promote militancy as citizens have no customary channels to redress. An understanding of this phenomenon could help us to locate the level and kinds of frustration that is prevalent in the Pakistani society.

On a broader spectrum, it has become a fashion to trace all acts of violent behavior to Islamic community. There is so much rhetoric in this regard that other possible reasons for the rise of militancy in Pakistan, have been set aside. The international media has found a new excitement about the activities of the militant groups and linking them only and only with the Muslim ideology, no matter where they are located. It is being prorated as if the origin and manifestation of extremism and terrorism is only confined to Islam or at least to people who believe in the religion and call themselves Muslims. It is also believed as if the militancy is constituted as part of the Pakistani society. This impression is further reinforced by the Greater Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes, which after 9/11 got the opportunity to strengthen their dictatorial rule, by deliberately misinterpreting the unrest in their respective societies. In this way the state extremism or militarism received its authenticity, from the international community.

After September 11, the dictatorial regimes of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan rushed to support the United States, facilitating the American onslaught on Afghanistan. The intension behind those gestures was not because of moral reasons or to become an honest partner in a war against the evil of terrorism. It was in fact to protect their regimes against the growing unrest within their societies, originating from the massive financial corruption, brutal control and gross injustice by the dictatorial rulers. In the process, every dissent and every revolt that took place within their respective countries was branded as Islamic militancy and being part of the international terrorist network. Under this pretext, the gross violations of human rights, by the state structures, were justified. These regimes have freely branded their opponents as Islamist militants, with the intension to disguise the grievances of the people. The rulers try to outdo each other, in getting legitimacy for their illegal regimes, as they are not able to get support from their own people. A glaring example is the massacre of nearly 700 people by the Uzbek army, while the world looked the other way. A more regrettable feature is that no distinctions are being drawn between the Islamic groups, having a visible political program and are part of the participatory system and those that are hidden and have an exclusive agenda of destruction.

Until the beginning of 1990s, the Pakistani society was reasonably tolerant. In 1968, a gigantic mass movement against the doctorial rule of Ayub Khan went on for months, in nearly all big cities and towns of Pakistan. There was hardy an instance of sabotage or any other source of violence, from the agitators. In fact this extended mass revolt, in search of tranquility, demanded freedom and democracy and a freely elected Parliament. Another mass movement against the rigging of the 1977 general elections followed the same pattern.

Decades of military rule created a way of life, where the real Pakistani values were undermined, which ultimately eroded for the worse. Oppression, intolerance and disregard for law were practiced by the ruling elite, as an accepted model. Taking advantage of the Afghan situation, in the 1980s, General Zia, further inculcated a culture of violence by his deceitful rule. While the Afghan resistance went on, his inapt military administration silently adjusted to the culture of violence and militancy, within the Pakistani society. Regional secular parties were created to protect the narrow objectives of the junta, which as a result undermined nationally acknowledged political entities. These narrow focused military sponsored political groups were based on hatred and suspicion, which became instrumental in disturbing the peace and balance of the society.
After the Soviet left, the military undertook upon itself an assignment of playing a “role”, in war-torn Afghanistan. The establishment’s interests were based on egoistic and self-defeating multifaceted conviction that they could play a role in the making and maintenance of a regime of their liking in Afghanistan. Their close ties with the Taliban encouraged the militant Islamist organizations, to go ahead unabated, with their agenda of extremism. The Pakistani governments callously allowed the Talibanization of the Pakistani society, inducting culture of hate and bigotry, which ultimately ruined the centuries of societal balance.

The Generals of Pakistan Army and the Taliban had nothing in common, as far as ideology is concerned – in fact they were poles apart. The Army generals have always been secular in their approach, representing in their habits, style and training a true reminisce of the British colonial rule. While, the Taliban advocated a unique interpretation of Islam – rigid and uncompromising by any standards. However, the interests of the two coincided on such secular matters of mutual interests as narcotics money, kick backs and providing arms and support to the Taliban regime, for financial rewards. After the nuclear tests of May 1998, the faulty concept of “strategic depth” was no more relevant, and with that the flawed rationale that had become an excuse to interfere in a neighboring country, could not hold ground. The Pakistan Afghan policy had a certain mind-set which continued even after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, although the events had drastically transformed the regional as well as international security perceptions. There was no possibility that in post 9/11 the Pakistani establishment could have wriggled out of the mess, of which it was equally responsible. Even the swiftness, with which the military took a u-turn, could not save the country from the well entrenched effects of violent behavior in the Pakistani society.

In Pakistan, there is a strong linkage between rising religious bigotry/terrorism and poverty and role of dictatorial rule, based on well defined hierarchal pyramid. James C. Davies gives a psychological explanation of why people revolt by explaining a gap that exists between what people want and what people get. His theory explains that when frustration becomes widespread and intense, society seeks violent means and once the frustration becomes focused on the government, the violence becomes coherent and directional. Decades of military oppression, establishment’s greed, chronic illiteracy, high unemployment and callus attitude of the military/bureaucratic alliance inculcate a feeling of despair and dejection in Pakistan. Under the circumstances, the frustrated youth becomes an easy prey for the recruiters of hate and rejection, postured under the brand of religious extremists.

The genesis of militancy must take into account the alteration of the society, under the extensive dictatorial rule in Pakistan. Concluding, we can say that despair and frustration, arising from the extended military rule, is directly linked to the unjust socio-economic order and the foreign policy issues, where a strong feeling exists amongst the Islamists, secularists and nationalists alike, that the national interests and sovereignty of the country, are being compromised.
-----------------------------------

Do we need democracy? by Mohsin Hafeez

2005-06-13T10:28:00.000-07:00

We have all heard ad nauseam on the need for democracy in Pakistan. But so far I have not even any semblance of democracy in Pakistan. We have had either 'militaryrule' or 'a sham democracy.' The rot started with the onset of the first Army takeover in 1958 and its diktat, even though there are views that date it back to soon after the Quaid's death. The apparent economic developmentin the early 60s, preceded by the start of the less than transparent Pak-US friendship, what with all its vissicitudes, went a long way in masking the real state of the State (the Union). Everybody basked in the glory of what they saw, totally ignoring the cancer it was spreading all over the institutional structure.The bureaucracy, in cahoots with the military junta,pitched in solidly then and continues to dominate therunning of the country to date. The feudalisticcharacteristic of the country has only gainedstrength. No government has had the courage to dealwith this evil. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to see how the social system got further plagued. With no emphasis on education among the masses, we are today at the lowest ebb of the LDCs in terms of literacyrate. The population growth has been explosive becausewe have let our 'mullah' class overrule 'rationale.' In addition, with contsant boosting of the military budget under the pretext of standing tall against theneighboring enemy has only drained the nation ofcritical resources. The trickle down theory works at its best when there is a spiral of ill-thought out decisions. To boost the military, we must borrow and thus increase our debt-servicing obligation. Word has it that between defence and debt-servicing, we are left with a mere 9-10% of the annual budget for social sectors. That includes, but may not be limited to, education, health, and women's development etc. With a good part of the population living at the subsistencelevel, does it make sense for us to even entertain the thought of acquiring F-16s? And what about the nuclear detonation of 1998?. Isn't this all a scourge that we must get rid of if we are to really and seriouslyrethink our country's priorities? The above may sound a little idealistic but there issomething to be said for 'idealism.' In a country where democratic institutions have been totally annihilated, the foremost concern should be the irreconstruction. Media need(s) to be liberated. We must choose, in this embryonic stage (imagine after almost58 years of physical existence), between 'liberty' and'democracy' as a start. It's a myth that the two are mutually inclusive. We know from our example in thegood, old US of A, which prides itself as the greatest political system, that while democracy flourishes,freedom or liberty diminishes. There is a frameworklaid out by the forefathers of this country that hascome to stay as the 'law.' I doubt if the majority ofthe population necessarily agrees with everything that has been handed down. Democracy is a loose term that has been used rather vaguely at times and equallyconveniently so as well. We need in Pakistan a system that respects the wishesof the people of the country, irrespective of theirreligion, caste, creed, or color. To maintain andexercize the famous management concept of simultaneous'loose-tight control,' there has to be a politicalsystem that is not only laid out but actuallyimplemented at all costs. This will take disciplinewhich makes me shudder as our nation is known to bequite nonchalant and cavalier. The military needs togo back to the barracks and leave the civiliangovernance to civilians. Musharraf's ideas for thecountry notwithstanding, I'd be happier to see him as a civilian president putting forth these policies. Additionally, I'd like him to be consistently clampingdown hard on the religious/extremist element. Finally, I'd like him to have good people around to advise him as, really, this is what it's all about!!I am willing to be patient as long as there are signsof promise...the product should be reliable and MUSThave 'promise of delivery.' Unfortunately, while I dohear about this boom (?) from the elite of thecountry, I see little hope of any improvement on the socio-political plain. And this is sad and must change!

Best,Mohsin Hafeez"

"Musharraf's new budget" by Hasan Askari Rizvi

2005-06-12T23:11:00.000-07:00

Here is a timely analysis by Dr. Hasan Askari Rizvi (taken from Monday's Daily Times). He writes:

"It is interesting to note that the combined federal allocation for health (Rs 9.43 billion) and education (Rs16.22 billion) is less than the increase in defence expenditure from last year’s budget. The budget for 2004-05 allocated Rs 193.92 billion to defence which was raised to Rs 223.5 billion in the budget for 2005-06."

Here is the full column:

Daily Times - Site Edition
Monday, June 13, 2005
VIEW: The federal budget and human security —Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi
The budget is geared primarily to serve the people of the first Pakistan. It offers them opportunities to engage in economic activities and to make money. The people of the second Pakistan are advised to wait patiently till the rewards of the activities of the people of first Pakistan trickle down to themThe presentation of the federal budget to the National Assembly on June 6 has started a highly opinionated debate in political circles. The official circles are overplaying the positive aspects of the budget and describing it as the biggest gift of the Musharraf-Aziz government to the nation. The opposition is taking the opposite view. Its leaders are pointing out the lopsidedness of the budget, which they say is based on concocted figures to hide the serious deficiencies in economic management. They take exception to Pakistan’s dependence on economic assistance from the international financial institutions and several Western countries. Such polemics can continue forever because the budget does have positive as well as negative aspects. There are serious problems with the budget but this does not mean that it has no good news about Pakistan’s economy. The downward slide of the economy as witnessed after the nuclear explosions in May 1998 has been checked and, since 2001-2002, the economy has shown significant progress. However, it is difficult to decide who should get the major credit for this recovery: Pakistan’s economic managers or the US and other Western governments that have made a determined effort since September 2001 to pull Pakistan out of its economic predicament? What matters most about a budget is its underlying philosophy and the over-all direction. The most crucial question is who benefits most from it? The statements coming out of Islamabad are optimistic. These indicate that Pakistan’s economy has “taken off” and Pakistan is now well set on the road to prosperity and development; the fruits of growth have started reaching the common people whose lives will soon experience an economic transformation for the better. Interaction with the people in the lower-middle to the lowest strata leads to a very different view of the economy. Islamabad’s optimism is not reflected here. Poverty appears to have increased. Most people in the lowest strata of the society talk of unbearable economic pressures. Some complain that they cannot provide two daily meals to their families. Poverty, underdevelopment, severe economic pressures and alienation from state institutions dominate the scene.It seems that there are two Pakistans. One — the Pakistan enjoying Islamabad’s attention — consists of the affluent classes: big business and industry, senior civil and military officials and those who draw special grade salaries and perks. It includes the people who have made a fortune in the real estate business. This is a world of affluence, prosperity and abundance. Optimism about the security of their personal and family’s future pervades these sections of the populace. Their children study either in private sector institutions in Pakistan or in the United States and the UK. This saves them from the acute crisis of quality in the state-run institutions, especially the state universities. The other Pakistan belongs to the people struggling for economic survival. Their main challenge is how to meet the basic needs, i.e., food, shelter, healthcare and personal security. If their children seek education, it is in the decaying state-run educational system. Pakistan’s economic recovery has very little to offer to the people belonging to the second Pakistan. The budget is geared primarily to serve the people of the first Pakistan. It offers them opportunities to engage in economic activities and to make money. The people of the second Pakistan are advised to wait patiently till the rewards of the activities of the people of first Pakistan trickle down to them. Economic activities of the big business and industry, they are told, will create new jobs and opportunities for them. There is some resemblance between Pakistan’s current capitalist economic policies and the economic development model pursued by Ayub Khan in the mid-1960s. Pakistan registered impressive economic and industrial growth during the Ayub years. In 1968, the government celebrated the Decade of Development (1958-68) to mark its achievements and massive propaganda was launched to highlight them. The major flaw in Ayub’s economic development strategy was that it had nothing much for the poor. They were advised, as they are being told now, to wait for the trickle-down of the benefits of aggregate economic growth. The standard argument was that inequality was integral to early stages of economic development. Once enough business and industry was established employment opportunities for the poor would increase. The difficult but temporary phase would soon be followed by an era of prosperity. This did not happen. As a matter of fact, the trickle-down philosophy and advice to the poor to be patient has worked in no large-population developing country. Ayubian economics increased the disparities between various sections of population and regions of Pakistan.A similar situation of growing poverty and disparities exists today despite an impressive economic growth. However, three major differences give some breathing space to the Musharraf government. First, international financial institutions and some Western states are providing funds for social development, including poverty reduction, and institutional capacity building. This assistance is meant to provide a cushion for Pakistan’s return to privatisation, free trade and globalisation, a new and updated version of capitalism. Second, remittances by Pakistanis working abroad, especially in the Middle East and the UK, to their families in Pakistan are helping ease economic pressures on a large number of people. Third, voluntary charities and the support from the extended family provide some relief to the poor. These factors have dampened many people’s zeal for agitation. Further, a large number of unemployed youth have taken to religious orthodoxy and militancy. This has diverted their energies to ideological issues. As some of them get demobilised, economic deprivation and poverty are likely to have implications for their social and political disposition.The poor sections of population cannot be left to the mercy of the market forces. They cannot be asked to wait while the rich gets richer and till the industrialists install more industry. The state must make corrective interventions in the economic domain in support of the under-privileged section of the populace. The federal budget needs to make more resources available for societal development and must adopt effective measures to ensure human security. Currently, debt repayment, defence expenditure, law and order and administration take up most of the resources. There is a tendency to under-spend the development allocations but the state almost always ends up over-spending the defence allocations. One wonders what will happen to Pakistan’s social development programmes once international financial assistance is not available. It is interesting to note that the combined federal allocation for health (Rs 9.43 billion) and education (Rs16.22 billion) is less than the increase in defence expenditure from last year’s budget. The budget for 2004-05 allocated Rs 193.92 billion to defence which was raised to Rs 223.5 billion in the budget for 2005-06. The defence sector also gets resources through other means. These include the pensions of military personnel, which is shown as civilian expenditure, covert expenditure on defence-oriented projects, income generated by the military through its commercial and industrial activities, and foreign loans and grants for military training and purchase of hardware. Pakistan can be described as a country where poverty of resources for human needs is in sharp contrast to the affluence under which the military operates. The budget priorities will have to change drastically if the gap between the two Pakistans is to be bridged.Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi is a political and defence analyst

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_13-6-2005_pg3_2

Where will Pakistan be (if and) when it turns 100?

2005-06-11T23:47:00.000-07:00

Envisioning Pakistan in 2047
Ahmad Faruqui

In the mid-nineties, Yale historian Paul Kennedy called Pakistan one of nine pivotal states in the developing world, since its collapse would create mayhem in the surrounding areas while its steady economic progress and stability would bolster its region’s economic vitality and political soundness.

In the year 2000, the US National Intelligence Council (NIC), which advises the US Central Intelligence Agency, offered a grim prognosis for Pakistan in the year 2015. It said that Pakistan would experience continuing domestic turmoil that would see the central government’s control being reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi. The latest report from the NIC, Mapping Global Futures, does not dwell much on Pakistan’s misfortunes, focusing instead on the rise of China and India.

Given the lawlessness that prevails in Pakistan today, it is hard to envision a positive future for Pakistan in the near term or even the medium term. However, it is possible to imagine such an outcome over the long term, when the current oligarchic leadership of generals, feudal lords and corrupt politicians would have turned over. There is a chance that they will have taken Pakistan down with them but there is an equally good chance that Pakistan would have survived their self-serving agendas. It is probable that their departure will create the conditions when Pakistan as envisioned by Allama Iqbal and the Quaid-e-Azam would finally come into being, thus fulfilling its Pakistan’s destiny.

Let us focus on the year 2047, when Pakistan would be observing its first centennial. It is reasonably close to 2050, the focus of two recent global economic and demographic projections.

The economic projection is by the investment-banking firm of Goldman Sachs in New York. It says the U.S. domination of the world would have come to an end by then. In 1950, the U.S. accounted for half of the world’s economic output. Today, it accounts for a fifth. By 2050, it may account for just a tenth. The Chinese economy will become larger than the U.S. economy around 2040 and by 2047 it would be some 25 percent larger. India’s economy would exceed Japan’s by 2030. However, by 2047 neither China nor India would be the richest nations in the globe, as measured by per capita income. China’s per capita income would be less than half of the U.S.’s while India’s would be about a fifth.

The Goldman Sachs report does not say anything about Pakistan but its approach can be applied to Pakistan. The projections are based on a widely used economic model, which forecasts economic growth as a function of three variables: growth in the labor force, the rate of investment and growth in labor productivity (managerial ingenuity and technological progress).

The demographic projection is by the U.N., and says that by 2050, Pakistan will be the fourth largest nation in the world. It would have a population of some 350 million, up from 141 million in 2000 and from 40 million in 1950. India would be the world’s most populous country but there would be one Pakistani for every four-and-a-half Indians, compared with one Pakistani today for every seven Indians. Pakistan would have a very large labor force, one of the conditions for rapid economic growth.

The second condition is that Pakistan sustains a high investment rate in the range of 20-25 percent of GDP. This rate is similar to India’s but much lower than China’s 35 percent. It is within the realm of feasibility but would require substantial foreign direct investment. This will only flow to Pakistan if a strong civil society takes root there and stamps out the current culture of intolerance between diverse ethnic and sectarian groups. There would be respect for law and property rights. Anarchy, kidnappings, rapes and tortures would become a thing of the past. Mosques would not be guarded by guns. Sardars, zamindars, waderas and siyasi faujis would give way to a new entrepreneurial class.

In addition, Pakistan’s economic managers would have to exercise fiscal discipline and ensure a budget surplus of two percent of GDP, brought about by expansion of the tax base and reduction in unproductive government expenditures such as those on the military. Foreign debt payments would be small and genuine economic reforms that provide significant incentives for private enterprise would have been implemented.

Pakistan’s global economic competitiveness would have risen from its current ranking of 91st out of 104 countries, as compiled by the World Economic Forum based on quantitative economic data and subjective information gleaned from a survey of business executives. Pakistan was ranked 67th on the quality of its macroeconomic environment, 83rd on the quality of its business environment, 87th on its technological capabilities and 102nd on the quality of its public institutions. Pakistan’s aggregate ranking is down from a value of 73 in 2003, largely because of a fall in the softer factors. India is ranked 55 and China ranked 46. Both countries have held their rankings between 2003 and 2004.

The final condition is productivity growth. This requires a commitment to education, science and technology. Pakistani universities would have to become centers of learning in both the sciences and the arts and attract the best talent from around the globe. The current drift toward extremism and militarism would have been replaced with a bias for invention, innovation and commercialization of new technologies.

If this begins to sound unrealistic, let us keep in mind that Japan, which has the world’s second largest economy today, was a developing country in the late fifties. Malaysia and Thailand did not become the powerhouses they are today until the seventies.

The 2047 vision will require inspired political leadership that represents the people and translates words into action. It will require the institution of checks and balances between the three branches of government and the establishment of democracy. And, most importantly, it would require the complete transformation of the adversarial relationship with India.

Gone would be the congenital insecurity and dread of being reabsorbed into the “mother country.” Something akin to the Canada-U.S. model would have settled in, allowing defense spending to be lowered to 2 percent of GDP. India would emerge as Pakistan’s largest trading partner and investor with many cultural affinities.

This scenario calls for a radical change in Pakistan’s strategic culture. Without such a change, the future is bleak. As Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew put it in his memoirs, “The Pakistanis are a hardy people with enough of the talented and well-educated to build a modern nation. But unending strife with India has drained Pakistan’s resources and stunted its potential.”

Militarization on Parade (what a joy ride it has been)

2005-06-11T23:45:00.000-07:00

http://community.webshots.com/scripts/editPhotos.fcgi?action=viewall&albumID=303552236

"Islam Under Siege" by Akbar Ahmed--A Book Review

2005-06-11T23:43:00.001-07:00

Middle East
BOOK REVIEW Islam Under Siegeby Akbar S Ahmed Reviewed by Ahmad Faruqui The world's 1.3 billion Muslims are being squeezed between two equally strong forces. On the one hand are the forces of the West that want to modernize them, if need be through regime change. On the other hand are the forces of Osama bin Laden who want to de-Westernize them, if need be by wrapping their women in dark flowing robes. The pain is being shared equally by the two-thirds of the Muslim population that lives in Muslim countries, and who are often governed by tyrants that suppress all independent scholarship and dissent and the one-third that lives in non-Muslim countries, where even some of the longest standing democracies are rapidly regressing toward tyrannical control over their Muslim minorities. Critics of Islam in the West have begun to argue that the Koran asks Muslims to follow it blindly and resort to fanaticism. Yet in the words of linguist and translator Thomas Cleary, "Islam does not demand unreasoned belief. Rather, it invites intelligent faith, growing from observation, reflection and contemplation, beginning with nature and what is all around us. Accordingly, antagonism between religion and science such as that familiar to Westerners is foreign to Islam." It is a fact of history that Islamic civilization eventually nursed Europe out of the Dark Ages, laying the foundation for the Renaissance. It is unfortunate that Islam, which means "submission to the will of God", and whose followers greet each other with the expression, "Peace be on you", stands accused in the West of fomenting violence due to the acts of a few extremists who are acting contrary to the teachings of their faith. A few months ago, I interviewed a learned Islamic theologian about these issues, Dr Khalid Siddiqi. He teaches Arabic and Islamic studies at several colleges in the San Francisco Bay area and directs the Islamic Education and Information Center. With degrees from Dar-ul-Uloom Nadwa in India, al-Azhar University in Cairo and a doctorate from the University of London, Dr Siddiqi is in a unique position to judge the compatibility of terrorism with Islamic precepts. He said, "Violence against innocent civilians had no place in the life of Prophet Mohammed, and it should have no place in the life of his followers today." There is perhaps no better writer to analyze and diagnose the Muslim predicament than Professor Akbar S Ahmed, who holds the Ibn Khaldun Chair in Islamic Studies at American University. Professor Ahmed is an anthropologist by training who began his career in the Pakistan civil service and subsequently switched to academe. He has taught at Cambridge, Princeton and Harvard, and is the author of many books, scholarly papers, and newspaper articles. More tellingly, he is also the producer of a BBC film series about Islam and a feature film about Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah. He is also a former high commissioner to Britain. His latest book, Islam Under Siege, takes head on the challenges facing the Muslims in the aftermath of the events of September 11. The book deals with the plights of Muslims from the vantage point of reflexive sociology, and certain parts of it constitute an ambassador's memoir. The thesis of the book One would be hard pressed to disagree with the core argument of the book, which is directed at Muslims. It consists of two parts. First, don't blame the "Great Satan" for all your ills. Second, be inclusive and compassionate toward other human beings regardless of their faith, because that is what God has willed the believers to do. Many (but not all) of the problems facing the Muslim world are indeed self-inflicted, and blaming the West for all of them has set the Muslims back on the path to progress. Conspiracy theories dominate Muslim views of the West, which is believed to be plotting for the extermination of Islam while indulging in an orgy of sex and violence. It is too often the case that the lives of Muslims are cloaked with a fatalism based on a misunderstanding of God's will. Ahmed eloquently debunks many commonly held myths about Islam, some of which are held by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. For example, he points out that there is no room for killing even a single innocent civilian in Islam. Much of the conflict between the forces of moderation in Islam and those that are inclined to take extreme positions and carry out acts of violence against innocent people arises from the misinterpretation of the concept of jihad. Islam allows jihad in the form of armed struggle against oppressors. However, there are very specific conditions under which fighting in self-defense is allowed. One must be deprived of the right to live and to earn one's livelihood. Individuals are not allowed to take on this fight, and jihad has to be carried out with the collective will of the Muslim community. Individual acts of vigilantism would create anarchy and are prohibited. Ahmed's interpretation is consistent with that put forth by the vast majority of Muslim scholars. For example, Siddiqi asserts that the Muslim community has to observe very strict limits when carrying out jihad. Thus, those fighting a jihad cannot harm women, children and unarmed civilians on the enemy side under any circumstances. Willful destruction of property is condemned. A Muslim is prohibited from even harming a tree that is green, because it is a common asset of humanity. The Koran states, in the 192nd verse of the second chapter, "But if they cease, God is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." And this command is reiterated in the following verse, "But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression." The terrorists have reinforced a common misperception in the West that the Koran asks Muslims to kill Jews and Christians. In fact, the Koran addresses the believers among the Jews and Christians with great respect, calling them "the people of the book". Former president Jimmy Carter, winner of a Nobel Peace prize, wrote about the common family ties among Jews, Christians and Muslims in The Blood of Abraham in 1985. It was this broad vision that brought about the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt. In the Koran (46th verse of the 29th chapter), God says to the Muslims: "Do not argue with the followers of the earlier revelations otherwise than in a most kindly manner - unless it be such of them as are bent on evil-doing - and say: We believe in that which has been bestowed from on high upon us, as well as that which has bestowed upon you; for our God and your God is one and the same, and it is unto Him that we all surrender ourselves." It is a common misperception that friendship between Muslims and non-Muslims is prohibited in Islam. That is also incorrect because the Koran (7th verse of the 60th chapter) even encourages making friends with one's enemies, "It may be that God will grant love [and friendship] between you and those you [now] hold as enemies. For God has power [over all things], and He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." It goes one step further and says, in the next verse, "God does not forbid you, with regard to those who do not fight for [your] faith nor drive you from your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them: for God loves those who are just." Methodology Ahmed's methodology is derived from the concept of group solidarity (or asabiyya in Arabic) first propounded by Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), regarded by many as the father of modern social science. Group solidarity serves a constructive purpose when it gives individuals a sense of identity and belonging to society. However, exaggerated feelings of tribal and religious loyalties can lead to a pathological case that the author terms hyper-group solidarity. The collapse of group solidarity also brings with it the collapse of justice, compassion and balance in society. These concepts hold a society together and their absence creates conflict and violence in society, leading to chaos and confusion. The author cites the Taliban, who were originally religious students confined to an Islamic seminary in Kandahar, Afghanistan as an example of a tribal society with social cohesion. Once the Taliban took over the regime in Kabul, their lack of training in political and civil administration, coupled with their exclusivist political identity that prevented them from assimilating non-Taliban ideas, ensured their failure. Their puritanical variant of Islam, which had been their strength in Kandahar, now became their weakness. They resorted to placing restrictions on women and destroying ancient Buddhist statues and when the US demanded they give up their special guest, Osama bin Laden, they failed to do so, because that would have compromised their tribal sense of honor. The author is quick to point out that hyper-group solidarity, as exhibited by the Taliban and the clerics in Iran, is not confined to Muslim societies. He mentions the Serb militias in Bosnia and the Hindu mobs that killed thousands of Muslims in Gujarat as examples of people who have succumbed to the same social disease. He also mentions that the freedom of speech and religion in the US prior to September 11 had created an atmosphere that could be compared to that of Muslim Spain (Andalus) when Christians, Jews and Muslims lived side by side in peace. However, everything changed after the terror attacks, as the US came in the grip of hyper-group solidarity. Muslims could be arrested anywhere and held without charges indefinitely, merely for being Muslims. Many who were arrested had their beards shaven forcefully. Is the book hard on Muslims and soft on the West?This question arises because depending on how one reads certain sections of the book, it comes across as being hard on Muslims and soft on the West. For example, there are instances when the book seems to equate Muslims generally with the bin Laden ideology, and holds them collectively responsible for his alleged actions. While discussing president Bill Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky, the book suggests that Muslims interpreted the president's actions as being those of a dishonorable man, and took that to mean that all Americans were dishonorable. The book says, "Muslim reading of Clinton had much to do with their planning for September [11], bin Laden misread Bush on the basis of Clinton's behavior." Second, the book is silent on the harm that has been inflicted on the Muslim world by the West over the past two centuries. It does not analyze why the grievances of bin Laden and his cohorts have acquired much legitimacy in the Muslim world. In its 12 pages of references, there is no mention of the Project for the New American Century. By now it is common knowledge that the neo-conservatives in Washington have a very definite plan to remake the Muslim world in their image. As they carry through on this agenda, they make it easier for bin Laden to recruit young Muslims to his cause. This point has been made by a variety of non-Muslim writers, including Gore Vidal, Noam Chomsky and Norman Mailer in the US and many others in Europe and Latin America. Both parties are fighting a "war of self-defense", using whatever weapons are at their disposal. For the fighters of al-Qaeda, terrorism represents a form of guerilla warfare, which helps them overcome the asymmetrical balance of military power between themselves and the West. It may not have religious legitimacy in the opinion of the vast majority of Islamic scholars, but they are undeterred because they have chosen to interpret the Islamic scriptures differently. Third, the book may suggest to some readers that the Muslims are at the center of political violence. A review of the past century will reveal that millions were killed in political violence and wars that did not originate with either the Muslims or their religion. The primary examples being of course the two world wars, followed by the internal wars carried out in the name of communism by Josef Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao Zedong in the People's Republic of China. The Korean War killed hundreds of thousands, the Vietnam War killed a million, the civil war in Kampuchea (now Cambodia) killed almost 2 million and another million were killed by the Soviet-Afghan war. In none of these wars were Muslims perpetrators of political violence. If anything, Muslims have often been the victims of political violence. As the book shows, large scale and systematic rape against Muslim women has been the hallmark of the past two decades, first in Bosnia and then in Gujarat. Fourth, the book seems to attribute the backwardness, illiteracy and misogynistic nature of society so prevalent in Muslim countries to the religion of the people who live there. Vast numbers of Muslims come across as simpletons who are gullible followers of the Egyptian activist Sayyid Qutb in the 1950s and 1960s and bin Laden in the 1990s. However, a review of the data published by the World Bank in its World Development Report and the United Nations Development Program in its Human Development Report reveals that the same problems bedevil much of the Third World. Muslim countries do not have a monopoly on backwardness. As others have shown, the problems faced by developing countries around the globe are caused by a miasmic interaction of culture, ethnicity, politics and economics, set against the backdrop of centuries of imperial conquest and colonialism by the West. As the author notes, the horrifying case in which a young boy was sodomized for walking alongside a young woman in Mianwali (Pakistan) and the girl gang-raped had nothing to do with the religion of Islam and more to do with a perceived violation of group honor by the elders of the tribe, ie, it was an act of hyper-group solidarity. Fifth, the book offers an incomplete analysis of terrorism. It seems to suggest that terrorism is caused by the existence of vast numbers of unemployed youth in the Muslim world, who are easily swayed by figures like bin Laden. This explanation overlooks the social and political grievances that are possibly the major drivers for terrorism. It was the Gulf War that spawned al-Qaeda. Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza causes Palestinians to resort to suicide bombings. Beijing's repression of its Uyghur minorities in Xinjiang and Moscow's brutal suppression of Chechens leads the survivors to commit acts of terrorism, just as New Delhi's failure to accommodate the aspirations of Kashmiris leads them to carry out terrorist acts. Nor is terrorism a recent phenomenon. Throughout history, oppression has led to what is called terrorism now and was called fighting for freedom in days past. Such was the case when black Africans were fighting the apartheid regime in South Africa, and when the American colonies were fighting imperial Britain. The proposed solution After reviewing the driving forces that have placed the Muslims and the West in conflict with each other, the author proffers a solution in the last chapter called the Global Paradigm. He argues that a just, compassionate and peaceful global order would be created if both parties would become inclusive in their thinking, and engage in a dialogue of civilizations. While agreeing with the noble premises of this solution, it is difficult to be optimistic that an early solution will be found to ease either the Muslim or Western predicaments. As the author notes, the Bush administration has embarked on a war that has no boundaries or time horizons. It is seething with as much anger and rage as its adversaries, and it is difficult to see any end in sight to this conflict that threatens to kill and maim Muslims in large numbers, in addition to curbing their civil rights in many countries. Viewed against the backdrop of the recent wars that the US had waged against Afghanistan and Iraq, and its plans to create a thousand military bases in 99 countries, a call for a dialogue among civilizations seems awfully Utopian. The book proposes that ultimately the Muslim world has to embrace democracy, and that is undoubtedly true. However, just as true is the fact that any form of government that is imposed externally in the Muslim world will reduce the new leaders to Western puppets, and undercut their credibility. Unfortunately, the West has a long tradition of installing puppet governments, under the guise of establishing democracy. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's comment that the liberated people of Iraq can elect any type of government as long as it is not an Islamic theocracy is an ominous development. Similarly, the West's objections to the Islamic laws being promulgated by the democratically elected government in North West Frontier Province in Pakistan does not serve the cause of democracy. There is a long list of Muslim grievances that can be cited, including Algeria's decision to ban the Islamic FIS party just as it was about to win the elections in 1992, the banning of the Muslim Welfare party in Turkey and the Central Intelligence Agency coup that overthrew the Mossadeq government in Iran in 1953. In fact, the West has a long track record of supporting military dictatorships during the past half century throughout the globe, including those in Chile, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Vietnam. Thus, if there is going to an inclusive dialogue between Muslims and the West, it has to be carried out by both sides. Lack of trust between the two sides remains a major impediment to the beginning of such a dialogue. A dialogue has been initiated by inter-faith groups on all sides. However, these groups often do not represent the center of gravity of the people who they represent, so that even total cohesion of viewpoints in the inter-faith dialogue may not carry over to the much-needed dialogue between civilizations. It is also important to recognize - and the author acknowledges this - that there is no monolithic entity called the West or the Muslim world. There is a lot of diversity in both. The Iraq war showed strong opposition in the West to the actions of the US government. There are many in the Muslim world who are opposed to the views articulated by bin Laden, and many in Pakistan are opposed to the Talibanization of parts of the country. It is this diversity in views within both worlds that gives hope that Samuel Huntington's apocalyptic clash of civilizations can be avoided. In closing, Ahmed has penned a must-read book. Part memoir and part exposition in social science, it should be required reading for scholars, policy makers and opinion leaders in both the Muslim world and the West. Islam Under Siege by Akbar S Ahmed, Polity Press, UK, 2003, ISBN: 0745622100, Price US$19.95, 224 pages (Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

The Idea of Pakistan--A Book Review

2005-06-11T23:43:00.000-07:00

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Jinnah's unfulfilled visionThe Idea of Pakistan by Stephen Cohen Reviewed by Ahmad Faruqui Stephen Cohen concludes his new book The Idea of Pakistan with an ominous sentence, to the effect that Washington has "one last opportunity to ensure that this troubled state will not become America's biggest foreign-policy problem in the last half of this decade". For those looking for inspiration to avail themselves of this opportunity to set things right in Pakistan, this book has much to offer. In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a plethora of books has been published on Pakistan. What makes Cohen's book noteworthy is that he is a veteran of South Asia. Currently serving as a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, Cohen served in the policy planning staff of the US State Department during the administration of president Ronald Reagan and for years taught political science at the University of Illinois. In some ways, this book is a companion piece to Cohen's India: Emerging Power that appeared three years ago. But in other ways, it extends the work that began with The Pakistan Army, a book that was banned in Pakistan when it came out in 1984. Nothing generates more controversy among Pakistanis and Pakistan-watchers than the idea of Pakistan. Some opine that it was a bad idea to begin with, while others argue that it went awry because of faulty implementation. Virtually no one argues that it was successfully implemented. For the first quarter-century, it seems, Pakistan's primary problem was the failure to integrate the eastern and western wings of the country. But new problems arose during the second quarter-century. Cohen's book will not resolve the controversy about whether Pakistan was a good or bad idea, but it will give proponents on both sides fresh ammunition for debate. It is likely to get a cold reception in Pakistan, where anyone questioning the idea of Pakistan is viewed as unpatriotic. But it will be read with great interest in Britain, China, India, Iran, Japan, Saudi Arabia and, most particularly, in the United States. The book begins by reviewing the ideas that led to the birth of Pakistan in 1947 and then progresses to discussing how these ideas were implemented. Despite the title, most of the book is focused on the implementation of the idea rather than on the idea per se. Cohen discusses how the state of Pakistan came to be ruled by an oligarchy composed of the army, the civil bureaucracy and the landowning class (called feudal lords in Pakistan). Reflecting on Pakistan's troubled history, he is moved to quote from Aristotle, who in his classic work on Politics regarded oligarchy as the evil twin of aristocracy, one of three forms of government along with monarchy and polity. The book concludes with a presentation of future scenarios and an assessment of US policy options. From the Quaid to al-QaedaMuhammad Ali Jinnah, who came to be known as the Quaid-e-Azam (great leader), was the founder of Pakistan. He brought to fruition the idea of Pakistan that was first put forward by the great poet and philosopher of India, Allama Muhammad Iqbal. As Cohen says, the Quaid had the vision of a secular, liberal and democratic nation state that would serve the needs of the Muslims of British India. Iqbal's vision had stronger religious overtones. Over time, the delicate tension between these two visions was exploited by various ethnic, sectarian and religious groups to argue their own agendas. This was partly due to the death of the Quaid within a year of the nation's founding and partly to the death of his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, three years later. But this proliferation of visions may have been due in part to the ambiguity of the idea of Pakistan and also to the cunning of the rulers who inherited the mantle of power. The most notorious among them was a former civil servant, Ghulam Muhammad. While serving as governor general, he deposed a democratically elected prime minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, on April 17, 1953. This unconstitutional act was carried out in concert with the army chief, General Ayub Khan, and the defense secretary, Iskander Mirza. The US looked the other way, since it was interested in enrolling Pakistan in the fight to contain communism. Democracy in Pakistan may be said to have died that year, even though Cohen places that date in 1955. In 1954, the US enrolled Pakistan in its Military Assistance Program and began to provide personnel training, hardware and munitions to field five and a half army divisions equipped with Patton tanks and heavy artillery pieces and a dozen air force squadrons equipped with F-86 fighter bombers, F-104 interceptors and B-57 night bombers. This heavy infusion of firepower strengthened the Pakistani military at the expense of other institutions and would lead to a military coup four years later. Three more coups would occur in the succeeding four decades. Citing the work of Mahnaz Ispahani, Cohen says there are at least three potentially conflicting visions of Pakistan: a state for the Muslims of South Asia, an Islamic state and a democratic state. Some would argue that this ambiguity and conflict are captured in the official name of the country, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Each of these visions poses its own problems. The first vision is based on the two-nation theory of statehood according to which the Muslims of South Asia would reside in Pakistan. At the time of partition, 400 million people lived in India, of whom 100 million were Muslims. When partition took place, a third of the Muslims wound up in West Pakistan, a third in East Pakistan and a third remained behind in India. After the secession of East Pakistan a quarter-century later, only a third of the Muslims of South Asia resided in the "new" Pakistan, making it difficult for Pakistani leaders to claim that the "two nation" theory on which the state was founded was still valid. Today's Pakistan cannot justify its existence on this vision, since there are almost as many Muslims in India and in Bangladesh. The fact that Bangladesh continues to exist as a separate state from India does not change the reality that the majority of the Muslims of South Asia now reside outside of Pakistan. Of course, this trifurcation of the South Asian Muslim population has not deterred the two-nation ideologues in Islamabad from calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir, the disputed territory with India. Cohen argues cogently that the pursuit of Kashmir has done more damage to the nation-state of Pakistan than any other single issue. In his other writings, he has argued that Pakistan's dispute with India is more than just a quarrel involving a piece of territory: it is a dispute about national ideology. One wishes he had expanded upon this line of reasoning in this book. Kashmir has caused Pakistan and India to fight two major wars and several minor wars. Recognizing the disparity in conventional forces between the two countries, the Pakistani army has adopted the strategy of waging a covert war in Kashmir. It has armed, trained and funded guerrillas that operate in Kashmir as "freedom fighters". Since the Afghan-Soviet war ended in 1989, these groups have increasingly drawn individuals into their fold who subscribe to a militant pan-Islamic ideology. Today, Pakistan is in the grip of a witches' brew of freedom fighters, militants and anarchists, including al-Qaeda fighters who regard terrorism as a legitimate weapon in asymmetric warfare. The Pakistani army has to shoulder the responsibility for bringing terrorism into the social fabric of the Pakistani nation-state, but the blame must also rest on the shoulders of Washington, which bought into the army's strategy of using the mujahideen in the covert war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Cohen erroneously concludes that the al-Qaeda ideology stems in part from the writings of Maulana Maudoodi, one of the leading Muslim writers of the past century and a political icon in Pakistani history. Nowhere in Maudoodi's writings would one find a reference to the use of terrorist attacks on innocent civilians as a way of establishing an Islamic state. The second vision of Pakistan was that it would be an Islamic state. The problem is that there is no unique interpretation of an Islamic state, since there are numerous sects and sub-sects within the Islamic faith. Invariably, a single brand of Islam would come into power and seek to impose its vision over the others by using the authority of the state to declare other interpretations as un-Islamic and subject to criminal prosecution. Thus, and this is the big worry in the West, how would one prevent al-Qaeda from coming into power under the guise of creating an Islamic state in Pakistan but intent on exporting its militant ideology globally? The third vision of Pakistan was that it would be a democratic state. In such a state, the people would be sovereign, not the army. The elected government would control the army's budget and set the foreign policy and national security strategy. This vision has yet to be realized. It was attempted unsuccessfully during the early-to-mid-1970s by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and then again in the 1990s by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Anyone who has traveled through Pakistan and talked to a cross-section of the 150 million people who reside there may be forgiven for concluding that there are not just three interpretations of Jinnah's vision but dozens. There is nothing unusual about that, since many other countries have a diversity of opinions about their national identity. What makes the situation in Pakistan dire is not the multiplicity of ideas but the exclusivity of these ideas. This leads to a culture of intolerance where the followers of different ideological schools, blinded by the certainty of their beliefs, are ready to impose them on every one else. Debate and competition allow for the co-existence of competing ideas in democratic countries and lead to their vitality and rebirth. Such "shock absorbers" have yet to be institutionalized in Pakistan's polity. Cohen contends that there was confusion from the very beginning about the idea of Pakistan but stops short of pronouncing judgment on whether the idea was good or bad to begin with. Others have been less circumspect in concluding that it was a bad idea. Altaf Hussain, who leads a large political party in Pakistan, gave a speech in New Delhi recently in which he said, "The idea of Pakistan was dead at its inception, when the majority of Muslims chose to stay back after partition, a truism reiterated in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971." A tradition of militarismA review of the historical record indicates that there was no consensus about what type of state Pakistan would was going to be. Thus it is no surprise that it took nine years for the Constituent Assembly to adopt the constitution. India, by contrast, adopted its constitution within two years of independence. The constitution that was nine years in the making only lasted for two years, when it was abrogated by the first military government of General Ayub Khan. Ayub provided his own constitution embodying the concept of "basic democracy" in 1962 and a presidential form of government. While reviewing the report of the Constitution Commission of Pakistan in 1961, Ayub noted, "politically, our people are immature. However, there are signs that after a couple of generations are reared in an atmosphere of freedom and suitable education on which we have launched, a national outlook will emerge. Until then we have to be continually on our guard, and may even have to do things to save [the] people against themselves." Ayub's constitution was replaced by a third constitution in 1973, which reverted to a prime-ministerial form of government, and was made necessary by the cataclysmic events that followed the secession of East Pakistan in 1971. Along the way, this constitution was amended numerous times, mostly notably by the third military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, who introduced the infamous Eighth Amendment giving the president the power to dismiss the prime minister and dissolve parliament. Subsequent civilian governments softened this amendment. However, in December 2003, this provision was brought back into the constitution in the form of the 17th Amendment. Ironically, that amendment was crafted by Syed Sharifudin Pirzada, a lawyer who was a personal assistant to the Quaid. Cohen notes that Pirzada had earlier assisted the three previous military rulers in establishing their legal bona fides. A separate parliamentary bill has recently passed both houses of parliament in Pakistan allowing General Pervez Musharraf to serve simultaneously as the president and army chief. Earlier, in April, a bill was passed creating the National Security Council to promote political stability. This is designed to institutionalize the involvement of the armed forces in national decision-making and is patterned after a similar arrangement that has been in place in Turkey. In the words of Musharraf, "You have to let the army in in order to keep the army out." To most people this sounds like letting the fox guard the henhouse. Moreover, as Cohen points out, the Turkish example is becoming increasingly irrelevant, since that country has almost cured itself of the scourge of militarism. Musharraf continues to fight a crisis of legitimacy five years after he seized power in 1999. He declared himself president after holding a referendum in the spring of 2002. This was widely regarded as a farce that drew only 10% of the voters to the polling booths. Musharraf claimed that 98% of the votes were cast in his favor, contradicting every analyst's assessment. Similarly, when he decided a few months ago to change his December 2003 decision to retire from the army the following December, he claimed that 96% of the people supported the reversal of his decision because the realities had changed. Winning percentages in the high 90s only accrue to military dictators and are rarely found in mature democracies. Musharraf does not realize that a general in uniform is expected to lead armies, not nations. During the five centuries of the Roman republic, its consuls were elected on an annual basis. During times of military emergency, dictators were elected by the Roman senate for a six-month term. Augustus Caesar put an end to this practice when he declared for himself imperium proconsulare maius (control over the provinces and the army) and tribunicia potestas (personal inviolability and the right to veto the actions of other lawmakers) for life, thereby acquiring complete control of the state, which contributed to the end of the Roman republic. Moved by Musharraf's consolidation of multiple functions in his person, an advocate recently petitioned the Lahore High Court to declare Musharraf the king of Pakistan. The petition was rejected on technical grounds. Perhaps he would have fared better had he asked that Musharraf be called "Qaiser-e-Pakistan", Pakistani Caesar. Cohen provides an extensive critique of militarism in Pakistan and how it has adversely affected the nation's national security. Not one to mince words, he says, "The army lacks the capability to fix Pakistan's problems, but it is unwilling to give other state institutions and the political system the opportunity to learn and grow; its tolerance for the mistakes of others is very low, yet its own performance, when in power, has usually dug the hole deeper." The Pakistani military is now more than 600,000-strong and includes some 165 generals, admirals and air marshals of two-star rank and above, of whom some 125 are in the army. There are five officers of four-star rank, including Musharraf, the chairman of the Joint Staff Committee, the vice chief of army staff, the air chief and the naval chief. Forty officers hold the three-star rank and the balance hold the two-star rank. The army has divided the country into nine corps formations, and it would be fair to assume that Musharraf rules the country with the concurrence of these formation commanders. During the past five years, he has very adroitly replaced all formation commanders who could have been a threat to his rule, either because they helped bring him into power or because they had fundamentalist leanings. The army is about 50% greater in size than it was during the crisis of 1971, when half the country was lost to the formation of Bangladesh. There is no evidence that the security of Pakistan has improved with the increased strength of the military. In fact, since it has diverted resources from other dimensions of national security, such as social, political and economic security, one can argue it has lessened. Cohen points out how Western leaders and academics have often ended up supporting military dictators. For example, he mentions how the noted Harvard professor Samuel Huntington called Ayub Khan a Solon, after the great Athenian lawgiver. General Zia was widely praised in the West for being a bulwark of freedom against the Soviet Union. Much of the same is true of the standing that Musharraf enjoys in the West. Cohen argues that Musharraf's international backers "see him as a wise and modern leader, a secular man who is not afraid to support the West or to offer peace to India, and a man who can hold back the onrush of demagogues and Islamic extremists". Yet, he notes, "no serious Pakistani analyst sees Musharraf in these terms". They see him as claiming to act in an undefined and abstract "national interest" and "taking people into confidence" after having made the key decisions. Cohen aptly comments that Musharraf believes that no civilian can understand the national interest. One wishes he had analyzed this point further. Does it imply that no civilian can be trusted with its protection? If so, that might suggest something more sinister, that in Musharraf's lexicon, the term "national interest" is a synonym for the military's interest. Over time, "Pakistan has adapted to changing strategic circumstances," Cohen observes, "by 'renting' itself out to powerful states, notably the United States, but also Saudi Arabia and China." He warns that the September 11, 2001, windfall and the al-Qaeda card will, beyond a certain point, cease to guarantee cash and support. And although economic growth is currently strong, Pakistan has a fundamentally weak economy. Seeking to put a new face on its legitimacy, the military government has put its macroeconomic statistics on parade. It says that over the past two years, gross domestic product (GDP) has grown at an annual rate of 5.8%, per capita income at 13.9%, and exports at 17%. National savings, as a percentage of GDP, have grown by 8.3 percentage points since 1998-99. Pakistan has attracted foreign direct investment of almost $1 billion and foreign-exchange reserves are at an all-time high of US$12.5 billion. Moreover, defense spending is coming down as a percentage of GDP. In other words, Musharraf would like investors to think that Pakistan is a rising tiger. During a recent visit to Washington, DC, the governor of the State Bank of Pakistan (and not the president of the central bank, as he is referenced in one place in the book) argued that these positive results could not have been achieved by a democratically elected government. Of course, Ishrat Husain has emerged as one of the leading apologists of the military regime. His book Economic Management in Pakistan, 1999-2002 reads like an apologia for military rule and a paean to Musharraf. One can only imagine what would be left of Alan Greenspan's reputation if he penned a similar work about any of the presidents of his tenure. Husain's thinking runs contrary to recent thinking in social science. What matters to the common person is her or her happiness, which depends on a number of microeconomic factors other than the country's macroeconomic indicators. People's happiness is influenced by a number of factors, including the kind of political system they live in. This is borne out by analysis of data across 38 mainly developed nations at the beginning of the 1990s. Citizens in a democracy are likely to be happier because they can vote poor leaders out of office, while those in a dictatorship can't. Cohen does not comment on the freedom of the press in Pakistan under military rule. According to a report put forward by Reporters Without Borders, last year the press in Pakistan was ranked in the 90th percentile from the bottom. A year prior, it had ranked in the 85th percentile. This group has labeled Musharraf a "predator of press freedom", alleging that he uses the military intelligence agencies to "watch, intimidate, manipulate or arrest both Pakistani and foreign journalists who annoy him". It cites the secret detention and torture of Khawar Mehdi, who investigated Taliban groups on the Afghan border with two journalists from the French weekly L'Express, who were themselves arrested and then released. It also mentions that an investigative journalist was fired from his newspaper in June 2003 because Musharraf accused him of tarnishing the country's image, and another journalist was condemned to death after criticizing the activities of an anti-narcotics governmental agency. In 2002, only 10% of Pakistanis said they were satisfied with their lives as a whole - which was the lowest percentage in a survey of 80 countries. Only one in five persons described him- or herself as "very happy". These are depressing results and are at odds with the rosy impression created by the government's parade of rising macroeconomic indicators. As a result of the largess conferred upon Pakistan by Washington, Pakistan has been able to reschedule $12 billion of its foreign debt and lower the amount of debt-servicing payments. It has received a $1 billion grant from the US and a package of $3 billion over a five-year period, subject to congressional approval. The US has also written off $1 billion in bilateral debt. In addition, Pakistan has received a large one-time injection of funds from its expatriate population in the US. It is questionable whether economic growth in the 6-8% range is either achievable or sustainable for Pakistan without continued foreign assistance. The fundamentals of the economy have not changed. It remains dependent on the export of raw cotton, textiles and apparel at a time when much of the region has shifted to information technologies. The continued political uncertainty and the ongoing "war against terror" do not provide a good backdrop against which to attract foreign direct investment. Cohen discusses the failure of Pakistan to develop much of a tourist industry that would take advantage of its natural beauty in the Karakorums and rich archeological heritage. Quo vadis?The book lays out six scenarios of the near-to-mid-term future: (1) continuation of the status quo, which involves rule by an establishment-dominated oligarchic system, (2) liberal, secular democracy, (3) soft authoritarianism, (4) an Islamist state, (5) divided Pakistan and (6) postwar Pakistan. While the scenarios are intrinsically interesting in themselves, alas, they represent the author's personal opinion. The methodology for developing them is never laid out clearly. The driving factors and their cross-impact matrix, well-recognized techniques for developing scenarios and used by the texts cited by Cohen, are not presented and may not have been used in the development of scenarios. Implicitly, probabilities are assigned to the scenarios through means that are unclear. Perhaps these scenarios can be viewed as the starting point of a Delphi process. The generals have come to power on virtually the same premise every time, ie, to save the country from imminent destruction. They have used Kelsen's doctrine of necessity to justify their unconstitutional takeover. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court has always blessed the treasonous act, validating Sir John Harrington's remark that "treason doth never prosper; for if it doth prosper, none dare call it treason". The "khakis" have assiduously cultivated a myth of their indispensability and overstayed their welcome. The commotion surrounding their entry into power blinds them to the need to develop an exit strategy. When they are forced to exit, the nation is no better off than when they had arrived on the scene. While discussing US options vis-a-vis Pakistan, the author says US policy has always given short-term gains priority over long-term concerns. He says this is no longer feasible, since ignoring the long term could have "grave consequences". For example, the Reagan administration was uninterested in the consequences of supporting the mujahideen because they were thought to be the best anti-Soviet fighters. Currently, terrorism has zoomed to the top of the US agenda but it needs to be given a long-term preventive quality, not just a short-term military quality. Democracy needs to be emphasized, despite the Musharraf government's contention that it would bring incompetent politicians or radical Islamists to power. Education should be a major priority. In the $3 billion aid package, only $100 million has been earmarked for this topic area. Cohen would like the United States to help change the technocratic focus of Pakistan's education system, which is designed to feed workers and scientists into a military-educational-industrial complex that is currently in place. Cohen says "this is an educational vision appropriate for a totalitarian state, not for one that aspires to be a free society". He calls upon the US to encourage the government of Pakistan to increase the share of its expenditures that go for education, especially primary education, by reducing military aid if a minimum amount is not spent on education. Similarly, Cohen argues that the amount of the US aid package should be made to vary with Pakistan's progress in democratization. In his view, the army is the biggest threat to democracy in Pakistan. For 29 years it has ruled directly and for the other 28 it has ruled indirectly. It has unlimited access to the government's budgetary and foreign-exchange resources. It sets the nation's foreign policy and its national-security strategy (inclusive of its nuclear-weapons policy) even when it's not in office. Cohen says that Musharraf is not a truly exceptional person, and the best service he could do for his country would be to allow capable civilian institutions to develop that would allow the military to exit the political sphere and focus on its military duties. He cautions that the army leadership will resist US pressure to change Pakistan's policies, whether foreign or domestic. At the same time, he reminds US policy officials that Musharraf is not irreplaceable and were he to be forced out of office, his replacement would be a like-minded general who will do the establishment's bidding. Unanswered questionsThe book covers a lot of ground in its 400-some pages. However, by the time one gets to the end, many important questions remain unanswered. For example, Cohen says the Pakistani army is long on memory and short on foresight, but he does not discuss either why that is the case or whether it can ever be changed. In addition, by presenting a scenario where the oligarchic establishment continues to rule as the most probable scenario, he seems to be endorsing Pakistan's recidivist militarism rather than analyzing and challenging it. Cohen says it is improbable that liberal democracy will take hold in Pakistan. Just a couple of decades ago, the same was being said of Latin America and Eastern Europe. He posits that Bangladesh, which also had an episode of military rule but now has a democratic setup, is unlikely to revert to military rule since it does not have a security problem. The implicit hypothesis that security problems lead to military rule is a non sequitur. Otherwise India would have military rule a fortiori, since it has security problems with Pakistan and China, in addition to numerous security problems in the eastern and southern states with separatist movements. There is no evidence that any serious coups have been attempted in India. Cohen alludes to Punjab's dominance in Pakistani politics but does not explore the implications of this for national stability. This single province accounts for 56% of the population and about 70-80% of the military and civil service positions. It is widely regarded as the most prosperous province and there is no question that its dominance has alienated the smaller provinces. India, with a population of a billion people, has continued to divide the states it inherited at independence to retain a national balance and the Indian Union now consists of 26 states. None of the states accounts for more than 15% of the population. Afghanistan, with a much smaller population of 29 million, has 34 provinces. The small nation of Switzerland, with a population of 7 million, is divided into 26 cantons, each with its own constitution. The federal character of the US would change irreversibly for the worse if one of the 50 states accounted for half of the population and three-quarters of the government jobs. Would it not make sense to subdivide Punjab into three or four provinces, resulting in a much more equal distribution of resources, assets and positions? This is a fundamental issue to the survival of Pakistan that may be worth addressing in the second edition of this book. While discussing the ebb and flow of the tide in US-Pakistani ties, Cohen does not explore the reasons that the tide has always been at a flood when a Republican administration has been in power in the White House and a military dictatorship in Islamabad. It cannot just be a coincidence, since it has happened at least four times in the past half-century. During Ayub's tenure, the ties were very strong during the Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower and weakened during the succeeding Democratic administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan had good ties with the administration of Richard Nixon but Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's ties with the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations were marginal. During the former, Henry Kissinger threatened Bhutto with making a horrible example of Pakistan if it continued with its nuclear program. Carter stopped arms shipments to Bhutto's government when it used force on protesters that were trying to toppled Bhutto from power. Zia's ties with Carter were poor but they improved dramatically under Reagan. Finally, Musharraf's ties with were very poor during the Clinton period and picked up dramatically under George W Bush. Cohen does not recognize that Pakistan's failure to emerge as a democracy is in part due to systematic US interference in its political development. There is strong evidence that the people of Pakistan want democracy. According to the World Values Surveys carried out by the researchers under the direction of Ronald Inglehart of the University of Michigan, only 4% of Pakistanis support military rule and 88% support a democratic dispensation. The data come from a random statistical survey of 2,000 Pakistanis in the year 2000. The surveys bear out Cohen's contention that the country is run by an oligarchy, with 89% saying the country is run by "a few big interests". Only 34% support having a strong leader who does not bother with an elected parliament. An even smaller percentage, 19%, support having experts (ie, technocrats) rather than elected officials make decisions of national importance. The analysis of anti-Americanism in Pakistan is weak. Cohen seems to suggest that this problem is confined to a segment of the population when surveys suggest the problem is much more pervasive. According to a survey conducted last spring by the Pew Research Center, only 16% of Pakistanis support the war against terror and 7 percent of have a favorable view of President Bush. As expected, conservative religious groups are not in favor of the US. But even the liberal elements of Pakistani society have now formed a negative opinion of the US because of that country's continuing support for military rule in Pakistan and the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much of Cohen's analysis does not appear to be based on micro-sources, such as interviews, surveys and polls. Another shortcoming is a lack of comparisons across regions and continents. The few that are made pertain to India or Bangladesh. This otherwise fine book seems to have been rushed off to the publisher. In places, the writing is labored and drags. In other places, the smooth flow of the text is interrupted by a series of dashed paragraphs that suggest they were transcribed from notes in bullet form. The concluding paragraphs in a couple of chapters are not motivated by the discussion in the body of the chapter. And the same event is given different dates of occurrence. In one place, Musharraf's referendum takes place in the year 2001 and in another place in 2002 (the latter is correct). The date of Yahya's takeover from Ayub in 1969 is cited as March 26 in one place as March 25 in another place (the latter is correct). The book comes with copious endnotes, but the source materials listed in these notes are a very small sample of the current literature on Pakistan. In his book on the Pakistani army, Cohen provided a very useful set of bibliographic notes, and one wishes he had done the same in this one. The sourcing of Islamic materials is quite weak and not likely to inspire confidence in the author's understanding of either Islam the religion or Islam the polity. In one instance, he uses a paper by Daniel Pipes to define an Islamist state. This is like citing Bernard Lewis as an authority on Islam or the Muslim world. These authors are inimical toward the idea of an Islamic state, since they assert that such a state would intrinsically use violence to destabilize the West. But the view widely held in the Muslim world is that an Islamic state is simply one that applies Islamic law (Sharia) to all those who live within its boundaries. The index is incomplete and does not list authors whose works are cited in the endnotes nor does it list topics such as the "oligarchs" or "Aristotle's Politics" that are discussed in the text. Even with these limitations, the book is a must read, if for no other reason than for the discussion of the "American Options" in the last chapter. Its most notable contribution is the counsel to Washington to factor in the long-run implications of its actions, especially regarding the need to support the implementation of democratic reforms in Pakistan. Given the author's standing as a veteran South Asian analyst, the book will be widely read in the corridors of power throughout the globe. It presents a US view of Pakistan, an increasingly apprehensive view, but one that can only be ignored by the military rulers in Islamabad at their own peril. The Idea of Pakistan by Stephen Cohen. Washington 2004: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1. Price US$32.95; 382 pages. (Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.)

Demilitarize or Perish (A book review)

2005-06-11T23:40:00.000-07:00

South Asia
BOOK REVIEWDemilitarize or perishRethinking the National Security of Pakistan by Ahmad Faruqui Reviewed by Chanakya Sen Always trust an economist to prick balloons of national security floated by militarists. Economic consultant Ahmad Faruqui's commentary on demilitarizing Pakistan offers an alternative vision for priming human development, the road that rulers in Islamabad never took. Published when generals are yet again preferred instruments of Western intervention in Pakistan, this book warns of dire consequences if new paths are not hewn. A Faustian bargain Faruqui's central thesis is that most of Pakistan's socio-economic problems originate from the heavy emphasis on national defense and military spending. Pakistan's unconditional support for the US's "war against terrorism" after September 11, 2001 has augmented this lopsided stress. President General Pervez Musharraf has been handed "an enduring rationale for continuing as president under Kelsen's law of necessity that has served all prior military rulers". (p xix). He is less inclined to take any major initiatives to pursue peace with India. Military expenditure continues to absorb the lion's share of the government budget and no major overhaul of Pakistan's military organization is likely. The endemic problem of military dominance in Pakistan has been perpetuated with the mutual embrace of the West and Musharraf. More harm than good has accrued when Musharraf short-sold Pakistan to the US. To prevent the "Islamic bomb" from falling into religious terrorist hands, the American 15th Marine Expeditionary unit is ready to "neutralize" Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction even at the cost of engaging Pakistani troops. The arrest of Pakistani nuclear scientists for passing know-how to al-Qaeda was done to please the US Federal Bureau of Investigation. Changes in the Pakistan army high command and the Inter-Services Intelligence were carried out to curry favor with the Central Intelligence Agency. India has succeeded in throwing flashlights on terrorist training infrastructure in Pakistani Kashmir. The victory of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan is a major setback to Pakistan due to the former's closeness to Iran and India. Pakistan's economy is deteriorating, with sliding per capita incomes lower than 1%, and foreign economic assistance evaporating after the Taliban were dislodged from Afghanistan. Musharraf's decision to ally with the US turns out to be a Faustian bargain, not a bright tactical move. It is similar to the 1999 Kargil war with India planned by Musharraf. Initially praised as "an act of military brilliance", Pakistan lost both the political and military battle for Kargil. It had to withdraw in humiliating circumstances since "the world chose to accept the Indian version of events". (p 16) History of militarism Pakistan's governance travails stem from dictators who are "specialists in violence rather than in economics". (p 19) Small cabals have acquired disproportionate organizational and collusive power under successive military regimes. The landed oligarchy, the bureaucracy and the jihadis are the main beneficiaries of Pakistan's "political economy of defense". (Ayesha Jalal) Their fortunes have been peaking through policies exacerbating inter-class and inter-regional inequalities. General Ayub Khan nurtured a class of robber barons with gigantic concentration of wealth in a handful of families. West Pakistan's per capita income was 61% higher than the East's under Ayub. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a feudal lord himself, was unable to rise above his roots. He transferred resources from public enterprises to private individuals and income distribution worsened under his so-called socialist tenure. General Zia ul-Haq mass-appointed retired and serving army officers to top public sector positions and allowed one fifth of the US$3.2 billion American aid for Afghanistan to be pocketed by the military-civil service elites. Benazir Bhutto doled out franchises to thugs and convicted murderers and triggered a new arms race with India due to her respect for the Pakistani military's "autonomy". Nawaz Sharif, Zia's protege, misused public funds for favoritism and kickbacks and followed his mentor's promotion of orthodox militancy. Musharraf's coup in 1999 occurred when "the army's corporate interests were threatened". (p 35) He has named manifold ex-generals as diplomats and many senior-serving officers to civilian duties for which they have no core competency. He has not touched the lucrative contracts and sinecures of the defense coteries and has failed to rein in religious militias waging jihad. Misreading India Pakistan's present and past national security strategies are premised on fear of being reabsorbed into India. The Pakistan army has convinced many citizens that India never reconciled itself to the partition of 1947. To counter this perceived Indian threat militarily, "no economic sacrifice is judged to be too much". (p 42) Pakistan's claim to Kashmir is the main legitimating potion of its ruling class and the hawks in its security establishment. This obsession has misbegotten four costly wars and countless acts of subversion that proved fruitless. Pakistan's military planners have projected India as "a pushover adversary that is cowardly because the Hindu has no stomach for a fight". (p 44) They have raised very high expectations about the superiority of Pakistan's armed forces, illusions repeatedly shattered by defeats. In spite of enjoying tactical successes, Pakistan has consistently failed to achieve strategic objectives in wars with India. Often, Islamabad has "completely misunderstood Indian intentions and capabilities" and jumped the gun with hubris and folly. In 1971, General Niazi believed that India would merely conduct a minor incursion into East Pakistan (to become Bangladesh) to set up a puppet regime, though Indian responses to provocation have always been aggressive, like those of other states of similar power and size in the international system. Failures in the higher direction of war have been matched by diplomatic fiascos and leadership blunders. Pakistan expects its foreign allies to bail it out of difficult situations against India, but these hopes have rarely materialized. In the Kargil war, China, the vaunted "perpetual ally", did not support Islamabad owing to fear of Islamic extremism. Counting on China as a counterweight to India is also chimerical because "the Indians have made it plain that they will not be routed a second time and intend to return any Chinese 'lesson' in kind". (p 90) Nuclear fallaciesPakistan's advocacy of nuclear deterrence is meaningless since it has not capped its program after developing a few atomic bombs. In the year following its nuclear tests of 1998, Pakistan had to increase defense spending by 10%, nullifying the publicized benefits of a "nuclear dividend". Nothing changed in the day-to-day life of common Pakistanis, even though nuclear scientists and generals commercialized weapons of mass destruction for personal gain. Cash-strapped Pakistan is incapable of matching the Indian increases in defense budgets, but the vanity of weaponizing "even if the people eat grass" (Z A Bhutto) has not receded. Pakistan's nuclear program cost an estimated $10 billion up to 2001 and set back development indices by more than years. Post-nuclear US sanctions caused Pakistan's economy to suffer a gross domestic product fall of 2.9%. The exorbitant opportunity costs of Pakistan's nuclear white elephant have actually diminished the country's national security. Retrenchment strategies The solution to Pakistan's security deficit suggested by Faruqui is to balance its economic resources with strategic ambitions. What is needed is a "lean and mean military organization, without becoming a drain on the national treasury and undermining the non-military dimensions of security". (p 115) The comparative experience of Israel, which depends on reservists for defending territorial integrity, is a lesson. To defend Pakistan against external aggression, a force level of 300,000 troops is enough, ie half of the present strength. Demobilization can be carried out by offering golden handshakes and compensation packages for converting swords into ploughshares. Small force levels do not imply weak defense. At present, Pakistan is incurring a price tag of $110 million a year for pumping the insurgency in Indian Kashmir and thereby earning the ire of the international community. Faruqui prescribes a more active "third party catalyst" role for the US to provide incentives for peace over Kashmir, though how a superpower interested in running off democratic India against China can be expected to be an honest broker over Kashmir is left for the reader's imagination. Faruqui's reading of post-Cold War realities and US-China equation are confusing. Economic aid, debt write-offs and conversion to zero-interest loans are also recommended to encourage defense spending cuts in Pakistan and India. Faruqui makes assumptions that Indian security is purely Pakistan-centric by adducing two-country game theory models to prove that economic diplomacy works. Bilateralizing concentric multilateral threat perceptions is too simplistic. Faruqui's proposals for reforming the Pakistani military are on firmer ground. To improve national security by lifting the people's confidence in the military, the latter should provide a transparent analysis of its fiscal expenditures. Pakistan's defense spending has been free from scrutiny or audit, thanks to the guiding philosophy of "defense for the sake of defense". Only two lines in the official budget (defense administration and defense services) represent the huge military expense bill, with no explanation of what these two items stand for. Pakistan should switch from exorbitant "offensive defense" to "defensive dominance" strategies that involve civilian participation. The military must formalize rigorous self-evaluation of combat effectiveness and be willing to accept failings. Do or die Pakistan's poor economic situation is linked intrinsically with faulty defense and foreign policies. Faruqui offers Pakistani leaders the example of Deng Xiaoping, who converted China's foreign policy of confrontation into one of economic cooperation. Pakistan's savings and investment ratios are among the lowest in the world, mainly due to defense spending and corruption, both severe drains. It spends 6% of its gross domestic product on defense, while health and education stagnate at 1% and 2%. Faruqui argues for correct, accurate and realistic threat evaluations, not exaggerated and unrealistic ones. These would also bring home the futility of massive arms importing and free resources for public welfare. Military spending in Asia as a whole has declined from the end of the Cold War and helped power investment and per capita incomes in the long run. Disarmament is feasible and practical, as examples from both developing and developed countries reveal. For Pakistan, which is on the edge of the precipice, there is no choice but to pragmatically take a leaf from Deng's famous dictum that strength is primarily economic. But for a disappointing reliance on International Monetary Fund and World Bank formulas for poverty alleviation, Faruqui's study is a fine blend of strategic revision and economic prognosis. The million-dollar question is whether Musharraf reads this honest reappraisal of what Pakistan requires to be really secure. Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. The Price of Strategic Myopia by Ahmad Faruqui. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot. ISBN: 0-7546-1497-2. Price US$79.95,190 pages. (Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)

Images of Pakistan's Future by Sohail Inayatullah

2005-06-11T23:39:00.000-07:00

IMAGES OF PAKISTAN'S FUTURE
by
Sohail Inayatullah*

Introduction
Exploring current images of Pakistan's futures is the task for this essay. Based on a literature review of Pakistani magazines, newspapers and journals as well as conversations with Pakistani scholars and interviews with members of the general public, we develop and evaluate five images or scenarios of the future. This essay concludes with suggestions for designing alternative futures for Pakistan.
Before we articulate these images of the future, let us first examine the "futures approach" to the study of social reality. A futures view focuses primarily on temporality. Where are we going? What are the possibilities ahead? What strategies can we use to realize our goals? How can the image of the future help us better understand and change today? Who are the losers and winners in any particular articulation of time? The futures perspective is initially similar to traditional political analysis in that it begins with an exploration of economic, international and social events and the choices made by actors that make these events possible. However, the futures view also attempts to place events and choices within an historical dimension; that is, the larger and deeper structures that make these discrete events intelligible, such as core-periphery, urban-rural, gender, caste, and macro patterns of social change. Also important in the futures view is the post-structural dimension; the larger meaning system or the epistemological ground plan of the real as embedded in language that constitutes events and structures.
Unfortunately, most efforts to understand the future remain in the predictive mode. It is often asked, what and when will a particular event occur and how can we profit or increase our power from a specific prediction? Economists and strategic analysts claim to excell at this task. Our efforts here--sensitive to the richness of reality and the need to decolonize the study of the future from narrow models of reality--is to explore images or scenarios of the future. Our task is not to predict and thereby make this essay political fodder for technocrats but to use the future to create real possibilities for change. We thus do not intend to give a familiar reading of Pakistan's future, as might be available in a five year plan, rather we enter into a discussion of alternative futures, of the many choices ahead as contoured by the structure of history and the modern boundaries of knowledge that frame our identity.
In the images or scenarios that follow it should be remembered that these images are meant as tools for discussion and dialog; they are intended to clarify the futures ahead not to reify social reality. Our goal is insight not prediction. As an initial caveat, an important failing of this essay is that the textual sources and conversations were entirely in english--one might get different images with local Pakistani languages.

1. Disciplined Capitalistic Society

The first image of Pakistan's future has many anchors, the most version recent uses S. Korea as a compelling image of the future. Both countries were underdeveloped thirty years ago but now S. Korea has joined the ranks of the developed, it is become an integral part of the "Pacific Shift." Through state managed industrialization with strong private spin-offs (and the economic activity caused by the Vietnam war) Korea has dramatically raised its standard of living. Along with a strong confucian ethic (respect for hierarchy, family, hard work, and an emphasis on education) Korea was a strong national ethic. However, given Pakistan's social structure perhaps North Korea is a better example of Pakistan's possible future as both have strong militaries. However, while North Korea has a strong totalitarian ideology, Pakistan does not. Islam is in many ways a legal/social doctrine and in that sense that it defies any particular authoritative interpretation rather it is up for grabs by a variety of ideologies. While a theocratic military state is possible so far this mixture has not occurred nor has a one-man state managed to succeed. The best way of stating this model of the future is the "disciplined capitalistic society." The military rules directly or indirectly under the guise of "law and order." Not only is civil society disciplined but so is labor. Labor exists to aid capital in its national and transnational accumulation. The Islam that is used is one that aids in societal discipline at the individual and social level. The head of the nation is then the strict father who knows what is best for the children. The mother is in this image is apolitical, remaining at home to take care of the nation's children so they can work for the larger good of capitalist development.
However there is an important contradiction here. Among the reasons of the rise of East Asia was women labor. Females are thus essential for for export oriented strategies that lead to capital accumulation; at the same time the Islamic dimension of this model demands their continued "home-ization." They are to provide care to labor. This is the semi-proletarian existence which in the long run cheapens the cost of labor for capital since the informal sector helps support the formal "monied" capitalistic sector. Females are integral to this semi-proleterian structure.
The other obvious contradiction is the role of the military. Besides the role of women, confucianism, the historical particular juncture in the worldeconomy, East Asia developed because of low military expenditures and high social expenditures. Is Pakistan ready to put health and education before military expansion, that is, to redefine security? We have yet to see. In the meantime, the hope is that through discipline and privatization Pakistan can join the ranks of the rich.

2. Islamic Socialism

This image is partially influenced by interpretations of Islam that give weight to the syncretic personal dimension of Islam; that is, an Islam that does not the become the facilitator of the mullah's rise--not rote discipline but revelation. The rendering of Islam is populist as for example in the view that the land is perceived as belonging to the tillers not the landlords. This image is also partially influenced by the third world movement which has attempted to follow an alternative development path not based on multinational West run capitalism or on soviet party/military run communism. This view was made famous by Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan. But let us be clear: this view is still industrial and growth oriented like the previous model, however, it has a strong emphasis on "roti, capra, makan," on basic needs and distributive justice. Nehru attempted a similar model but without the Islamic overtones as have numerous other third world leaders. In this model, the state softens the impact of local and transational capital on individuals. At the macro level, import substitution and nationalization become key strategies. However, the larger problem of the world economic system as essentially capitalistic and politics nation-state oriented with Pakistan near the bottom of the global division of labor remains.
The meaning of this image, however, does not come only from the economic as central is the religious. It is Islam that unites, it is Islam that gives direction, it is Islam that integrates individual, family and nation. And although Islam is pervasive, it remains open and committed to distributive justice and individual spiritual growth--a soft Islam, if you will. National allies in this image come from other third world countries with collective self-reliance the long run goal--south/south cooperation on economic, cultural and political levels.
Among other writers, Syed Abidi's writes that these two images take turns dominating Pakistan's politics. Exaggeration of one leads to individual and social frustration and then the rise of the other and visa versa. However, revisionist historians, such as Ayesha Jalal, argue that both are unsuccessful because of the nature of the Pakistani state, molded along authoriatarian lines due to the circumstances of partition.
A third image, based on individual and national identity attempts to transcend the earlier two, using the past as its gateway into the future.

3. The Return of the Ideal and the Search for Identity

The original image of Pakistan was that of a safe heaven and haven for muslims: safe from both the hindus of the east and later on from the jews of the west (in Israeli and American forms). It was derived--at least in its popular myth--as the territory wherein muslims would not be oppressed by the hindus of India. While Jinnah's intent may have been political power (a share in the action when India was to be divided) for the Muslim League and later the creation of a secular state, it quickly became a state for muslims of muslims. Pakistan's self image was to a large degree defined by India. India has been the enemy that gives unity. Even after three devastating wars, military strategists still believe that Pakistan can defeat India. In this view, India has many gods, is bent on destroying Pakistan (the empirical evidence of the Bangladesh war), has nuclear weapons and is allied with godless Russia. But would Pakistan retain any sense of its identity without India since Pakistan knows itself through the other of India? Indeed, is Pakistan but not-India. India has survived thousands of years with and without muslim domination, but Pakistan is still struggling to complete a half-century, to imagine itself as a nation, to find a coherent self.
This image exists in many ways outside our earlier dimensions in that internal identity is more important than external reality. The image is that we reside in the land of the Pure, the place where there is no threat from the outside, wherein the purity of Islam can flourish. Other variables such as the type of political-economy, culture and geo-politics are less important. The moral dimension of Islam is central.
Questions that arise from this view is: has Pakistan achieved this level of purity? Some muslim scholars argue that each Islamic nation attempts to recover the polity of the initial Islamic state, the ideal of the original promise of the time of the Prophet--the revolution had occurred, prophecy had been delivered, the rightly guided caliphs ruled, and there was social justice and economic growth in Arabia. This ideal is then the image of the future for Pakistan; this is the time of partition when there was promise in the air, a great deal had been achieved through sacrifice, the British and the hindus had been thrown back, and the Quaid lived. The image of the future then is a return to a time of hope and dreams; of victory over struggles and of purity, before the politicians in the form of the military and the landlords coopted the future. In this sense this image of the future is a search for an ideal past, a mythic past.
But while this image may be glorious, revisionist historians point out that the birth of Pakistan was already steeped in power politics, in feudal domination: there was never any purity to speak of, to begin with. If this is true then perhaps what is needed is a reimagination of Pakistan. A search for a new vision, a new purpose that makes sense of the last forty years of frustration and creates real visions of the future not dreams based on a past that is but a lie. This reimagination task could occur through a democratic process of collective future envisioning or it could come from the words or images of great artists or others marginal to the present established power structure. But while we await this reimagination of the future, in the meantime the present disintegrates.

4. The End of Sovereignty

This images is the most pervasive and has many variants and levels. The first is conquest by India leading to a greater India. This is possible through military conquest or through economic imperialism if the doors of trade are left wide open.
The second is more sophisticated and deals not with military or economic imperialism but with cultural domination. The main villain is the West, especially the United States. Irrespective of US AID and other ties to Pakistan, religion and their distant locations in the world economy make Pakistan and the USA naturally antagonistic. Recent desires of the US to inspect Pakistan's nuclear development exacerbate this tension. But cultural domination comes in many forms: technology transfer from the green revolution to the microcomputer revolution--technology is not neutral but has many cultural codes and messages embedded in its hardware (the actual physical technology) and software (the rules that make it sensible). For example, certain technologies might promote individualism and the expense of family. Others might promote mobility. Education transfer also leads to cultural penetration, the widespread emigration to the USA for education and then for work is the obvious example. Electronic technology even in the ostensibly neutral form of CNN can but spread foreign views of what is significant and what is unimportant; that Pakistan is rarely covered is not inconsequential to cultural self-images. Travel to the West for tourism, conferences, and medical reasons is another example. While certainly there is a bit of cultural transfer mostly it is but one-way communication. Sovereignty then is clearly violated; the idea that a nation can exist given this level of cultural penetration is highly problematic. For instance, just as there is a world division of labor there is a world division of culture and news with some supplying modern culture others providing exotic or traditional culture. We provide the data for their theories of the traditional. The responses to this form of penetration are obvious: fundamentalism in its strongest forms--a return to the historic text, a denial of physical and mental mobility, and a critique of all things foreign even those which increase the freedom and life chances of individual and family. This is the famous call by the ruling elite for a local form of "democracy" in which basic "universal" freedoms are denied so as to save traditional local culture. Liberals, thus, argue that the defense of cultural sovereignty of the nation is but the denial of the sovereignty of the individual and the reaffirmation of the power of the State. In the name of tradition, all sorts of injustices can be committed and rationalized. Other responses to Western penetration could be further Islamic penetration, for example, by Iran. This could lead to a Pakistan-Iran partnership with an increased Shia influence in Pakistan. It would increase the power of ulema in that they would have the power to define and narrate legitimate cultural and political activities. Conversely the end of sovereignty could become a positive image in that Pakistan could be forced to become an international blend of many cultures and technologies: a place where the future resides, a place where sovereignty finds itself renewed at a higher plantery or spiritual or cultural levels not at a myopic national or local level. This is then a reaffirmation of the idea of the ummah but extended to the entire world in the form of a global community. Pakistan could then become a compelling image for other places to emulate. A receiver and sender of social technology and a creator of postmodern culture. But this direction would take a great deal of daring and courage as there are no models to follow only vague possibilities to explore.
As problematic as cultural sovereignty is the loss of the sovereignty of the self. The self was previously constructed around familiar lines: heaven was above, hell below, and God all around. One knew what one was to do with one's life: class and caste were clear. But with the world continuously being recreated by the science and technology revolution and with the problem of West continuously staring at the Pakistani "self," there no longer exists any clear cut self. Am I Sindhi first? A woman first? A Pakistani first? A wife first? A muslim first? A feudal first? Where do my loyalties lie? Can I integrate these often contradictory fragments of identity? And where do these categories stand in the larger scheme of things? Moreover, the problem of the self can but become increasingly problematic with the feminist movement, increased exposure to the outside world through travel and the development of an overseas Pakistani community. Instead of one mutually agreed upon authoritative construction of self we may see many Pakistani selves all vying for individual and national dominance.
The next layer of sovereignty that is made problematic is internal territorial sovereignty, that is, the provinces increasingly wanting more autonomy and in some cases secession. The calls for an independent Sindh is the latest case in point. The image of this future is of all the provinces going their separate ways with Pakistan finally only being Punjab. The north-west might join with Afghanistan or the Phaktoons might form their own country. In addition, Baluchistan might join Iran, become its own nation, or join a loose confederation with Sindh. And in this image, Azad Kashmir would either join Punjab or unite with the rest of Kashmir to form its own nation. While this might lead to conquest by India most likely the same forces that would lead to end of national integration in Pakistan would also lead to the disintegration of India, from one India to many Indias. Also possible after a period of disintegration is reintegration into a united states of south asia with Punjab as the most likely center of this loose regional federation.

5. No Change: the Continuation of the Grand Disillusionment

The last and we would argue most pervasive image of the future is that of the present continued or "no change." This is a general malaise, a grand disillusionment with the ideal of Pakistan, with the promises of the rulers, with the intentions of politicians. In this view, the power structure--so obviously unjust--appears unchangeable to individuals and groups.
Given this malaise, there are then a range of strategies available. The first is individual spiritual development, an escape from the social and material worlds. The second is to flee the country to brighter horizons outside: "Dubai Chalo" or the fabled green card. The poor and middle class go to the Middle East and the rich and the upper middle class leave for the United States. Within the country the strategy is to find a job and then use one's personal influence to help others find work thus allowing the family as a whole to move up the economic ladder. Of course this is more difficult in times of contraction. During economic expansion, movement is easier. Another tactic is politicization in the form of joining political parties for the purpose of social transformation. However, this strategy is often quickly abandoned once the enormous weight of the historical structures at hand are made obvious (the military, the landlords, and the interpretive power of the ulema, mentioned earlier). What remains is politics as patronage.
This regression from politics as social transformation to politics as patronage has a devastating influence on the national psyche. Individuals are forced into corruption and dishonesty (within their definitions of these two terms) and must live with their own moral failures in a land where morality is central to personal and social valuation. Violence--individual, institutional and state--becomes routine and acceptable. Cities disaggregate; the rich secure themselves and the rest either form separate communities or create their own armies. What emerges is cynicism and pessimism, a breakdown in the immune system of the political and social body--a world ending with a whimper not a bang.
For those in the position of leadership or responsibility the contradictions are even stronger and inasmuch as the local, national and international structures are too difficult to transform others are blamed: the foreign elements, the bad local elements, or the undisciplined youth, to name a few enemies. The oppression of the present bares down on leader and follower alike; both lose their humanity, both lose hope in any collective image of the future. Worse, there is no savior ahead: all models have failed; leaders have failed; religion has failed; capitalism has failed; socialism has failed; political parties have failed.

Conclusion: Designing the Future
The need for reimagination of purpose, of identity, of vision from this dismal final vision is glaring. Part of revisioning is creating alternative structures. Among the points of departure for these new structures should be the centrality of difference. Pakistan has placed its strength on unity; a unity that has proved elusive. Perhaps we need to create institutions and models of change that use difference to create strength, that celebrate our uniqueness among each other and in the world. From an embracing of difference, a unity of self, family and a larger group identity then might be possible. As important as difference is decentralization, the creation of local practices to solve local problems, that is, endogenous development. Finally, we should not forget democracy, not in the trivial sense of voting--which has historically but strengthened statist politics--but in the more important sense of individual empowerment and community participation in the creation of preferred futures as contextualized by the social designs of others. In any case, designing the future at local and community and broader levels (through local and nternational social movements, for example) might be a more promising task than waiting for a politician or some other central authority to solve the problems ahead. Imagination does not mean, however, a forgetting of the material world and the real interests--structural, institutional and individual--that impede attempts to transform the present. The future must then be a sight that one moves toward as well as a site wherein the material and the creative meet. The future--like politics, economics and culture--must be decolonized and reappropriated by each one of us. Today. While the above represents an initial exploration of Pakistan's images of the future, dimensions within these images have yet to be explored: the role of the environment, structural and direct violence, the role of children, images of health, the possibilities of growth and distribution, and the relative powers of various actors, such as nation-states, political parties and social movements. To conclude, one might ask: what is my image of the future for myself? for my family? for my community? for my nation? for the planet? And what am I doing to realize my personal and social image of the future?

http://www.metafuture.org/Articles/IMAGES_OF_PAKISTANS_FUTURE.htm

*(Dr. Sohail Inayatullah is a member of the executive council of the World Futures Studies Federation and is currently editing a book on the Futures of South Asia. In the preparation of this essay, Dr. Inayatullah, the author's father, provided a wealth of insights and made helpful editorial comments)

Star Wars or earth wars?

2005-06-11T23:25:00.000-07:00

Daily Times - Site Edition
Sunday, June 12, 2005
VIEW: Star Wars or earth wars? —Ahmad Faruqui
Chile lost annually one to 1.5 percentage points in its economic growth rate between 1974 to 1988, when the military government of August Pinochet held sway, after having overthrown the government of Salvadore AllendeRevenge of the Sith, the sixth movie in the Star Wars saga, is drawing record crowds and grossing millions by the week. George Lucas, heady with the success of American Graffiti in 1973, conceived the series two years later. It was to be the story of Anakin Skywalker’s rise, fall and ultimate redemption. Since the story was too large for one film, he divided it into two trilogies and decided (for reasons best known to him) to make the second trilogy before the first one. He offered the science fiction concept to Universal Studios, who had produced American Graffiti. In a decision they would regret badly in the years to come, Universal passed on it because they dismissed the story as “unfathomable and silly”. In fact, every single studio in Hollywood passed on it except for 20th Century Fox. The first film in the series was released in 1977. By the end of its first theatrical run, it had become the most successful in the history of cinema and turned Lucas into a multi-millionaire. In the decades to come, the Star Wars brand would acquire a cult following equally among the young and the old. Some would be drawn to it because of the lure of space travel. Others would love the stunning special effects that became its hallmark. And many would love its portrayal of war between good and evil. Located in a “galaxy far, far away” war seemed glorious. However, if you strip the exotic location and the stunning special effects, the film is a gripping portrayal of the arrogance, anger and hostility that drive people to make war on planet Earth. By not calling it “Earth Wars”, Lucas ensured that millions of people seeking to escape the real wars going on around them would become moviegoers. Addressing the Asian defence ministers in Singapore earlier this month, an indignant US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld asked why China — which faced no immediate threat — was increasing its defence spending in consecutive years by double-digit percentages. Such high spending rates, he said, could destabilise the Asian military balance. One may, of course, ask the same question of Rumsfeld. The only known enemies of the US are non-state actors that hardly justify the type and level of military spending that it is engaged in.While accounting for only five percent of the world’s population, the US accounts for half of global defence spending, according to figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, global military spending topped a trillion dollars last year. This amounts to 2.6 percent of the world’s gross domestic product and represents an expenditure of $162 for every man, woman and child on the planet.In addition to spending $500 billion annually on its military, the US has allocated $238 billion since 2003 to prosecute the global war on terror. As Jeffrey Sachs of the Earth Institute argues in his new book, The End Of Poverty, the US has unfortunately neglected the deeper causes of global instability that lead to terror. Its spending on extremely poor people who live on a daily income of less than a dollar a day is about three percent of its defence budget. These people are chronically hungry, ill and uneducated. They lack basic housing and clothing. Today, there are 1.1 billion such people, all in danger of being killed by poverty. Yet a callous world continues to increase military spending. Nowhere is this more evident than in South Asia, where defence spending grew by 14 percent last year, compared to a global average growth rate of five percent. While always arguing that it is not engaged in an arms race with India, Pakistan has just raised its defence spending by 16 percent to $3.8 billion. The saving grace is that in the same budget, the government has announced it will raise infrastructure development spending by almost 35 percent to $4.6 billion. Higher economic growth rates in the six to eight percent range have made possible the increased spending on both defence and development. However, this should not be taken to mean that there is no trade-off between spending on development and defence. If there is any ironclad law in economics, it is that there is no free lunch.Peace economist Kanta Marwah and Nobel laureate Lawrence Klein have published an analysis of the impact of defence spending on economic growth, drawing upon data from five Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Peru. During the 1970s and 1980s, these countries spent on average 3.3 percent of their GDP on defence, which translated into an annual military expenditure of $7.4 billion (measured in 1990 dollars). Marwah and Klein quantify the “hidden cost” of defence spending during this period, by assessing how much it lowered the rate of economic growth.Applying econometric methods to annual data over the 1970-91 timeframe, they find that military spending had a negative impact on economic growth in all five countries. The worst affected country was Paraguay and the least affected was Bolivia. To determine the impact of the defence burden, they simulated what would have happened had the burden been reduced to one percent of GDP, emulating the spending cap set by the Central American nation of Costa Rica. Marwah and Klein found that high military spending caused Argentina to lose nearly two percentage points in its annual economic growth rate during the 1976-81 period. It was during this time that the generals in Argentina waged a “dirty war” after having overthrown the civilian government of Isabel Peron. Similarly, Chile lost annually one to 1.5 percentage points in its economic growth rate between 1974 to 1988, when the military government of August Pinochet held sway, after having overthrown the government of Salvadore Allende. For the five countries collectively, excessive military spending took off 1.5 percentage points of the annual rate of economic growth. The findings of this exercise in revisionist history are very revealing and worth pondering over by governments in all developing countries seeking a brighter future for their citizens. In particular, they should be of interest to the leaders of South Asia — home to a third of the world’s poor. Pakistan and India need to take the lead in reducing the defence burden on their populations, especially now that their long-standing tensions seem to be dissipating. Capping (and eventually reducing) military spending would be the ultimate confidence building measure on the road to peace.

Dr Ahmad Faruqui is an economist and author of Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan. He can be reached at faruqui@pacbell.net

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_12-6-2005_pg3_2

Is military rule reversible in Pakistan?

2005-06-11T22:45:00.000-07:00

General Pervez Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan who seized power in October 1999, has declared that the peace process with India is irreversible. This welcome news was issued in a joint declaration between Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars and several minor wars since the two countries gained independence from Great Britain in 1947.

However, there has been no declaration in Islamabad that military rule in Pakistan is reversible. Musharraf is Pakistan's fourth military ruler. Must one sadly conclude that the trend in Pakistan toward military rule is also irreversible?

Your host

2005-06-11T13:17:00.000-07:00